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This PhD thesis offers a critical overview of the instruments used for the attainment of 
objectives in the realm of the EU external human rights policy through bringing to the surface 
the implicit theoretical premises on which evaluation of the policy is performed. The analysis 
is based on the recent review of the whole policy area finalized with the adoption of the  
Strategic Framework and Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy (25 June 2012).  
In the course of this study three hypothesis are explored and given substance on the basis of 
selected examples from the toolbox: The existence of the assumption as to the required 
design of the EU external human rights policy is investigated on the basis of the critiques that 
can be traced in the literature of the subject. The thus identified underlying rule of law 
paradigm is subsequently used to scrutinize the creation, application, and judicial overview of 
the instruments used in the EU external human rights policy field. The exercise permits to 
uncover the features of toolbox's elements that are not given due consideration, should 
solely rule of law lens be used for the policy evaluation. Finally, the alternative means of 
analyzing the policy is offered creating the expanded list of benchmarks which build on new 
modes of governance theory and amount to an alternative framework through which the EU 
external human rights policy could be evaluated.   
In general terms, there are two conclusions to be drawn from the exercise performed by this 
study. Sensu largo, it demonstrates that on borderlines of legal systems, governance 
practices are reality. Therefore, their characteristic features should (and in recent practice 
are) be appreciated parallely to those of rule of law - especially at the stage of norm 
application. Sensu stricte, for the EU external human rights policy, the application of the 
governance paradigm allows for fuller appraisal of a policy finally paying dues to its 
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If we were to ask ten randomly selected individuals whether the EU sufficiently promotes 
and enforces human rights abroad, the responses would be by and large negative, at best 
given in the form of a shrug of the shoulders. If we were to ask the same question to a well-
informed academic, NGO representative, or a politician, the answers received would be 
possibly more nuanced but conveying a similar, rather critical view. Curiously, no matter 
who is the author of the critique, the impression of the EU actions' inadequacy prevails. The 
EU thinks too long, does not speak out in time, nor does it act sufficiently. Its clear responses 
to human rights abuses come infrequently, neither at times of war, nor at times of peace.
1
 
Such a view on the EU external (and internal) human rights policy has been a standing one at 
least for the past 15 years and hence the beginning of discussions on the shape of the future 
Union that materialised with the  Treaty of Lisbon entering into force in 2009. There exists a 
vast amount of literature analysing all possible aspects of the internal and external human 
rights policy of the European Union.
2 
Conclusions are infrequently positive, and whilst 
acknowledging the progress of the Union in this area, the authors above all emphasise the 
insufficient legal framework, incoherent practice, and lack of legitimacy on the part of the EU 
to pursue human rights related goals.  
Yet, even though the incoherence of the EU actions is the fact, it seems unlikely that such a 
complex legal and political framework does not operate and thus is hardly ffective. The 
disbelief that a policy which has developed since the 1970s
3
 is indeed a glass half empty has 
been a driving force behind the considerations presented below.  
The general critical approach of the commentators has, clearly, a firm grounding in facts - it 
is a fact that in specific circumstances the EU does or does not react, as it is a fact that it 
does not use its legal instruments to their fullest capacity. However, such a consideration of 
                                                      
1
 Which has been well illustrated in the context of 2014 conflicts in Israel and Ukraine where the EU stance 
towards human rights abuses was not taken long after the conflicts began. See, the statements of the Foreign 
Ministers made as the result of 330th Foreign Relations Council, Conclusions of 22 July 2014, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/144098.pdf.  
2
 For the sake of simplicity I shall use the term "European Union" or "EU" to refer both to the EU and what used 
to be the European Communities. 
3
 If we assume that the beginning of conscious creation of the EU external human rights policy is the time of 
Uganda crisis and the rejection of Spain’s candidature to join the EU. 
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facts leaves out a fair number of substantive issues. Even if we focus on purely legal aspects 
of the EU actions in the external human rights policy field, there appears a series of 
questions that go well beyond factual considerations: Is the EU supposed to achieve a 
specific result, or is it about its best efforts? Which standards is the EU to abide by - the ones 
rooted in the international legal order, or the European Union ones? Is the EU expected to 
provide always harmonious, if not uniform, answers to the EU external human rights policy 
problems? Is the toolbox adequate to fulfil thus drafted mandate? If not, has the EU taken 
measures to both alleviate inadequacy of existing instruments and limit the risk that such 
inadequacy becomes visible? And finally, what are such expectations based on? 
Attempts to answer such questions echo the need that the EU is bound to surpass the 
mentioned insufficiency and inadequacy: The EU is supposed to devote its best efforts in 
order to attain the best results. It is supposed to abide by the higher - internal - legal 
standards. The policy is to be coherent and comprehensive, and instruments at all times fully 
used. This utopian vision of the manner in which the policy is to function is very much rooted 
in two prevailing discourses of the EU law literature. Firstly, it refers to the constitutionalist 





. Secondly, it is based on the fact that the steady emancipation of the 
EU legal order from the international legal one has proven that the EU is apparently capable 
of surpassing the limits of the classical international setting and, with the use of its 
experimentalist methods, going beyond the conventional frameworks. These are the means 
through which the objectives of the EU are pursued that are of central importance for 
analysis of any policy. In Andrew Williams’ analysis of the EU’s institutional ethos it is where 
the law comes to play a central role:. 
                                                      
4
 E. g.: Jürgen Habermas, ‘A Political Constitution for a Pluralist Society?’ [Blackwell Publishing Inc] 34 Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 331, Jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization’ New 
Left Review <http://newleftreview.org/I/235/jurgen-habermas-the-european-nation-state-and-the-pressures-
of-globalization> , Jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’ 11 New Left Review 
5
 E. g.: J. H. H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices’ [Blackwell Publishers Ltd.] 40 JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 563, Joseph Weiler, The constitution of Europe : "do the new clothes have 
an emperor?" and other essays on European integration (Cambridge University Press 1999), more recently: J. H. 
H. Weiler, ‘The political and legal culture of European integration: An exploratory essay’ 9 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 678. 
6
 I. a.: Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European constitution and European identity: Text and subtext of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe’ 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 295. 
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'Merely through the EU's construction as a polity that attempts to impose order on the basis 
of espoused values or principles, an institutional ethos is created. We may not like its nature 
(assuming we can determine it) but we should not dismiss its presence and influence. 




Thus, as it seems, in part because of this institutional ethos the EU is expected to perform 
better when pursuing its external human rights policy objectives.  
The above presented brief introduction permits us to formulate the first of the major 
questions posed at the outset of this study. The question why there is such a capability- 
expectations gap
8
 between what the EU is doing and what it is supposed to do will be 
addressed indirectly at all stages on the analysis. There are three hypotheses that are tightly 
connected with answering the question as to why the expectations gap emerged. They will 
also permit for better establishment of the steps that will be undertaken in the course of 
investigation for this study, and its ultimate objectives.  
The Hypotheses 
Firstly, we need to determine that for the purposes of this study human rights are treated as 
the objective to be attained by the EU in its external actions. Though some references will be 
made to content of human rights as a notion used in the EU legal framework
9
, this will be 
done in order to sketch a broader context for the analysis.  
If we consider human rights as the ‘object’ of the policy (albeit of particular importance, yet 
a mere object), what matters are two issues. It is clear that the EU has developed quite an 
extensive toolbox that serves the purpose of the attainment of the EU external human rights 
objectives. We are interested, therefore, in (1) how these instruments are used and (2) 
which are the criteria used for such evaluation. The constitutionalist approach to the policy 
mentioned above hints at rule of law concerns that underlie both the practice of the EU and 
the critiques. Thus established framework for analysis of the EU external human rights policy 
does not seem to fully reflect the reality of the EU external human rights policy.  
                                                      
7
 Andrew J. Williams, The ethos of Europe : values, law and justice in the EU (Cambridge University Press 2010), 
at 11.  
8
 Term which was used in reference to the CFSP: Christopher Hill, ‘Capability-Expectations Gap, or 
conceptualising Europe's International Role’ 31 Journal of Common Market Studies. 
9
 See: Chapter 3 below. 
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Yet, despite the prevailing criticism of the EU’s practices, it seems that legal systems relevant 
for the discussion - the international and the EU one - do not permit the full reign of the rule 
of law. In other words, the EU, whilst pursuing its external human rights agenda on the 
international level, has arrived at the limits of its legal capacities. In this context it is true for 
both the more traditional environment of international law and international human rights 
law, as well as the EU’s autonomous legal system. The pursuit of the external human rights 
objectives in line with the standards advocated by critics is simply not feasible within the 
prevailing legal frameworks not only for the EU, but, in fact, for any internationally acting 
entity. 
The two hypotheses per se position the EU external human rights policy in the constitutional 
and legal framework inasmuch as the creation of instruments and, above all, their use is 
concerned. Yet, when one investigates further the said instruments, it seems that in their 
construction, even if they do not rigidly follow the rule of law principles, they accommodate 
other, numerous, notions.  
This contestation has led me to put forward the third, and last, hypothesis. Given the active 
stance taken by the EU in relation to the development of the EU external human rights 
policy, one could venture the statement that the existing constitutionalist framework is 
insufficient. This hypothesis gives birth to a question that lies at the core of this study: which 
is the apt framework for analysis of a policy such as the EU external human rights one?  The 
object of this third hypothesis places this study t in the midst of doctrinal work dealing with 
the general inadequacy of tools used to describe and analyse the existing structures of 
power.  
Objectives of the Investigation 
The above described hypothesis indicate the objectives which are pursued in the course of 
this study, also with the view of clearly defining the value added of this work as compared to 
the existing literature in the field. The general goal of this investigation is add to the 
understanding whether the evaluation of the EU external human rights policy as it has been 
performed so far takes fully into consideration the characteristics of the instruments used in 
the area of EU external human rights policy. In particular, this study strives to attain three 
specific objectives. First, it attempts to uncover the paradigm, or underlying assumptions 
17 
 
that guide the authors in the field and the extent to which their postulates reflect theoretical 
elements of the policy and the manner through which it is realised. Secondly, the test of this 
framework ensues applying the elements of the identified theoretical framework in a 
conscious manner. The approach taken is to examine whether the specific features of the 
prevailing framework have been given due credit. The identification of concrete 
shortcomings and features which are not conventionally mentioned ensues. Finally, the 
attempt is made to broaden the theoretical approach by including additional benchmarks to 
the check-list thus re-constructing the framework and possibly placing it in the midst of 
alternative available theoretical models.  
Hence, the gradual attainment of the above described particular objectives contributes to 
the fulfilment of the general goal of finding a more comprehensive framework of the 
analysis that can be applied not only to the EU external human rights policy, but other 
borderline  (internal/external) policy fields and legal instruments that are employed therein. 
The following sections offers the overview of the whole study posing the questions that 
underpinned the analysis in each of the three parts.   
Step by Step Search for the Framework of EU External Human Rights Policy 
Evaluation 
I. Part I: Introducing the Puzzle – the Perceptions of EU External Human 
Rights Policy, the Paradigm of Their Construction, and the Toolbox 
The above outlined considerations have lead me to undertake the analysis of instruments of 
the EU human rights policy following the three steps that determined the structure of this 
study. The first part is of introductory character.  
The literature review presented in Chapter 1 serves two purposes. It firstly outlines the 
problems that can be observed in relation to the EU external human rights policy – both its 
legal (constitutional basis, the capability of creating instruments, their actual elaboration) 
and application and execution components. Secondly, it sheds light on the underlying 
assumptions of the authors and the manner in which they fall within the currently prevailing 
strands of scholarship.  
As the overview of doctrinal reception of the EU external human rights policy allows for a 
working categorisation of noted shortcomings. The emerging picture of the policy as seen by 
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the scholars is of an incoherent body of legal frameworks, instruments which are enforced 
on interest basis with disregard for the obligations they foresee for the EU. For the simplicity 
of discussions the various threads of criticisms have been identified as: (1) Human Rights as 
the component of the EU legal order; (2) Horizontal Incoherence (where the external-
internal divide of the policy is addressed as well as the relationship between the human 
rights policy and other external relations’ fields); (3) Vertical incoherence (referring to 
discrepancies in creation and application of instruments towards various 3
rd
 countries and 
the Member States). Each of the aspects of incoherence corresponds to a lack of or 
inadequacy of actions and in substance points to an expected standard the EU is to abide by.  
Given the above considerations the subsequent steps of the analysis involved the uncovering 
the conventional framework applied usually to the EU external human rights policy. 
Chapter 2, therefore, places the critiques in the midst of the most obvious theoretical 
framework - that of the rule of law. It identifies the common denominator benchmarks that 
can be found in almost all the theories of rule of law. These have been divided into three 
categories:  
Rule of law principles concerning instruments/norms creation; 
1. Non-arbitrariness, generality, prospectivity 
2. Transparency 
3. Clarity 
4. Judicial Review 
Rule of law principles concerning application of the created norms; 
1. Equality 
2. Judicial Review 
Rule of law principles concerning conflict resolution 
1. Accessibility 
2. Enforceability of decisions 
Having the benchmarks ready, Chapter 3 proceeds with presentation of the environment 
where the ‘testing’ is performed. It offers first the insight into the role human rights are to 
play in the constitutionalist context, and then proceed to the identification of the types of 
instruments that will be analysed from the point of view of the above criteria.  
The three chapters included in Part I prepare the ground for the actual, concrete and 
detailed analysis that is performed subsequently within the second part of the study - the 
section where the fulfilment of Rule of Law criteria is traced in a systematic manner.  
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II. Part II: Instruments of EU External Policy Under the Rule of Law Scrutiny 
The second part subsequently proceeds to analyse the various types of instruments against 
the principles that constitute the paradigm decrypted in Chapter 2. The purpose of the 
analysis is two-fold – firstly, to understand whether the principles of the paradigm when 
applied in systematic manner lead to the same conclusions as those outlined in the first part 
of the analysis. If this is not the case then, secondly, the systematic analysis will permit for 
identifying the instruments which do not follow the paradigm, yet have been developed by 
the EU and applied with a success.  
The analysis of subsequent three chapters forming Part II will therefore follow the three sets 
of instruments devised by the European Union for the pursuit of the EU external human 
rights policy. The ‘instrumentarium’ making up the body of human rights policy in EU’s 
external action seems to be fairly straight forward.  
The analysis is based on the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 
in 2012 which outlines the actions undertaken by the Union on the basis of the 2012 Action 
Plan and points to the instruments that were chosen as implementing measures. 
10
 Amongst 
the actions, in part, in line with Alan Rosas’s
11
 distinction, we should distinguish:  
- Unilateral Measures that are adopted for internal purposes whose addressees are 
Member States and the EU institutions (guidelines and regulations implementing 
international standards); 
- Unilateral Measures that are adopted for external purposes directed at third 
countries and civil society both within the EU and outside of it (financial instruments, 
trade measures, sanctions, diplomatic measures including those taken in order to act 
on the international forums); 
- Bilateral and multilateral measures (chiefly international agreements but also 
regional policies instruments and human rights dialogues). 
The subsequent three chapters proceed with the analysis of the three sets of instruments 
used in the EU external human rights policy applying the rule of law lens to their creation 
and implementation.  
                                                      
10
 See Annex I for the detailed analysis which instruments fall within which category.  
11
 Allan Rosas, ‘Is the EU a Human Rights Organisation?’ 11/2011 CLEER Working Paper, at 11.  
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The activity of the Court of Justice in this regard will be conducted separately pointing to its 
role with reference to instrument creation, application and conflict resolution. Accessibility 
and enforceability of decisions constitute probably the weakest of the three groups of 
criteria, structurally reflecting any traditionally conceived international law instruments.  
III. Part III: Beyond the Rule of Law Paradigm 
The third part builds on the conclusions of the second in determining where the prevailing 
paradigm does not reach (Chapter 7) and searches for alternative manner in which the EU 
external human rights policy could be analysed, understood (Chapter 8) and ultimately 
improved (Chapter 9).  
Chapter 7 uses the policy cycle approach and the metaphor of the sieve in order to identify 
the notions that if analysed from the perspective of the Rule of Law paradigm are not given a 
due consideration. As such it works as an introduction to the subsequent chapters which 
offer an alternative theoretical framework, and finally, the set of benchmarks.  
Chapter 8 of this study engages with trying to answer the question which trivially could be 
formulated as: ‘if not the rule of law, then what?’ The most obvious reference such 
framework would be the studies of governance. If constitutionalism gave birth to the rule of 
law ideal; governance should father the framework close to that of the rule of law. 
Obviously, governance and the sets of principles it advocates is as enigmatic as rule of law. 
This Chapter attempts at understanding what lies beyond the various theories of governance 
and whether they could be combined in a set of criteria subsequently used for policy 
evaluation purposes.  
The initial definition of governance takes us in a straight line to the good governance 
principles’ lists prolifically produced by international organisations. Yet, the closer scrutiny of 
these make it clear that these are little else than new clothes for the rule of law. Based on 
the rule of law, they incorporate Raz’s ‘thick’ conception of the rule of law obscuring the 
possible value added of the procedurally inclined analysis. The search had to move back into 
the legal field – also because ultimately law needs to respond to growing governance 




In the past ten years, lawyers made two meaningful attempts to conceive of governance 
theories in the manner which would use legal categories that go beyond good governance 
descriptive wish-lists.  
Thus the principles underlying processes are the key to understanding of what could be 
expected of the European Union with reference to its external human rights instruments.  
The new modes of governance seems to be offering the most straight forward  – theory born 
on the ground of EU internal social policy with reference to the areas that require a 
‘horizontal structure of authority’. Since every single state is responsible for human rights of 
its citizens, it seems new modes of governance could provide a response to many criticisms 
against the external human rights policy.  
In the final chapter the broadened benchmarks are applied to the EU external human rights 
instruments. The outcome, though not perfect, is satisfactory. And whilst it takes us back to 
some of the basic criticisms the EU is addressed with, it opens also a field for new enquiry.  
Before moving on to the first steps of the attempted analysis it is necessary to emphasize 
that this study constitutes a modest attempt to map out the theoretical labyrinth that 
informs current research on EU external human rights policy. Since the labyrinth is extremely 
complex and multi-dimensional, the analysis proposed provides for more of a skeleton for 
further research. Bridging the existing theories of international governing structures outlined 
the shifts in what is considered important with reference to the legal instruments. The law of 
external relations of the EU offers the best of the playgrounds to test the shifted paradigms 
and altered balances.  
The intersection of legal frameworks and circumventing limits thereof have led to a situation 
in which procedures multiply parallel to law – if we follow the conventional theme of 
reasoning. If we, however, assume that they share the characteristics of law and because of 
functional connection could be considered as such, it provides the scholars and policy 
makers with opportunities to shift weight of their actions; possibly address problems at 
stake in a more direct manner (as in the EIHRD). If governance, therefore, is internal to law, 
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then it can be used to deepen the external human rights policy.
12
 Yet in order to be able to 
do it, the gathering of know-how on the case-by-case basis is necessary.  
Let us now have a closer look at the first of the possible case studies that constitutes the 
object of this analysis: the EU external human rights policy. 
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Part I - Introducing the Puzzle – the Perceptions of the EU External 
Human Rights Policy, the Requested Paradigm of Its Construction, and 
the Toolbox  
Part I constitutes a de facto methodological introduction to this study. It deals with how the 
human rights policy is analysed. In fact, it focuses on two aspects of the 'how' – namely, the 
meta-layer devoted by academic literature to the policy and the underlying assumptions that 
guide such writing - the criteria of the analysis. In other words, we shall start from 
examining the critiques uttered by various authors in the field in order to uncover the 
assumptions that underlie thus made conclusions. This first step will permit us to determine 
what benchmarks this paradigm consists of in order to apply them in a more disciplined 
manner to the relevant elements of the EU external human rights policy. 
The second methodological step will involve the identification and presentation of relevant 
elements of the EU external human rights policy. In the spotlight, we shall position their 
procedural nature as it is the creation and, above all, application of the instruments that is 
more frequently criticised than the content of the policy itself, which, by its nature, is of 
rather generally accepted nature.  
Chapter 1 - Literature Review: Prevalent Vices, Infrequent Virtues of the EU 
External Human Rights Policy 
The opening scene of this study is devoted to presentation of critique of the EU external 
human rights policy area. Such overview should permit to identify elements of the critique, 
thus such an approach will allow us to reconstruct the standard against which the practice of 
the policy is evaluated. Whilst decrypting of that standard will be the focus of the 
subsequent chapter, this one will place emphasis on the critique itself, with the view of 
sketching the most profound background picture of the academic discussion. Whenever 
necessary, the image will be enriched with a relevant historical perspective, as many of the 
postulates were addressed in the course of the subsequent treaty reforms.  
There is no doubt that the inclusion of human rights in the EU sphere of activity has been a 
painstaking, pragmatic and at the same time controversial process. Possibly, every single 
author working in the EU law area has addressed the issue, both in descriptive and 
normative terms. Yet, amongst the multitude of opinions, Andrew Williams remains the 
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chief reference point as far as a comprehensive overview of the EU external human rights 
policy is concerned. Whilst echoing the conclusions of many authors
13
, he summarizes the 
conventional discourse of the EU human rights area in the following terms: 
'When the European Economic Community was established in 1957, human rights did not 
figure in the political or legal landscape constructed by the Treaty of Rome. Their presence 
was at best subliminal. The subsequent claim by the European Court of Justice, the 
Commission, the Council, and now all institutions of the EU that human rights were 
fundamental in the EU's creation is a myth.  
The institutional practice and constitutional framework that has developed over past thirty 
or more years has, nonetheless, placed respect for human rights at the core of the EU's 
shared values. Not only is respect for human rights a prominent and explicit feature of the 
values now identified by the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, but it has also helped to frame an array 
of other implicit constitutional themes. From constructing the identity for the EU, 
legitimising its operations, providing a bulwark against extremism and the abuse of power, 
to acting as a spur to "closer union" between the peoples of Europe, human rights provide 
an iconic concept without respect for which the EU would lack moral and enduring 
substance. This remains true even with adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.'
14
 
Whether one agrees with the claim about the mythical or iconic character of human rights as 
underlying values or not, there is no doubt that human rights had to become a part of the 
European integration project. The result, as pointed out by de Búrca
15
, could have taken a 
different form, had the initial 1950s ambitious plans for the European Community been 
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followed. Instead, the human rights policy of the European Union came about together with 
deepening and widening of the European project. Scholarly attention followed suit.  
Yet, unlike the progressing European integration, the EU human rights policy has received a 
lukewarm feedback. Obviously, as time went by, human rights were attributed more and 
more prominent a place in the EU legal system. Yet, such progress did not suffice to accord 
the EU a title of a human rights actor or organisation neither internally, nor internationally.  
Curiously, as the human rights policy developed, the criticisms directed at the EU have been 
elaborated, yet in their core they would remain concentrated around three areas. Firstly, 
they would refer to the mere presence of human rights in the EU legal order. This would 
raise questions as to the role of human rights in constructing the European Union; the EU’s 
competence, and the interaction with the Member States. Secondly, the commentators 
would point to the horizontal incoherence in the policy creation and enforcement. In 
particular, the gap between the internal and external policy aspects would be emphasised as 
well as the manner in which human rights policy goals interact with other policy objectives 
(in the external relations context those would refer to trade and security concerns). Thirdly, 
the criticism would evolve around the issues of vertical incoherence – namely, how the EU 
would treat various third countries and the stance it would take towards its own Member 
States.  
In the historical perspective, the academic discussion of the subject is fairly straightforward 
and emphasises the conventionality of the approach to the subject. The initially neglected 
human rights aspects of the economic cooperation could not be further ignored, especially 
once the Internal Market had been called into being. The issues faced by the EU institutions 
concerned initially internal matters – social and economic rights, consumer rights and 
further development of the non-discrimination principle necessary for the development and 
attainment of four fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the perception of human rights as 
underlying values, somewhat written into the law and construction of the EU, required 
development of the concept and its clearer and more straightforward presence in the legal 
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framework of the European Union.
16
 And as a result, human rights issues did slowly soak into 
the Community actions.  
Above all, it was the Court of Justice that focused its attention on the internal sphere of the 
Community law in the context of the debate on the supremacy of the EU law.
17
 
Simultaneously, as a result of external events, human rights became present in the external 
sphere as well. The two aspects of the human rights policy have been presented as having 
almost a causal relationship – the external aspect was never to be successful without the 
sufficiently coherent internal approach. The voices confirming this statement abode: 
Member States of the EU, NGO's, third states and the academic community emphasised 
various negative aspects of the human rights policy of the EU, reminding that practicing 
what one preaches is essential.
18
  
On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon finally came to force after years of negotiations, 
insecurity and questions as to the nature, ethical, moral and philosophical foundations, and 
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the future of the creation named the European Union.
 
 The character of this construct, its 
role in the world and its ability to pursue the wide array of objectives had been a subject of 
the public, political and legal debate for more than ten years.
19
 These arrangements 
determined also the scope of the reform. As a result, the new reform treaty consists of an 
array of improvements to the structure of the Union, making its management easier in the 
changed architecture of the 28 Member States. It includes also a response to long voiced 
criticisms against the scope, modes and measures of various policies pursued by the 
European Union. This Treaty – somewhat an achievement of the human rights policy per se – 
is the focus and the background of the analysis pursued in the subsequent chapters. 
Whilst the first set of criticisms concerning the mere fact that the Union had to deal with 
human rights concerns has received a consistent legal response in subsequent Treaties, 
starting off with the Treaty of Maastricht, the Lisbon reform seems to be responding to 
coherence pressure. It strengthened the internal dimension of human rights policies
20
 thus 
legitimising the external dimension. The Treaty, therefore, provides the direct response to 
Philip Alston’s and Joseph J. H. H. Weiler’s et al most comprehensive set of postulates. The 
memorable report An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights Policy: the European 
Union and Human Rights which was adapted from the report of the Comité de Sages 
responsible for 'Leading by Example – A Human Rights Agenda for the European Union for 
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the Year 2000' has summarised everything that could be said about the EU human rights 
policy at the end of the 1990s
21
 and proposed a roadmap for its improvement.  
This brief historical de-tour permits us to view the critiques that will be analysed in depth in 
the following sections somewhat as the settled, conventional view of looking at the EU 
external human rights policy. The manner in which the area is treated has been established 
with the mentioned pioneer report by Alston and Weiler drafted approximately 15 years 
ago. The analysis has been deepened in those years, fitting, however, the set of criticisms 
that have remained intact. And so, even though Alston and Weiler admitted that the 
external human rights policy of the Union presents itself better than the internal one, they 
have pointed to the lack of its apparent fully-fledged policy features and the obvious 
reluctance to undertake the leadership position despite rhetorical claims of universality and 
indivisibility of human rights.
22
 They, therefore, made a connection between 
comprehensiveness of the EU approach and the ultimate effectiveness of the EU external 
human rights policy. Above all, they referred to double standards – those on internal-
external axis - inherent for the policy which by no means resembles the postulated two sides 
of the same coin, and those characteristic for bargaining and diplomatic dealings with 
various states that ultimately are not treated in an equal manner. 
The problem is similarly treated by Williams, who in his emblematic 'Study in Irony'
23
 
identified the reasons for institutions' structural ability to avoid coherent enforcement of the 
mainly rhetorical human rights claims. The discussion of conditionality and its use reveals the 
latter form of double standards – the one which refers to third countries which depending 
on their political and economic power are treated differently. Whoever has taken human 
rights clauses as the focus of their attention, emphasizes the discrepancies in treatment of 




                                                      
21
 Alston and Weiler. 
22
 Ibid, at 7 – 8. 
23
 Williams, EU human rights policies : a study in irony, op. cit. 
24
 Lorand Bartels, Human rights conditionality in the EU's international agreements (Oxford University Press 
2005), Elena Fierro Sedano, The EU's approach to human rights conditionality in practice (M. Nijhoff 2003), 
Mielle Bulterman, Human rights in the Treaty Relations of the European Community : real virtues or virtual 
reality? (Intersentia; Hart 2001). 
29 
 
The conventionality of the approaches thus presented against the fairly dynamic 
development of the EU makes one question the assumptions behind the criticisms and the 
policy. As it can be inferred from the scholarly writings and the legal responses anchored in 
the Treaties, the 'normative power’, exportation of values and standard setting is the 
appropriate way of conducting external relations by the EU (or for that matter foreign policy 
of any state). Bridging the gap between the internal and external policy field corresponds to 
the image of the EU acting externally as if it were a State dealing with internal human rights 
abuses. In this context all states – third countries and the Member States of the EU – are to 
be equal before the law. The implications of the above mentioned statements are pretty 
meaningful both from the perspective of the architecture of the policy and its possible 
venues of development. The following sections will attempt at presenting a more detailed 
analysis of the three groups of criticisms in order to place under the spotlight the 




I. Human Rights as a Component of EU Legal System and EU External Policy 
The first of criticisms of the EU foreign human rights policy can be gathered from the 
repetitive questioning whether the EU should and can deal with human rights concerns.
25
 It 
is construed against the classical tale of 1957 Communities which had no human rights 
objective in their constitutive documents. Many changes have taken place since the 
beginnings of the European project, yet human rights as a component of EU legal system and 




This consideration is comprised of the vast set of questions reflecting the inherent interplay 
between the internal and external aspects of the policy. Firstly, given the lack of explicit 
provisions regulating the human rights competence, could the EU undertake actions in this 
area of human rights? Secondly, what is the role human rights play in the EU legal system? 
And what purpose is to be achieved through their integration? Thirdly, which is the 
relevance of the type of competence attributed to the EU in the area? Finally, and most 
importantly for our purposes, how does this affect the EU external policy? Could the EU be 
perceived as the enforcer of human rights beyond its borders? All of the outlined questions 
refer at their core to two issues – the legal/constitutional basis for the action in the human 
rights policy on the one hand, and the construction of EU’s identity externally.  
The attempts to answer these questions can be traced back even to 1960s when the 
European Court of Justice started referring to human rights in its case law. Yet the most 
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dense discussion started after the adoption of the Single European Act of 1986 and against 
the background of the collapse of the Berlin Wall. From this moment onwards the European 
Community could no longer be a purely market oriented structure – it had to emphasize 
values it stood for, if it was to produce a successful response to the changed geo-political 
situation in Europe. Suddenly, in order to emphasize its uniqueness, but also to protect its 
integrity, it had to procure a quasi-identity based on the Western approach to state – it was 
to be based on values of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights. The 
scepticism as to the Community's capacity of accomplishing this goal is visible in the 
Cassese's, Clapham's and Weiler's study of 1991 in which they turn to the Member States 
calling for them to adopt a Human Rights Action Plan.
 27
 There the authors emphasized the 
potential of human rights to control the supra-national organization which has already been 
gaining power.
28
 The call for the adoption of the European Union (or Community at the time) 
bill of rights and accession to the ECHR were the means through which the realisation of the 
human rights policy of the European Community should take place.
29
 The explicit opinion of 
the European Court of Justice about Union's lack of the general competence in the human 
rights issues and its consequential inability to join the ECHR confirmed the implied deficiency 
of the EU construct.
30
 Von Bogdandy in 2000 looked to whether the EU could become a 
human rights organization in the view of the discussions of the proposed Charter for 
Fundamental Rights and gives the positive answer conditioned upon making an EU human 
rights policy one of the core policies of the Union and de facto emphasizing its importance 
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amongst other policies of the EU.
31
 Rosas, more than ten years provides a negative answer 
emphasising what may be called as holistic character of the European Union.
32
 
1. From No Provisions on Human Rights to Treaty of Lisbon  
The above quoted excerpt from Williams’ Study in Irony is just a sample of the usual account 
about the history of the European human rights policy.
33
 The tale follows the usual pattern: 
from the nothingness of the Founding Treaties emerged a need to address the human rights 
concerns. Internally the need was a by-product of expanding Union; externally the need was 
dictated by the changing geo-political architecture of the world. In internal sphere this need 
was replied to by the Court of Justice
34
; in international dealings other institutions needed to 
act in order to patch the loophole in the legal system of the EU potentially destructible for its 
reputation.  
Indeed, it was the said nothingness that initially was pointed to and defended – the 
Communities as the product of the far-fetched political compromise needed to retain their 
economic character. Human rights were rejected as the field of action and the European 
construct was too young to constitutionally address the issue. The Court of Justice, however, 
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was free to act, hence judgements in cases Nold35 and Stauder36 date back to late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The Council and the Commission similarly had to face the human rights 
emergency at the time of Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.
37
 In both cases the actions lack formal 
legal basis which is not paramount to the actions being illegal. The Court explores the 
traditions common to Member States as potential source for a quasi-legal basis, and the 
institutions place their response in the context of international and human rights law. The 
inability to act legally
38
 in the face of human rights abusive events made it clear that there is 
a need for the more explicit reference to be placed in constitutive documents of the EU.  
The first appearance of human rights in the treaty language followed a series of political 
documents and the 1986 Single European Act preamble. The Treaty of Maastricht referred 
already to 'the respect of fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States' (Article F(2)) which are treated as 
general principles of Community law. Subsequently the references to human rights are made 
in provisions concerning development cooperation ('Community policy in this area shall 
contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule 
of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms'). In this area the 
obligation was placed on the Community to take account of objectives approved in the 
context of the UN and other "competent" international organisations. Similarly, one of the 
objectives of the CFSP (Article J.1) focused on the Union and its Member States acting for 
ensuring highest security levels for themselves but also worldwide whilst developing and 
consolidating 'democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms'. Likewise, the fundamental rights obligations have been present in the 
cooperation in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs (Article K) and therefore whenever the 
external dimension of this conglomerate of policies is concerned. Thus outlined foundations 
for human rights have been maintained through the subsequent treaty versions. The 
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elaboration thereof has not, however, been satisfactory – one could not claim that the EU 
has a full-fledged system of human rights protection, nor could it make use of the existing 
system of the European Convention of Human Rights
39
. As the result, the role of the 
European Court of Justice has increased due to the fact that it needed to guard two sets of 
‘gentlemen’s agreements’. First group was that with the national constitutional courts that 
following the Bundesverfassungsgericht adopted the So-lange doctrine40;  the second one 
was that with the European Court of Human Rights following the Bosphorus  judgement41. 
The evolution of the legal basis for the human rights internal action has taken place 
parallely. One should note the difference in terms
42
 – internally defined "fundamental 
rights" have been given as off the outset the status of "domesticated" and therefore well 
developed concepts. They have been linked to the European Convention for Human Rights 
and derived from the constitutions of the Member States. Their presence is therefore 
justified in the internal sphere of the Community and Union action. "Human rights", on the 
other hand, have remained conceptually outside to the legal system of the Union and 
Community. There is no coincidence in the fact that the references are kept by Treaty-
makers separate. In fact, Rosas observes that this approach reflects the constitutional 
approach the EU has taken towards human rights in its internal dealings: 
‘The emphasis on the notion of fundamental rights when EU law and EU internal 
developments are at stake suggests a constitutional rather than international approach. The 
EU legal order is a constitutional order which now, with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
is endowed with its own Bill of Rights, much in the same way as States have constitutions 
and constitutional rights catalogues.’
43
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It is true that the Treaty of Lisbon provides of constitutional solutions for the human rights 
policy. Firstly, it provides the basis for the accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Article 6(2) TEU)
44
 with the clear intent of limiting the review 
of its application only to the acts of the Union origin.
45
 Secondly, it grants the status of the 
Treaty to the European Charter for Fundamental Rights which, similarly to the Convention, is 
addressed to 'the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (...) and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law'.
46
 Thirdly, and most 
importantly, the Union is equipped with general objectives concerning human rights 
enshrined in Article 3 TEU:  
‘1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. 
(…) 
3. The Union (…)shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social 
justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations 
and protection of the rights of the child. 
(…) 
5. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, 
the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free 
and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the 
rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international 
law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ 
The above outlined developments have possibly marked the end of the ‘dramatic’ inability 
on the part of the EU to act, but still retained the question about the character of the 
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 Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
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competence the EU has in the field of human rights. Does the EU finally have the general 
competence as argued by White?
47
 Or is it still the limited one, that needs to be reconfirmed 




The obligation to promote internally and promote and uphold externally Union values seems 
to be equipping the Union with legal basis to undertake human rights related actions. This is, 
to an extent, confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter is 
addressed to institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and the Member States 
only when they are implementing Union law. They are to ‘respect the rights, observe the 
principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers 
and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties’. At 
the same time the invocation of the principle of subsidiarity and the limitation of Charter’s 
application gives an impression that there are areas where the Union cannot undertake 
human rights actions. Definitely, the decision as to whether there exists a general human 
rights competence of the Union in internal matters is very much connected to the scope of 
the application of the Charter. It will be, therefore, up to the Court of Justice (yet again) to 
provide with an ultimate answer. The first steps have been taken through the judgments in 
McB49, Akerberg Fransson50, Melloni51 and others, yet none of those provide the definite 
answer.  
In the area of external relations, human rights competence seems to be of general character, 
yet it is not accompanied by the equally general system of remedies. Article 275 TFEU 
establishes the competence of the Court of Justice to adjudicate in the area of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy only in case of restrictive measures adopted against legal and 
private persons. The remainder of the actions of the EU are governed by Article 3(5) TEU and 
Article 21 TEU. As it seems, at least inasmuch the Treaty formulation is concerned the EU has 
migrated far from the nothingness of the 1957 Community Treaties, yet has not arrived yet 
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at the full human rights capacity guaranteed by its constitutional documents. It remains to 
be seen whether and when such capacity will be attained.  
2. The Purpose and Function of Human Rights – the Construction of EU 
Identity 
The inclusion of human rights concerns in the constitutive documents of the European Union 
though in itself an act of extreme importance was also prone to criticism. For it is clear that 
this act in addition to providing necessary support to the Court, and other institutions to 
undertake necessary steps, had a symbolic meaning.  
Firstly, there was obviously the positioning of the European Union in the midst of the 
civilised and taking on the vernacular of rights. Quoting after Gráinne de Búrca 'international 
status of human rights had become such that no state and no developed political entity, 
especially not such an ambitious emerging supra-national order could afford to eschew its 
language or its values'.
52
 
Secondly, there was the positioning of the EU vice versa its own peoples. The deepening and 
widening of the European project came hand in hand with elaboration of European identity. 




Thirdly, the EU has painted itself as the model to follow and indeed with the Treaty of Lisbon 
leading by example for the purpose of achieving peace and stability worldwide is a binding 
obligation. In the words of Blockmans, Van Vooren, and Wouters: 
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‘This role for the Union whereby it ‘stabilizes’ the world and ‘points the way ahead’ is not 
merely a moral imperative proclaimed by its political leaders, but has found its way into EU 
primary law as a legally binding obligation.’
 54
  
Taking on the vernacular of human rights and strengthening internal fundamental rights is 
supposed to ultimately legitimise the EU’s actions worldwide and make the EU’s normative 
appeal stronger. 
What is disputed here apart from non-idealistic and instrumental treatment of human rights 
is the extent to which such legitimisation can take place – to what extent it makes EU’s 
actions credible. However, there appear two problems with such legitimisation – the first 
one is well outlined by Andrew Williams and echoes the legitimisation model developed by 
Kinzelbach, Kozma and Suchman
55
. The second of the problems emphasised by the 
academics goes back to the nature of human rights – their universalism and Western origins.  
For the purpose of analysing the legitimising quality of human rights, Williams coined the 
term 'authentication'.
56
 It is a preceding legitimisation test for a polity such as the EU which 
is placed outside of the familiar international organization patterns. He elaborated that the 
process of authentication involves the three-fold discourse: 
'First the Community needed to represent itself as an authentic institutional site of 
governance so as to authorize the making of decisions and laws that were to bind the 
Member States and their citizens and to intrude politically and legally in their lives. Secondly, 
the Community had to justify its claim to represent its constituency beyond its borders. And 




In the international sphere, the process of authentication, according to Williams, involved 
the development of the international human rights discourse under the auspices of the 
United Nations manifested through the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and subsequent human rights instruments. The word 'discourse' emphasizes the 
rhetorical dimension of this process which lead to the establishment of the moral code 
against which any polity functioning in the realm of international relations and law could be 
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judged, without necessarily ensuring its practical application. Hence, there is no surprise that 
the European Community when pupating into the European Union reached out for the ethos 
that came with the language of international human rights in order to 'authenticate' its 
credibility. At the same time, the European Union needed to 'authenticate' its actions from 
the regional, European perspective – here the predominant role that the European 
Convention for Human Rights has played puts itself in the forefront.  
Williams points to the issue of competence and the role of the European Court of Justice in 
this process which consequently lead to the establishment of the 'new legal order' with 
constitutional pretence. It was thus the European Court of Justice that, starting from the 
initial void in the area of human rights has commenced the narrative of the authentication of 
human rights in the internal institutional discourse of the EU – the narrative which, being in 
part retrospective linked the 'positive and inspiring humanitarian aspects of the European 
past and the aims of the Community in its moves towards Union'.
58
 The narrative developed 
by the Court seeks legitimization of the Union policies whenever the actions of the Union 
intersect with the area of human rights in the internal dimension and starts with the 
significant silence. Human rights were not supposed to be a part of the European project, yet 
they proved instrumental to the development of the European 'actorness' and its 
international position, especially with the European Community first, and subsequently the 
Union striving to develop relations with third countries, and especially with its former 
colonies. This very delicate relationships required additional efforts which would 
authenticate the activities of the EU not only in the eyes of its collaboration partners, but 
also for the international community. The developing relations with the ACP states have 
been fundamental in this respect. Therefore external legitimisation process had to move 
forward regardless of treaty and legislation development in this area.
59
 
Williams, therefore, apart from providing the EU’s human rights policy development with a 
conceptual context, explained the discrepancy between the internal and external policy 
fields. This reasoning is parallel to that proposed by Kinzelbach and Kozma
60
. Their 
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terminology followed classification of Suchman
61
  who referred to Williams’s authentication 
as to a normative legitimisation process. Suchman
62
 for the purposes of the theory of 
organisation uses a broad definition of legitimacy: 
'Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions' 
The 'socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions' in which the 
European Union as an organisation functions had been shaped since the World War II under 
the premises of the United Nations Organisation and involved pre-acceptance of the 
internationally recognised standards reflecting humanist traditions of the allies (victors) – 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been therefore the basic reference 
point for any subject of international law. Regionally, as it was mentioned before, this 
commitment has been reinforced through the Council of Europe and its chief instrument – 
the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
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Kozma’s and Kinzelbach’s approach, similarly to that of Williams requires the denoting the 
audience which defines legitimacy. The most immediate audience of the EU are beneficiaries 
of its existence – the citizens and the Member States. From this point of view it is important, 
that the EU in pursuing any of its objectives, acts in line within the limits imposed by the 
Treaty, but also within realms of national legal systems governed above all by their 
constitutions, and therefore in line with principles of the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights (which form the common foundations of any European state). As it has been 
mentioned above, granting high legal status to those principles gave yet another 'whip' to 
the Member States which become better equipped to control the European Union. It is 
important also that those were national courts that forced the ECJ to legitimize its stance by 
analyzing it with the human rights lens. This is what happened in the early case known for 
bringing the change of approach towards the fundamental rights – the case Stauder of 1969. 
The case was instigated by a preliminary reference filed by the administrative court in 
Stuttgart – the question concerned the Community measure and its compatibility with 
general principles of the Community law and with human rights, in particular. Moreover, one 
of the first references to human rights which are protected under the EU law comes about in 
the case Nold in which the ECJ clearly pronounces that the 'Court is bound to draw 
inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the Member States'. The Court cannot, 
thus, not only disregard those common traditions and the substance they bring, but it is 
limited in its search for 'inspiration' as to what is their exact meaning.
63
   
There is a clear message sent to Union’s direct, closest audience. It seems to be saying – on 
the basis of your constitutions, and international obligations of your states, we have 
developed a catalogue of rights which the EU is going to observe. We are also a part of the 
international community to which you belong which is guided by principles enshrined in the 
European Convention for Human Rights and in the Charter of the United Nations. This 
message though reinforced with time is, however, not as clear as it could have been. The 
Member States eye EU’s efforts with a substantial amount of distrust which has been 
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At the same time the EU is sending also addressing the 'wider world' which by and large 
contributes to the general and regional (equivalent to the ECHR) systems of human rights 
protection. In order to reinforce this call, both soft and hard legal instruments used by the 
EU in external relations contain references to norms binding on the EU and those binding the 
partner states.
65
 Hence the loop closes and the EU’s actions can become accepted by the 
international community. 
The second of the concerns expressed in relation to the role that human rights have taken in 
the EU legal system, in particular in external relations, refers to their use in dealings with the 
third countries. Human rights even though proclaimed as universal have Western roots, and 
their presence worldwide is considered as the form of cultural neo-colonialism. Even though 
the colonial history of the EU Member States is a (not-so-remote) past, the European Union 
– and in particular some of its Member States - continues to be a predator.
66
 The criticism of 
the EU as a neo-colonial power is frequently accompanied by the universalistic approach 
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towards human rights as manifested by the United Nations Organization and therefore its 
prominent members. The imperialistic nature of universal human rights policy of the 
European Union is visible exactly in the indifference manifested already at the time of the 
Treaty of Maastricht to the contribution of the European Union to the substantial debate on 
what human rights are. As the result, the internal dimension of human rights policy of the 
European Union remains developed within the framework set in the world by the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights, in Europe by the European Convention of Human Rights and 
the ECtHR in Strasbourg and national constitutional and highest courts of justice of the EU 
Member States. Universalism from this point of view does not pose much of a problem – 
European states, as summarized in the Preamble to the Treaty on European Union, have 
common roots (whether they go as far as the Greek city-states, Roman empire or the 
Christian one is irrelevant for this discussion). In Europe, human rights have become the 
undisputable ethic code after the second World War and the common point of reference. 
Lack of respect for them was the common Western World experience. Universalism of the 
experience lead to the belief in the universalism of values, signing up to which was easier 
when they demarcated us from those who have committed deeds believed commonly to be 
evil. There has not yet occurred a change according to which such conceptualization of 
human rights gained a different dimension.
67
 Universalism has remained the political tool of 
distinguishing friends from enemies. As such, it keeps on being used in the Treaties, political, 
and legal instruments employed by the European Union. The external dimension of the EU 
human rights policies has retained its post-II World War function – you are with us if you 
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subscribe to our values, you are not one of us, if you do not. From this point of view 
universalism poses a problem and the critique of the European Union actions in this respect 
has not been addressed in the Treaty of Lisbon. Obviously, given the ‘authentication’ or 
‘legitimisation’ role they were to play, it is highly doubtful that any constitutional act could 
amend such problem. This does not mean, however, that the universalist approach cannot 
be modified when dealing with particular states. In fact, the manner in which the European 
Union uses the existing world and regional human rights treaties and designs its human 
rights instruments could be seen as the attempt at facing thus posed problem. 
This has brought us to the final consideration of this section – namely to the manner in 
which the European Union creates its global identity. According to Karen Smith
68
 there are 
seven different dimensions which account for the global ‘actorness’ of any international 
entity – these are: economics; international or regional cooperation; promotion of human 
rights, democracy and good governance; prevention of violent conflict; fight against 
international crime and terrorism; and military capability. Indeed, the European Union has 
been active in all of those areas to a bigger or lesser extent depending on its competence 
attributed to it by the Treaty, and especially in the so-called 'original' – economic - area of its 
activity, it has been successful in marking its presence on the international arena.
69
 However, 
areas of human rights, democracy and good governance have definitely not become the EU 
action brand; even as by-products of other EU policies.
70
 The Treaty of Lisbon has, at least on 
the surface provided the tools for bridging the gap between the way the Union paints itself 
and the way it is being perceived by the wider audience. From this point of view the 
construction of ‘normative power Europe’ seems to be more feasible.
71
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3. Constitutionality Considerations and their Impact on External Human 
Rights Policy 
In words of Christian Tomuschat the Union has the unnerving daring to look beyond its 
borders and include the human rights concerns into its foreign policy instruments: 'Instead 
of looking mainly into its own affairs, the European Union has made it a habit to deal with 
the human rights situation in other countries, third party states outside the Union.'72 Indeed, 
as we have seen in the considerations above, the EU would deal with its internal matters 
only to fulfil the Williams’s notion of authentication criterion. 
This general overview allows for a conclusion that in its formal constitutional provisions the 
European Union has seemingly developed its human rights policy responding to most of the 
vivid criticisms uttered against the pursuit of its human rights goals also in external policy. 
Referring back to the earlier analysis of legitimacy of the European Union in this area, one 
could claim that the Treaty of Lisbon places the European Union in the commonly 
understood 'system of norms, values and beliefs' of international community – that of 
human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and regional systems 
of human rights protection amounting to the international human rights protection system.  
Whilst the Treaty of Lisbon has amended the situation providing for a sound legal basis for 
the EU’s action in the area of fundamental rights, it possibly has paved the way to the more 
focused analysis of the EU external human rights policy. We could state that whilst the 
strand of criticisms presented in this section concerned legislating for human rights in the 
EU, the subsequent ones will focus more on how human rights are enforced externally in 
various policies of the EU and its secondary legal sources. 
The double reference both in the Treaty of Lisbon and instruments of human rights external 
policy fulfils double function. As Williams has rightly foreseen the 'bifurcation' of the two 
policies has been maintained for the sake of creation of the European Union image 
regardless of the real intent to follow them.  
                                                      
72





II. Incoherence of the EU External Human Rights Policy 
1. The Concept of Incoherence in the Critique of the EU External Human Rights 
Policy 
Coherence is one of the catch-phrases frequently abused when evaluating a policy design. In 
the language of the primary law of the EU ‘consistency’ in the context of the external policy 
appeared already at the time of the Single European Act.
73
 Its exact meaning has been 
widely disputed by scholars
74
, yet I do not wish to engage in the discussion of the concept 
here. Since the purpose of this section is to address the criticisms of the EU, it is rational to 
assume that the EU is expected to achieve the most complex level of coherence – that 
referred to by Cremona as synergy between norms, actors, and instruments.
75
 The ultimate 
utopian aim is that of a policy where there are neither conflicts nor gaps (and if overlaps 
exist they are necessary for the achievement of a goal) and positive actions on the part of 
institutions lead to the creation of the synergy
76
. Such description is by no means 
attributable to the EU external human rights policy.  
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 The analysis will proceed with Cremona’s distinction between horizontal and vertical 
incoherence albeit slightly altered.
77
 On the horizontal axis – the lack of coherence across 
the policies of the EU, with particular case of the internal – external divide will be observed. 
On the vertical axis incoherence refers to the differentiated practice with relation to human 
rights in relation to both third countries and third countries when contrasted to the Member 
States of the European Union. 
The alleged lack of coherence allows for placing the spotlight of this analysis finally solely on 
EU external human rights policy. The focus shifts thereby also from the constitutional 
provisions to the manner in which human rights are forged into instruments and 
subsequently enforced. The lack of coherence of EU external human rights policy is the 
second most frequently described shortcoming of the EU external human rights policy. 
Before focusing on particular aspects of the horizontal and vertical incoherence, let us start 
the analysis with the generic calls for coherence. Yet again, Alston and Weiler
78
 will be our 
point of departure accompanied by de Búrca’s
79
 reflection on the way the human rights 
policy could have been had the European Political Community come into being. These 
generic statement serve as an illustration of what coherence would mean if it was to 
correspond to the ideal of synergy as described above.  
2. Coherence for EU human rights policy 
Philip Alston and Joseph J. H. H. Weiler in their memorable article An 'Ever Closer Union' in 
Need of a Human Rights Policy: the European Union and Human Rights which was adapted 
from the report of the Comité de Sages responsible for 'Leading by Example – A Human 
Rights Agenda for the European Union for the Year 2000' included a number of objectives of 
the new human rights policy for the European Union’s coherence of EU human rights policy 
from the outset. The proposals are placed in the forefront of their list of recommendations: 
'1. (…) there is a need for a comprehensive and coherent EU human rights policy based on a 
clarification of the constitutional ambiguity which currently bedevils any discussion of 
Community action in this field; 
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2. The development of more consistent linkages between internal and external policies and 
the promotion of greater interaction and complementarity between the two levels; (...) 
7. The elaboration of policy approaches which bring the human rights dimensions of action 
under each of the three Pillars into closer alignment, while respecting the key differences in 
terms of Community competence, financing and decision-making processes; (...)'
80
 
This set of recommendations reflects, in Cremona’s terms, rules of delimitation and 
principles of synergy  – especially as ensuring the lack of gaps and overlaps are concerned – 
the focus is placed on interaction and complementarity and bringing actions ‘into closer 
alignment’. Although intuitively we know that rules of hierarchy – those that are to aid in 
conflict avoidance – are included in this analysis by implication, it is curious to note that they 
are not expressly worded. Possibly, should a conflict arise, the resolution thereof is 
perceived as a task of the Court of Justice. What strikes, is the pragmatic reliance of the 
authors on institutional coherence – the one to be guaranteed through the constitutional 
text, with respect for the differences in terms of competence.  
It may be useful, at this point, to recall the exercise made by the Gráinne de Búrca
81 
who 
traced the evolution of the EU human rights law back to the envisaged European Political 
Community Treaty
82
 and to the Comité d'études pour la Constitution européenne (CECE) 
resolutions. Her analysis provides a vivid contrast to the recommendations of Alston and 
Weiler made at the eve of constitutional reform. De Búrca takes us back to the European 
arena in which there existed no supra-national organization and the human rights policy 
could have been designed from the outset in the most coherent manner.  
Indeed, the EPC Treaty envisaged the coherent framework of the policy with clear underlying 
assumptions and goals to be achieved. Interestingly, the starting point for the human rights 
policy corresponds to the criticisms discussed in this chapter – the focus was placed on the 
internal dimension of the policy. The EPC Treaty would have regulated it in the threefold 
manner. 
Firstly, the European Political Community was to 'contribute towards the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Member States' and the integration of 
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provisions of the ECHR in the text of the Treaty (Article 3 EPC Treaty).
83
 There was, therefore, 
no doubt that human rights were to be the core concern for the Community.  
Secondly, the drafters of the EPC Treaty envisaged the Community human rights regime as 
the part of the external, European human rights regime, to an extent that the jurisdiction 
over human rights cases concerning the Community would be relinquished by the ECJ to the 
ECtHR. No mention was made, obviously of the EU separate catalogue of human rights. This 
design, despite having some similarities to the current scheme, is fundamentally different - 
the ECHR was to be incorporated into the EU legal system, unlike the current, somewhat 
forced, borrowing from external system. De Búrca, similarly, comments:  
'But even if the EU becomes a party to the ECHR and the Court of Human Rights thereby 
gains jurisdiction to rule directly on whether the EU has violated provisions of the ECHR, 
such membership is currently envisaged as an external system of EU accountability to the 
regional human rights system More specifically, it has repeatedly been said that EU 
accession to the ECHR will not affect the autonomy of the European Court of Justice and will 
not formally subordinate the ECJ to the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.'
84
 
Thirdly, even though the 1950s framework was to be focused on the internal dimension – it 
externally envisaged the role of the Community in the accession process and foresaw the 
conditionality to be included in international agreements.  
It seems that the opposite is true for the current Treaty text regardless of the upgraded 
status of the Charter for Fundamental Rights and the accession of the EU to the ECHR. The 
comparison of the Lisbon Treaty provisions (Articles 2 and 3) concerning the external and 
internal dimensions of the policy have lead de Búrca to the following conclusion:  
'(W)hile the protection of human rights is asserted as an overarching objective in all EU 
external relations, in its internal policies the EU treats the proper sphere of human rights 
policy as being limited to those areas of EU power or competence which directly promote 
human rights – ie mainly anti-discrimination and social inclusion policy.'
85
 
De Búrca, therefore, reiterates the claim made by Williams in 2004 in his 'Study in Irony'. 
And even though the initial intention of her analysis was to alter the standard tale on human 
rights, the ultimate result is quite the opposite. Coherence, even if not a complete one, 
could have been easily achieved at the time of creation of the EPC. It is way more difficult to 
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amend existing structures than building from the scratch. The comparison rendered in such 
way is definitely unfavourable and, to a certain extent unjust towards the current framework 
– no matter how incoherent it may be. For, there is no doubt that the now existing Union 
has been developing step by step – moving forward though maybe not at the pace desired, 
neither in the mode proposed.
86
 The inherent experimentation that results from the 
evolutionary road should not be, however, underestimated. 
3. Horizontal Incoherence – Take 1 -  Internal v External Human Rights Policy 
As we have seen in the previous sections, the incoherence between the EU human rights 
activity in the internal and external spheres has been a contentious issue ever since there 
was a talk of any kind of European human rights policy. Hardly equipped with the internal 
competence, the EC noted the need for the presence of human rights in its external relations 
already (or as late as) in 1979 and took to actively include the area in its external 
instruments. In 1989 and 1990
87
 did the first human rights clauses appear in agreements 
with thirds states entered into by the European Union. Ever since the European Union has 
been criticised for its 'apparently greater willingness to promote and enforce human rights – 
through forms of conditionality including the use of negative sanctions – in its external 
policies than in its internal policies'.
88
  
Again Alston and Weiler state with reference to bridging the gap between internal and 
external dimension of EU human rights policy: 
'In the case of the Union, there are several additional reasons why a concern with external 
policy also necessitates a careful consideration of the internal policy dimensions. Firstly, the 
development and implementation of an effective external human rights policy can only be 
undertaken in the context of appropriate internal institutional arrangements. Secondly, in an 
era when universality and indivisibility are the touchstones of human rights, an external 
policy which is not underpinned by a comparably comprehensive and authentic internal 
policy can have no hope of being taken seriously. Thirdly, as the next millennium 
approaches, a credible, human rights policy must assiduously avoid unilateralism and double 
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standards and that can only be done by ensuring reciprocity and consistency. Finally, the 
reality is that a Union which is not prepared to embrace a strong human rights policy for 
itself is highly unlikely to develop a fully-fledged external policy and apply it with energy or 
consistency. As long as human rights remain a suspect preoccupation within, their status 
without will remain tenuous.'
89
 





, Rosas and Brandtner
92
 and, most recently Grainné de Burcà
93
, who 
frequently assumed it as the starting point to their critique of the human rights respect, 
protection and enforcement by the EU. The critique of this aspect of EU external human 
rights policy and the reasoning behind it is presented below as Graph No 1.  
Graph No 1: The Reasoning Behind the Need for Internal-External Human Rights Policy 
Coherence 
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The EU is international actor and as such it is required to take a stance with regard to human 
rights. This obligation is justified in a twofold manner – firstly because of its own branding. In 
the words of Dierckxsens:  
‘In order to establish normative legitimacy in the European Union – on other words in order 
to fill the paradoxical gap between legal and social legitimacy – constitutional engineering 
will not suffice. The European Union should also be given a normative appeal. Europe should 




Secondly, as de Búrca
95
 rightly points out – the importance of human rights is such that no 
international actor can permit itself neglecting thereof. Hence, foreign policy of any 
international actor that is to be seriously taken has to include the reference to human rights. 
Yet, this reference is legitimised only through the coherent stance towards policy object, 
and, therefore must constitute an internal commitment that permits reciprocity. Only once it 
is in place, can the EU be perceived as the human rights enforcement agency. This, in turn 
has further implications, especially for the vertical coherence inasmuch as the EU is obliged 
to treat third countries and its Member States alike.  
In short, for the human rights to be efficient externally, it is essential that they are present 
internally, that they are being pursued with the same zeal and energy and are given the 
same key value as in external policy. The idea is clear – projecting light requires being a 
source of it. In other words, the EU should shine by example in order to be able to 
normatively act in the world. Without this 'shine', following Weiler and Alston, there is not 
much likelihood that the actions undertaken by the Union are to be accepted by third 
parties. In the absence of the internal-external legally entrenched inter-relatedness the 
commitment to human rights in external relations remains void of content and retains 
purely rhetoric quality. 
This reasoning, though logical has taken an immense time to sink into the constitutional 
structure of the European Union. It can be explained through two factors – in part by 
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institutional dynamics, and, on the other hand, by the inherent complexity of the EU system 
of competence.  
Andrew Williams, in particular, blames the maintenance of 'bifurcation' – the cleavage 
between the internal and external manifestation of the human rights policy - on the 
institutions of the EU.
96
 The formulations of the Charter and the limitations of the mandate 
of the Fundamental Rights Agency make this point more vivid. Whilst the Charter does, in 
theory
97
, apply to the institutions, agencies, and offices of the Union, the FRA irrelevance in 
the field is more problematic. Clearly, when dealing with external problems, the EU’s 
institutions like to enjoy a wider margin of discretion. Yet, even there, sooner or later issues 
pertaining to fundamental rights will emerge. The case of FRONTEX’s Consultative Forum on 
Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Rights Officer illustrates well this phenomenon.
98
 
Furthermore, the inherent complexity of the EU system of competence has not been altered. 
As indicated by Williams – human rights appear in the most difficult areas of the functioning 
of the Union. Internally, apart from the principle of equality and non-discrimination essential 
for the internal market, they are considered a part of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ). By its nature, it is a cross-cutting area belonging to the shared competence of 
the Union and its Member States – and similarly to the external area – full of contentious 
concerns. The consequential mix of problematic issues present in this cluster of policies 
makes it more difficult for the Union to pursue the underlying one. Fundamental rights are 
instrumental
99
 but their treatment lacks depth if not a deeper philosophical commitment. In 
external area, human rights fall within the category of external relations associated with 
trade, development and general cooperation policies, Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
and as the spill-over of the actions undertaken under the AFSJ umbrella. These are, 
therefore, three diverse regimes. It remains to be seen whether the distinctiveness of each 
of them will be maintained or enhanced through three various regimes in which the 
internal/external divide is constructed.  
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4. Horizontal Incoherence – Take 2 - Human Rights v Other Policy Concerns in 
the EU External Relations 
The second of horizontal issues discussed with reference to EU external human rights policy 
is that of synergy between the norms, actors and instruments used, or, following the 
formulation of Alston and Weiler terms such ‘(…) elaboration of policy approaches which 
bring the human rights dimensions of action under each of the three Pillars into closer 
alignment, while respecting the key differences in terms of Community competence, 
financing and decision-making processes; (...)'
100
. Neither the generic formulation of current 
Article 3(5) TEU and Union’s obligation to ‘promote and uphold its values’, nor that of Article 
21 TEU where the Union is to consolidate and support democracy, rule of law, and human 
rights provide the information on how the EU should treat human rights objectives as 
opposed to other policy objectives. The lack of rules of hierarchy creates doubts as to the 
actual commitment on the part of the EU to human rights and creates the impression of 
their secondary importance. The impression is made more apparent if one scrutinises the 
practice of human rights in EU external relations as the lack of safeguards for human rights 
goals is more visible. 
The secondary importance of human rights is especially apparent when they clash with 
imminent interests of the EU – especially those of maintaining security in the region and 
ensuring economic development. The literature on nexuses between human rights and 
development, migration, and security particularly well illustrates the lack of required synergy 
in those areas.  
The nexus Human Rights and Development seems to be the most straight forward out of the 
three. This is possibly the case, as the EU human rights conditionality has developed in this 
context. It refers to the two aspects of the policy – that of human rights being 
complementary for development and that of the policy being based and implemented from 
the rights perspective. The latter approach has been developed by the UN. The Human 
Rights Based Approach to Development created the methodology according to which, in line 
with Sen's vision
101
, human rights and development concerns should be developed along the 
same lines, parallely, as they are interconnected and interdependent. Though the idea on 
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the face of it has been logical, the legal (human rights focused) and development 
(practitioners and field officers) community disagreed strongly on the issue. And so did the 
criticism towards the approach trickle down from the UN to the EU level. Philip Alston
102
 
wrote about development and human rights as ships passing each other in the night, and not 
much has changed since his criticism was published in 2005. Yet in criticisms addressed 
against the EU policy in this area, there is a number of problematic issues that overlap 
characteristic for the EU. First of all, the EU is a donor, but it works together with its Member 
States. Development is the area of shared competence which makes it more difficult for the 
EU to change the overall image of the policy. Secondly, development aid, being often 
connected with trade and investment, is a natural policy field for the EU to pursue. It is not 
the case with human rights.  
In case of the Human Rights – Security Nexus we are faced with a different kind of function 
that human rights bear. Here, they act as a break to the overly interventionist policies both 
internally and externally. The Kadi case103 provides an excellent example of a situation in 
which the EU projects its values through the court's judgement and though attempting to 
affect the international sphere, fails to do so, because of the security policy referring more 
to the state security, and its lack of a direct influence on the UN. Another example of human 
rights concerns contradicting security purposes is that of the negotiated agreement with the 
US concerning data protection. The negotiations show that high internal standard of data 
protection on the Union level does not translate well in the international fight against 
terrorism. The criticisms of the nexus, therefore, go two ways – either against the 
insufficient provision of security to the Member States or the insufficient protection of the 
human rights as ensured by the Union. 
Finally, the nexus Human Rights – Migration provides an example of an area in which the 
nascent EU policy fails to accommodate human rights concerns as protection from migration 
whilst migration remains the primary concern of the EU. The attempt to 'export' immigration 
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controls to neighbouring countries
104
, the incoherent interpretations of the right to the 
family life (Article 8 ECHR)
105
, the returns directive case law
106
 provide just a few examples of 
incoherence within the nexus itself, not only the treatment of the people affected.  
5. Vertical Incoherence – Take 1 - Unequal Treatment of Third Countries 
The second scene of the incoherence of the EU policy concerning differentiated treatment of 
states can be pictured amongst the third states. In concrete terms this refers to the 
application or non-application of the existing instruments of the EU human rights external 
policy in case of human rights abuses. The following instruments
107
 are employed by the 
European Union in its human rights external policy realm and, therefore, in the area of 
trade, development, and CFSP: 
1. Negative conditionality (usually through inclusion of essential elements and non-
execution clauses in international agreements); 
2. Positive conditionality (used in a form of hard law instrument in the accession 
process and GSP+ Regulation; as soft law functions under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy)' 
3. Financial Assistance (especially: the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument 
(ENPI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)); 
4. Political Dialogue; 
5. Cooperation with the Council of Europe, the UN and the OECD. 
The criticisms are distributed evenly in this catalogue and stem from various sources. 
Generally, non-governmental organisations lament over the lack of concrete and radical 
measures on the part of the European Union. The Amnesty's International Report 2009 
referred to the lack of attention on the part of the European Community to the 
consequences of the world financial and economic crisis on the state of human rights in the 
                                                      
104
 See, on the example of Ukraine: Lyubov Zhyznomirska, ‘ Externalities of the EU Immigration and Asylum 
Policy: The Case of Ukraine ’ Review of European and Russian Affairs . 
105
 See, the overview of the case law of the CJEU and the ECHR: Nuala Mole, ‘Family reunification in EU law and 
under the ECHR’ Family Reunification Project WP <http://familyreunification.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/Aire-Family-reunification-in-EU-law-and-under-the-ECHR.pdf> . See also other 
publications of the Family Reunification Project: http://familyreunification.eu/index.php/project-publications-
4/ 
106
 See the thread of case law on the implementation of the Return directive in Member States: CJEU, Case 
C‑357/09 PPU Kadzoev [2009] ECR I‑11189, CJEU, Case C-61/11 PPU Hassen El Dridi alias Soufi Karim [2011] 
ECR I-3015, CJEU, Case C-329/11 Achughbabian [2011] ECR I-12695, 
107
 For the extensive discussion of the analyzed instruments – see: Chapter 4. 
58 
 
world and therefore criticised the EU for lack of flexibility and short-sightedness in this 
respect.
108
 Amnesty did not elaborate how far-sightedness and flexibility translate into 
concrete measures. Criticisms of the academic environment
109
 concern mainly the lack of 
coherence in human rights policies of the European Union, recourse to mainly diplomatic 
measures in cases of blatant human rights abuses, application of double standards (cases of 
Palestine Autonomy and Israel
110
, the United States and China) or non-application of 
measures despite their availability (usually of non-execution clauses)
111
 as well as allegations 
targeting the value-related colonial aspirations of former colonial powers.  
However, distinction (and, therefore distinctive critique) needs to be made with reference to 
the 'EU-governed' instruments such as conditionalities and the GSP+ and financial 
regulations and the ones which constitute the part of the international system of human 
right protection and international diplomacy (political dialogue and cooperation under the 
auspices of other international organizations such as the Council of Europe, OECD and the 
UN). The former group of instruments has to be viewed from the perspective of the EU 
interest – they have been devised as the instruments of an international actor which adheres 
to and promotes certain type of values and norms.  
Their formulation is determined by the rules of international law and the legal system of the 
European Union with all its opportunities and limitations. Here the EU is criticised for not 
only imposing the standards, but also the manner of their enforcement and the approach 
towards third countries in their creation.  
The latter group of instruments, on the other hand, belongs to the widely accepted 
catalogue of tools employed by international community. The political dialogue is the most 
common tool of diplomacy, applicable either complementarily with other instruments or 
whenever nothing else can be agreed on. As such, without underestimating its importance, it 
serves as a confirmation that something is being done, and thus as a rhetorical means of 
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subscribing to a certain area of policy (be it human rights or other). The European Union 
engages in a political dialogue with every country with which it maintains relations 
regardless of human rights record of this country – one could say that it is the most 
coherently applied tool for its human rights external policy. Yet, as such, it remains as any 
dialogue – voluntary, unbinding, easily fluctuating and inefficient. The activity of the Union 
on the forum of the UN
112




 (which indirectly affects human 
rights problems) is of different character. Here the EU is acting in line with other members of 
a given organization, though it does not enjoy the status of the member of any of them. As 
the result, these are the Member States that are visible and equipped in decision making 
power on the forums of those organizations. The EU's contribution (especially in the form of 
financial support) is allegedly not visible. Yet again the system of law – this time 
international has disabled EU's policy impact. 
In sum, amongst the human rights policy instruments employed by the European Union, we 
can find those which include the EU in the international community of human rights 
protection system and those which have been to a larger or lesser extent generically 
developed by the EU itself. It is the latter group that focuses the biggest amount of criticism 
despite its innovative nature. Whether the external relations instruments are to be truly 
evaluated negatively shall be assessed in the subsequent parts of this study. For now, I 
would like to give the brief overview at how severe the disease is. 
Firstly, the negative and the positive conditionalities have been employed by the EU 
externally in an inconsistent manner as noted by Elena Fierro
115
 and Lorand Bartels
116
. The 
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incoherence has been emphasised by the European Parliament.
117
 The human rights clauses 
(understood collectively as the essential element and the non-execution clause) in standard 
international agreements have been enforced in few cases, more frequently were they 
evoked in the consultation procedures which preceded the suspension of an agreement. This 
seems logical given that the suspension of the agreement is, in fact an ultimate sanction 
which can be imposed under any agreement's regime.
118
 And as such, as it has been noted in 
the literature on sanctions in international law
119
, it affects to a higher degree the population 
– rarely the third country's government and administration. Nevertheless, the modesty in 
enforcement of the human rights clauses by the EU is hardly a result of concern for third 
country's population or economy. Instead, it is more a consequence of combination of 
factors such as: partner's status on the international stage (and so his de facto power), his 
willingness to collaborate on EU’s terms, the interest of the EU in maintaining the bonds 







most probably the most obvious odd-ones-out partners of the EU, with by no means clean 
human rights record. No form of conditionality can affect drastically and immediately the 
political reality of relationships between the EU and those states. The political and 
economical interest prevails over the international law rules which, in these cases, are 
applicable to equal, if not more powerful actors - true partners. They cannot be equalled 
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with small and less economically meaningful states for whom, as it seems, the human rights 
clauses have been made where there it interest in fulfilling human rights obligations in 
exchange of other types of benefits (be it development aid, trade or investment incentives). 
By extension, to a certain degree, conditionality has been regarded as efficient in the more 
interest based process of accession. What is referred to as 'the carrot and stick approach', 
allows for the assumption that the perspective of the membership gives enough of an 
incentive to states which willingly adopt the principles underlying European democratic 
states – democracy, rule of law, human rights. Thus construed process is focused on the 
institutional adjustments as required by the Union and foresees gradual change of governing 
culture. Despite this flaw, however, the acceding countries have been successful in 
complying with EU's requirements, yet the criticism remains as to the subsequent 
development of human rights culture. 
Given these inconsistencies in the application of human rights instruments, had the EU been 
a Member State, it would have been certainly punished by the Court and the Commission for 
infringing principles of equality and non-discrimination. Yet, it is not – externally it functions 
within the realm of international law which remains relatively silent on the issue of positive 
duties of international organizations. International legal system is neither equipped with an 
efficient prosecutor such as the European Commission, nor it is capable and free to quickly 
respond to abuses or inconsistencies in action on the part of the members of international 
community. As a result, the European Union is free to apply its own instruments in any 
manner it deems appropriate. The incoherence characteristic for the application of the 
toolbox is a consequence of the design of its external policy; that one, in turn, is determined 
by the internal design of the European Union and its general (in)ability to act and speak with 
one voice. This brings us back to the general question as to what kind of Union is there on 
paper in the Treaty formulations and what kind of Union is implemented. Yet again, it 
remains to be seen whether the current construction of the European External Actions 
Service can in any way influence the hypocritical approach towards the third countries 
characteristic for the second of three facades of the incoherence. 
The internal-external dichotomy in the EU human rights policy has been already discussed 
through the lens of the constitutional design of the European Union. Mention must be also 
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made of the prevailing enforcement practice of the European Union, the postulates made 
and their possible reflection in the practice of the institutions. 
'The EU purveys a notion of the rule of law in its external dealings, particularly in 
development, trade and accession policies. It is represented as a paragon of virtue when it 
comes to fulfilling aspects of the rule of law and promotes many projects associated with 
developing the ability of third states to adhere to the rule of law. But the apparent 
incapacity of the EU to exercise any value control over its Member States on rendition 
suggests an ironical distance between the external and internal adherence to this concept. 
Does the export of this idea, then, reflect something of the internal understanding? Or does 
it demonstrate the relative lack of application internally by comparison?'
123
 
To summarize, the discussed differentiated treatment of the third countries and, therefore, 
the inconsistent application of available instruments has been present in the European 
Union foreign policy. As it seems, the instruments have been devised in such a manner as to 
be coherently included whenever a cooperation with third countries takes place, thus adding 
to the legitimacy of the Union. At the same time, however, though framed in legal terms, 
they were always flexible enough so as to leave space for political decisions. This is, 
obviously, characteristic for the realm of the foreign policy, but not consistent with the 
supposedly prevalent and apparently cross-cutting area of human rights policy. 
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6. Vertical Incoherence – Take 2 - Unequal Treatment of Third Countries v 
Member States 
The internal dimension of the discussed differentiated treatment can be, in turn, subject to 
further sub-division. Yet again, we can speak of the internal and external situations in which 
the EU could 'discipline' its Member States and yet refrains from doing so. The former takes 
place when a Member State acts within the realm of its imperium on its own territory. The 
latter, finds a Member State originating entity acting outside of the territory of the European 
Union.  
The first of the identified incoherent actions on the part of the Union can be illustrated by 
fairly well researched and analysed examples from the European legal social and political 
life. If we take Haider's affair in Austria, the case of the Media Law and the constitution in 
Hungary and the clear prosecution of the Polish minority in Lithuania, we end up drawing a 
picture of Europe in which various states experience various treatments. The strong reaction 
of the European Union and the Member States to Haider's party presence and success in 
Austria was the resultant of many factors – the World War II ideological experiences, the 
historical role of Austria, finally, the need to respect the rule of law and principles of 
democracy within the European Union. It was, to a lesser extent, a reaction to the human 
rights actual or potential abuse. The cases of Hungary and Lithuania are different – in the 
former one, it was the European Parliament that took on the role of the voice of the Union, 
speaking out against the potential and feared censorship and, thus, the infringement of the 
freedom of speech. Similarly, with reference to the constitution, those were the Member 
States and the EU parliamentarians
124
 that spotlighted the issue. The MEPs called for 
Hungary to submit the constitution for the review of the European Commission, whilst the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe commissioned the Venice Commission the 
task of to preparing an opinion on the new Hungarian constitution.
125
 
Similarly, it is the European Parliamentarian – Tomasewski who, while responding to his 
direct constituency – that of the Polish minority in Lithuania – has been trying to focus public 
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opinion's attention on the abuse of minority rights by the Lithuanian government which, 




There is a loud critique on the part of the parties involved, calling up the Union for the 
action.
127
 Curiously (or perhaps: unsurprisingly) this action hardly ever comes. Austrian case 
was the first unprecedented event in which the EU-14 at the time have taken the bilateral, 
though coordinated, action which rendered Austria evidently the pariah of the EU. Though 
there were voices that sanctions thus imposed were a result of particular interests rather 
than the EU based common shared values, there is no doubt that the latter had created the 
clear basis for action.
128
 One could speculate that there are reasons why some events in 
domestic politics did lead to a decisive action on the part of the EU institutions, and others 
didn't, yet the critique remains intact. Ideally, there should be no differentiation, especially 
given the discussed commitment to the ECHR.
129
 Yet, any disturbance of a delicate balance 
between the domestic politics of the Member States and the one on the European level 
remains a contagious issue. Nevertheless, again the European norms prove to be 
instrumental for the control of the institution – not of the Member States.  
On the other hand, one could argue that none of the situations could constitute the basis for 
the 'reasoned proposal' as advocated by the reformed Article 7 TEU, which is the basis for 
the 'Member States' disciplining measures.
130
 It remains to be seen how the two described 
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situations will develop and whether the EU will chose to act once given the improved Article 
7 TEU. Should this be the case, the importance of the action subsequent to publication of the 
Venice Commission's report should not be underestimated.  
The second dimension of the discussed double-double standards can be illustrated by 
numerous examples of the abuses performed by the economic actors seated in the EU which 
participate in the global economy and benefit from bilateral and mixed investment treaties. 
The recent, ultimately, ICJ judged case Pulp Mills Case131 provides an example of this type of 
situation where the right to the clean environment had as its opponent the rights of 
investors (in this case coming from Finland) and of the country in which the investment was 
to take place (Uruguay). It is true that the complicated structure of the investment treaties 
regime did not make the simple, disciplining response to this type of abusive behaviours on 
the part of EU based companies; nor towards the Member States
132
. On the other hand, if it 
is the international community reacting, the EU has no choice but to respond as shown by 
the oil leak case in the Mexican bay.
133
 However, this types of cases yet again provide for the 
example of the differentiated treatment of Member States' seated entities acting abroad.  
The criticism of the double standard of treatment between the Member States and third 
countries and, therefore, incoherence in the policy application and development is not wide 
spread – it is uttered mainly by the non-governmental organizations, local politicians, rarely 
wider European forums or institutions, who look up to the European Union for help 
whenever some of values deemed to be underlying Europe are threatened. This can be 
                                                                                                                                                                      
serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the 
Member State in question to submit its observations. 
3. Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may 
decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in 
question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the 
Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the 
rights and obligations of natural and legal persons. The obligations of the Member State in question under this 
Treaty shall in any case continue to be binding on that State. 
4. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to vary or revoke measures taken under 
paragraph 3 in response to changes in the situation which led to their being imposed. 
5. The voting arrangements applying to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council for the 
purposes of this Article are laid down in Article 354 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.' 
131
 ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay),. 2010 ICJ (Apr 20). 
132
 The Treaty of Lisbon has amended the hitherto existing architecture by including the foreign direct 
investment in the realm of exclusive competence of the European Union (Article 207 TFEU – ex Article 133 
TEC). 
133




explained by the difficulty to pin-point the abuse on the one hand, and rather elusive 
standard of what can be expected from various categories of states. Rarely, does it reach 
other international organizations or, generally speaking, the international community – 
however, if it does, the EU finally feels compelled to act.  
III. Conclusions – What Do Those Criticisms Tell Us About The EU External 
Human Rights Policy? 
Criticising EU human rights policy in both of its aspects has become an academic sport or a 
pass-time activity. Human rights policy, next to the discussion of EU integration constitute 
the second most prolific theme to write about. From the perspective of this study it is more 
than perfect, as the multitude of sources provides a wealth of information about the ideal 
this policy is to follow. The table below makes an attempt at organising the extracted 
criticisms and classifying them from the point of view of the subject matter they deal with. 
Generally speaking, each of them provides an outlook on the policy clearly from the systemic 
point of view. Hence, we need to speak of constitutionalist approaches on the part of the 
academics dealing with the area. The ‘constitutionalist’ path of reasoning is also connected 
with the discussion of EU and international human rights law demonstrating the intersection 
between various legal areas. The question of relationship between them needs to be 
determined by the EU legal system as well.  This classification amounts to a proposition as to 
what is the required paradigm the EU external human rights policy is to follow. 
Constitutionalism implies fairly stringent procedural rules; it implies the existence or 
expectation of rule of law as constituting a part of EU rule of law. 
Table 1: Criticising EU (external) human rights policy  
Human rights as a component of 
EU legal order 
- need for a legal/constitutional 
basis; 
- principles v objectives; 
Constitutionalist 
criticisms 
Horizontal Incoherence:  
external v internal aspects of 
the policy 
between various fields of 
external relations policy 
- comprehensiveness and 
uniformity of the policy across 
the policy fields; 
- competence; 






 with reference to third 
countries 
with reference to the EU 
Member States 
- design of instruments; 
- use of instruments 
Realist (power) related 
criticisms/International 
law type of criticisms 
The information about the expected performance of the EU as presented in the table 
reflects the building of the institutional ethos of the European Union that comes hand in 
hand with the development of the legal system. In Williams’s words: ‘(…) through the EU's 
construction as a polity that attempts to impose order on the basis of espoused values or 
principles, an institutional ethos is created. We may not like its nature (assuming we can 
determine it) but we should not dismiss its presence and influence. Second, law occupies a 
hugely significant place within the construction of the institutional ethos.'
134
 Such approach 
echoes Weiler’s observation about the qualities attributed to the brand ‘European Union’.
135
 
The EU bears, according to authors whose opinions are gathered in Chapter 1, the 
characteristics of an entity capable of having a constitution and as such is also required to 
observe the rule of law principles. Yet, in addition to that, the EU is apparently capable of 
surpassing the limits of the classical international dealings and going beyond the 
conventional frameworks as its experimentalist framework has demonstrated. The 
emancipation of the EU legal order from the international legal one has proven this point 
sufficiently. 
Chapter 1 of this study provided us with a starting point in the quest for the deeper 
comprehension of the image and the content of the EU external human rights policy. Guided 
by the academics working in the area, we have been given a direction. The constitutionalist 
base requires that the EU develops and takes on the elements of the ethos. Since in the 
particular context of the present analysis we are primarily interested in how the EU pursues 
its external human rights objectives, the direction to be taken in the subsequent parts of this 
study hint at rule of law elements. This is where the Chapter 2 will start off.  
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Chapter 2 - Extracting Benchmarks and Drafting Methodology – Constitutionalism, 
Rule of Law, and the Policy Cycle for the EU External Human Rights Policy 
道可道非常道, 
名可名非常名 
The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao; 
The name that can be named is not the eternal name.136 
I. Setting the Ground for the Search of the Benchmark - the EU and the 
International Law 
Before making the first attempt to uncover the benchmarks
137
 which underlie the above 
presented criticisms of the EU external human rights policy, I would like to take a detour and 
place the discussion and choice of this particular analytical framework in the context of the 
debate on the nature of the European law’s development that has been taking place over 
the past fifteen years. This discussion will help to position the criticisms presented in 
Chapter 1 within the broader analysis of the characteristics of EU law and will further ground 
a search for a paradigm for the analysis to be applied to EU external human rights policy 
instruments. 
Since we are moving in the context of the inter-section between legal systems, the position 
of the international law within the EU legal system should be our starting point. After all, 
human rights obligations both for the European Union and its Member States stem from 
there. The EU, whilst pursuing its external human rights objectives, moves within the realm 
of international law, yet at the same time, within the European constitutional setting. This 
makes us reflect upon the architecture of this multi-layered legal space, and the position of 
values EU holds as fundamental for its existence. Let us deal with the two issues in turn. 
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The relationship between the EU and international law had focused limited scholarly 
attention before 2008.
138
 It is only after the Kadi judgement that these issues re-emerged in 
the doctrine
139
 leading, importantly to reassessment of, inter alia, the old notions of dualism 
and monism of international law. Yet, the choice of looking at the position of international 
law within the EU legal order from this perspective indicates a deeper analysis – namely of 
assessing whether international law should be positioned within hierarchy of legal sources of 
EU law. Until 2008, the stance taken by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
primary text of the treaty seemed to indicate a monist approach. Article 216(2) TFEU states 
that Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and 
on its Member States. It goes in line with the standing jurisprudence of the Court confirming 
that international treaties are the ‘integral part of the Community law’
140
 ranking between 
primary and secondary law
141
. This holds true also for customary law and international law 
of secondary nature.
142
 Such approach does not provide us with an information about the 
direct effect of provisions of international agreements which are decided on case-by-case 
basis by the Court. Generally, the Court tends to deny direct effect to provisions of those 
agreements which do not confer rights on individuals
143
, and attempts at protecting the 
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discretion of agreements’ enforcement
144
. This seems to be confirmed through Kadi, yet 
even there, the interpretations of Court’s position have been extremely varied.
 145
  
What remains a fact, however, is that it is the Union that shapes the relationship between its 
own legal system and international law. More concretely, it is the Court that sieves the 
international law elements through the EU’s intrinsically complex legal system assessing 
objectives, interests, and needs. In the words of AG Maduro Opinion in Kadi, the relationship 
between EU and international law ‘is governed by the Community legal order itself, and 
international order can permeate the legal order only under the conditions set by the 
constitutional principles of the Community’
146
. Subsequently, the Court set the limits of how 
this filtering effect could go – namely as far as constitutional principles of the legal order – 
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such as human rights or rule of law.
147
 Some authors call this approach a neo-monist one
148
, 
yet I would be more inclined to follow von Bogdandy in deeming the distinction between 
monist and dualist approaches as archaic and irrelevant.
149
 Possibly, concurring with his 
pluralist approach
150
  would explain some of the criticisms of the EU human rights policy.  
It seems, however, that the EU external human rights policy is an interesting example for the 
enforcement of an ideal of international constitutionalism.
151
 Whilst acting in this area, the 
EU reinforces the set of values it ‘shares’ with third countries, thus limiting the possibility of 
creating conflicting situations. This follows the de Búrca’s explanation
152
 of international 
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in opposition to ‘strong’ constitutionalists
155
, advocates a ‘soft’ approach where there exists 
no rigid hierarchy of rules. Instead in this arrangement, a set of commonly negotiated, 
shared principles would underlie a constitutionalist system. She proposes three 
characteristics of such system: the existence of a community of some kind, a focus on 
unversalizability and emphasis on common norms or principles of communication for 
addressing a conflict
156
. The ‘soft’ constitutionalist approach in its emphasis on negotiation 
and ownership of the system of values resembles new governance theories contributed to 
heavily by de Búrca in her earlier work
157
 which can serve as an inspiration for the EU 
external human rights policy.  
In the light of the above, it could be claimed that due to the initial lack of competence in the 
area, the internal development of fundamental rights policy followed necessarily pragmatic 
pluralist logic. At the same time, the external human rights policy followed the international 
constitutionalist logic. The Treaty of Lisbon altered the landscape bringing the two aspects of 
the policy ‘home’. The ideology underlying the two is uniform – both from the point of the 
common standards the EU, its Member States, and third countries – collaborators - are to 
follow, and the purpose they are to serve – collaboration, promotion of economic 
development and wellbeing of the peoples, and ultimately peace. The European Union 
through pursuing its human rights policy together with other external relations objectives 
creates the comprehensive framework by making sure that the direction all actors involved 
follow is the same and eliminating the potential conflicts from the outset. This way of 
framing external relations has been considered since 1989 and is connected with 
international law (and international law scholarship) renouncing the politically indifferent 
vision of international law.
158
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That, in turn implies, the invoking of the constitutional triad that the EU itself so gladly uses 
in its political documents and which has been endorsed since the Treaty of Maastricht by the 
EU treaty makers. Where there is constitutional spirit, there is also human rights, rule of law 
and democracy. This is a liberal vision of the state and international order functioning 
accepted by the Western world, or rather constructed in contrast to totalitarian regimes in 
the post-World War II periods. And even though the liberal practice is lagging behind, the 
idea itself is definitely victorious.
159
  
This desirable and apparently correct approach to external relations is reflected in the 
general analysis of the EU role in global governance: 
‘The EU is morally, politically and legally held to pursue equality amongst wealthy and poorer 
nations, to support their development and ensure ‘fairness’ between them, to pursue the 
sustainable management of global natural resources, and so on. In terms of methodology, 
the EU is to be guided by the principles which inspired its own creation and which it seeks to 
advance in the world: progressive development of multilateralism based on the rule of law 
as the preferred approach to conducting international relations. These provisions are the 
‘external projection’ of an internal reality, namely that European integration itself has been 
progressively constructed through a variety of law-making processes.’
160
 
Hence, it is clear that the inspiration for the design of EU external relations, and external 
human rights lies in the values that the EU deems as fundamental for its own creation. It is, 
therefore, logical to assume that the ‘multilateralism based on the rule of law’ is the desired 
manner for the pursuit of EU external human rights policy. Defining the notion of the rule of 
law for this multilateralism will be, therefore, the next step in  the current analysis. The task 
is difficult, as the rule of law resembles the Buddhist notion of Tao – it is extremely elusive 
and every single author writing on or in reference to the subject has his own vision thereof. 
In general terms, the rule of law encompasses two propositions: ‘(1) that the government 
ought to rule by law (“ruled by laws, not by men”), and (2) that to achieve this objective, 
laws must meet certain formal conditions relating to practicability and certainty.’
161
 
Rule of law benchmarks in this context are considered, therefore, as means to an end. It is 
not my purpose to approach rule of law as yet another value that is to be promoted by the 
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European Union in external relations (although the mere fact that the EU abides by it 
inasmuch as it is expected to do so by its internal rules, could be considered as a part of such 
analysis).
162
 It is irrelevant, for our search whether the EU has given a deeper thought to the 
notion of rule of law.
 163
 Its constitutionalized legal system permits for a general (albeit far-
fetched) assumption that in its internal dealings the EU institutions rule by law; and the laws 
comply with the formal criteria enshrined in the Treaty. This is the guidance the EU is to 
follow in its external relations, and I will assume it as a suggestion as to the model the EU 
external human rights policy is based on.  
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II. The Rule of Law for the EU External Relations? 
The criticisms outlined in Chapter 1 reflect the desirable architecture of the model human 
rights policy defining rights of individuals and obligations of EU as a duty bearer. The 
criticism about the mere pursuit of the objectives of the policy both in internal and external 
realm amounts to the call for legitimacy of the policy which is to be rooted in the primary 
law of the European Union. Various dimensions of incoherence correspond to the demand 
that the policy is to be envisaged as a one harmonious whole. It needs to be equally present 
in the internal and external sphere, as only this way can it be considered transparent and 
legitimate. Furthermore, the rules characteristic for the human rights policy in the external 
realm need to be applied in the same manner to all the affected countries, hence they need 
to be predictable. Finally, these should be non-conflicting with other policies' rules and 
applicable on equal terms to all of them.  
In claiming incoherence, all of the above described criticisms and the characteristics of the 
model external human rights policy share one more underlying feature. The objects of the 
critique are procedural safeguards of the policy. It is to be pursued according to the rules 
that lie at the basis of the European Union policies in abstract terms referred to as the rule 
of law principles. According to the commentators, therefore, the European Union, when 
creating the human rights policy instruments is to give due consideration to the rule of 
law.
164
 In other words, it is to follow possibly an over-simplistic
165
, but useful notion of a 
'good legislator' and a ‘good enforcer’ paradigm not only internally, but even more so 
externally. There, the traditional internal legal system safeguards do not apply – there is no 
legal authority to judge the Union if it does not ‘uphold and promote’ human rights; there is 
no court to protect individuals whose rights are harmed as the result of EU external action.   
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The demand for the European Union to behave as a 'good legislator' and a 'good enforcer' is 
complements the core for this work demand the European Union should have the human 
rights policy since the two complement one another, together with the third element of the 
EU constitutional triad – democracy. That the EU acts in line with the rule of law standard 
seems to be one of the most obvious things, though it should be possibly justified further in 
the three fold manner.  
Firstly, the question about motives appears. Why it is the EU and not other actors that is to 
abide by the high standard of rule of law? Undeniably, it is the European Union and its 
institutions that set the standard in relations with third countries by, though not merely, 
being a stronger economic power, providing thus the tangible incentive to the broadly 
understood cooperation. In addition to the above, it is also the European Union institutions 
that for the sake of its internal legitimacy have insisted on enhancing the focus on human 
rights' presence in its foreign and internal policy instruments.
166
 The task was completed by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union that 'imported' the principles of human rights 
regime into its case law from the legal systems of the EU Member States.  
Secondly, we need to answer the question as to the chief characteristics of a good legislator. 
In the external policy sphere, the context in which the European Union is functioning is that 
of international law. Therefore, what first is required of a good legislator in the international 
law context is adherence to the rules and values underlying the international law. 
Furthermore, the ultimate product of the good legislator's activity needs to abide also by 
internal rules of the legislator. Similarly we would be speaking of a national Parliament which 
needs to act according to its own rules of procedure. Obviously, this comparison is very 
superficial, yet it serves the purpose of demonstrating that, theoretically, the European 
Union is subject to two sets of obligations stemming from the internal and external sphere 
corresponding to two different sets of values underlying the two different legal regimes.  
Thirdly, the regard needs to be paid to the observed importance of human rights protection 
as a necessary condition for the international rule of law.
167
 It is emphasised in the literature 
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that the underlying values manifested by human rights are universally shared, and though 
relatively recent in their development, have been repeatedly acknowledged by international 
legal bodies as of highest importance. The United Nations Security Council made the express 
reference to the rule of law in 1996 in its resolution and has continued to do so ever more 
frequently since.
168
 The similar trend could be observed in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights which since 1975
169
 has been consciously and consistently developing 
the link between the two values. Finally, the realm of international human rights protection 
is an area of international law where the role of the courts is prominent, as is that of 
individual claimants making it a more advanced international legal environment than that of 
inter-state relations characteristic for international law realm. Thus, the EU as a good 
legislator should take the intrinsic inter-locking between the rule of law and human rights 
into consideration.  
In the end, however, the picture of the EU – a good legislator and good enforcer, as painted 
by the critics, is more complex than the sole determination that the EU is subject to external 
and internal obligations (and pressures) when it is pursuing its external human rights policy. 
It seems, that they evaluate the EU external human rights policy predominantly from the 
point of view of the internal standards, or some sort of mixed internal-external standard 
demanding of it to act beyond every other entity existing in the international sphere. The 
standard they expect to be present in the EU external human rights policy seems to be that 
of the principles of the rule of law; seemingly the same that applies to the internal sphere. 
The critiques do not specify which standard applies to the European Union, neither do they 
refer to a possible meta-form particular for an international organisation of unusual type. 
Instead, they provide a check-list of concrete actions to be undertaken for the external 
human rights policy to be regarded positively rather than in an ironic manner. This 
somewhat ad hoc criticism gives the impression that even on the part of the critics, there 
exists no clear vision as to what would be the expected shape of the external human rights 
policy (or its internal counterpart).  
Yet, at the same time it seems that each of the critiques departed from an implied 
assumption that the policy at stake needs to fulfil some sort of a standard. They clearly 
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evaluate it within a uniform constitutional framework guided by the set of pre-determined 
principles. The trouble is that none of the commentators reflected on what those pre-
determined principles are, or could be in the normative perspective. Given the Treaty 
projected design of the European Union the standard could be searched for within the quasi-
constitutional provisions ruling EU policies' frameworks. Yet, the human rights policy of the 
EU neither in its internal, nor in its external aspect, had been extensively provided for by the 
Treaty.
170
 This means that the assumed standard we are looking for must be of more general 
nature, underlying the structure of the European Union. Democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law values have been granted the foundational status within the legal system of the 
Union, and so give the hint as to where to begin the search. This is the standard to which all 
the policies must comply, including the external human rights policy of the Union; this is the 
ultimate system of the control of the institutions. Ultimately, if the European Union as a 
good legislator is to adhere and actively create the rule of law, the concept itself must be 
meaningful; preferably it should consist of the set of the benchmarks which the activity of 
the European Union should be tested against. The possibility to test the policy actions 
against a set of benchmarks is, in fact, one of the most favourite strategies of the European 
Union in dealings with third states. 
Much has been written about the instrumental use of the value and the vulnerability of the 
process.
171
 From the point of view of this study, however, we are more interested in 
unfolding the perspective from which other policies may be evaluated.  
The search will start off with the prevalent theories advocated by various theorists of law, 
and move to the notion inconsistently developed by the Union in order to determine the 
elements which are present in the EU self-reflection and those that are still missing. 
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Subsequently a check-list will be elaborated which will allow for examination of the external 
human rights policy from the internal constitutional perspective and the external 
international law one. The list of the benchmarks thus elaborated will be a guiding tool in the 
subsequent analysis of the EU operation taking place within the constraints (also the 
governance ones) of its internal legal system and that determined by international law.  
In the end, what is needed from the point of view of the European Union and its 
commentators, is to find such a conception of rule of law which can have its practical 
manifestation - which can be simply operational. Following the conclusions of Wennerström, 
it is not important what theoretical type of the conception one adopts. What matters is 
whether it is connected with an ambition to implement it.
172
 This ambition is demonstrated 
through creating such mechanisms that enable the attainment of objectives and respect for 
the values.   
III. Which 'Rule of Law' for the EU? 
The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao; The name that can be named is not the 
eternal name.173 The rule of law concept in the framework of the legal system reminds very 
much of the Chinese philosophical notion of Tao – elusive as it can get, Tao is omnipresent, 
escaping definition for the purpose of maintaining universality. Similarly, there is not one 
universal and commonly agreed definition of rule of law, as if the supreme quality of this 
value was to be lost, should the concept become equivalent with one of possible theories. 
Alternatively, the multitude of understandings strips the concept of the meaning rendering it 
as a mere catchphrase abused by politicians, media, and scholars. Similarly to Tao, whoever 
addresses the concept, will perceive it differently. The comprehensive account of Hamara is 
very telling in this respect: 
‘As Richard Bellamy and Joseph Raz have noted “some accounts of the ‘Rule of Law’ use the 
term as a catch-all slogan for every desirable policy one might wish to see enacted’
174
. The 
term is frequently accused of having no determinate meaning. Waldron has called it an 
“essentially contested concept”
175
 and Olufemi Taiwo has commented that “[it] is very 
                                                      
172
 Erik O. Wennerström, ‘The rule of law and the European Union’ (Thesis (PhD), Iustus, Uppsala universitet 
2007), at 44-45. 
173
道道道  Daodejing, op. cit. 
174
 Richard Bellamy, Political constitutionalism : a republican defence of the constitutionality of democracy 
(Cambridge University Press 2007), at 54. 
175
 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)?’ [Springer] 21 Law and 
Philosophy 137, at 137. 
80 
 
difficult to talk about the “Rule of Law” as there are people defending it”
176
. According to 
some, the “Rule of Law” is a metric for evaluating whether or not there is law in a given 
society.
177
 On other accounts, it is the quality of the law that is evaluated.
178
 Some scholars 
suggest that to claim that the “Rule of Law” exists in a given society says nothing of the value 
of law in that society.
179
 Some think that it is a value, albeit not a moral one,180 whilst others 
regard it amongst the highest of political ideas.
181
 In fact, the only thing that seems to 
consistently garner agreement  within “Rule of Law” discourse is that there is pervasive 
disagreement within “Rule of Law” discourse.’182 
Furthermore, the concept's entanglement with other foundational notions of contemporary 




 and ruling power makes it even more elusive.
185
  
Nevertheless, as it is frequently observed, various conceptions share the common core, 
rendering at the same time the concept sufficiently abstract and flexible and in such a way a 
useful tool. The concept of the 'rule of law' coined in the 19
th
 Century by Albert Venn 
Dicey
186
 belongs to the English tradition of constitutionalism and is parallel to (though 
slightly different) the French l'état de droit and German Rechtsstaat.187 Thus, the concept 
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has become the basic value of the Western European democracies, and as such was 
transferred to the European Union legal system, crowned, subsequently as the common 
value.  
This section does not attempt to provide a new definition of the rule of law, nor does it try 
to provide the unifying theory of all (as it might seem). Instead, it strives to determine a 
common denominator of the theories which could be used to decrypt what underlies 
criticisms described in Chapter 1. In short, in this section we seek to understand which 
qualities of the rule of law are to be visible in the external human rights policy of the EU? 
In some aspects, the undertaken analysis of the Rule of Law in the context of evaluation of 
an/the EU policy refers back to the observation Jeremy Waldron made with reference to the 
American case study, where the “Rule of Law” (capitalised by the author to denote the 
abstract political ideal; not a concrete legal requirement) is an actual benchmark of 
legitimacy. This conclusion echoes and underpins some of the above-quoted scholars 




The search for the content of rule of law will follow three steps. Firstly, the brief outline of 
the most accepted theories of the rule of law will be presented, justified precedence given 
to one of the two prevailing trends. Secondly, the European Union approach to the rule of 
law in various contexts will be outlined and linked to some other emerging governance 
concepts. Finally, the list of benchmarks will be drawn and linked to the criticisms described 
in Chapter 1 bringing, possibly the final justification as to why it is that the Rule of Law 
provides and explicit theoretical framework for this study. 
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1. Categorisation of Rule of Law Theories - Formal or 'Thin' theories v 
Substantive v 'thick' theories of the Rule of Law 
The first step in the analysis of what constitutes the rule of law is the distinction between 
the two major trends – Paul Craig referred to them as to formal and substantive conceptions 
of the rule of law
189
, Tamanaha basing on this classification referred to them as to 'thin' and 
'thick' theories.
190
 Craig explains the distinction in simple terms stating that formal theories 
address the manner in which the laws are promulgated, the clarity of norms, and the 
temporal dimension of a norm, whilst substantive ones go beyond the doctrine in as much as 
they involve the value judgement on whether we are speaking of 'good' or 'bad' laws.
191
  
The prevalent thin theories of the rule of law are those of Dicey, Hayek, Fuller and Raz (for 
short description of each of them – see below), whilst amongst the 'thick' ones the most 
well-known ones are that of Dworkin (inherently connected with his concept of law)
192
 and 
the more contested ones of Sir John Laws
193
 and Tevor Allan
194
. In making this classification 
Craig underlines that the basic difference stems from various conceptions of 'law' that are 
assumed for respective theories, predominantly agreeing on the formal core of the rule of 
law concept.
195
 The need for incorporation of 'right' approaches into the concept of the rule 
of law is connected with frequent criticism according to which adherence to the formal rule 
of law theories would render legal also the totalitarian systems had they fulfilled the basic 
formal requirements of the rule of law. This critique has encouraged the search for the mid-
way in the theorisation of the concept. Amongst others, Joseph Raz's in his later work 
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developed the concept of 'principled adjudication'
196
 which took his formal theory in the 
direction of substantive one, thus pointing to the need of value loaded action on the part of 
the judiciary. 
From the perspective of the analysis of the European Union policy, however, this distinction 
(and the underlying assumption of the basic conception of law) does not contribute to 
focusing the image; it rather blurs it. As Raz stated, the rule of good law renders the 
conception of the rule of law useless – it deprives it of its analytical quality. He insists that 
the rule of law is to be regarded as just one of the qualities on the basis of which a legal 
system may be judged.
197
  
Raz's theory provides also the basic explanation why the rule of law should be perceived 
from the 'thinner' perspective, by insisting that the concept of the rule of law is one of the 
series of virtues and should not be confused with them. Amongst those virtues he lists: 
democracy, justice, equality, human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the 
dignity of men.
198
 Paul Craig unpacks the condensed statement by Raz in the following way:  
'What Raz is getting at here can be explained quite straightforwardly. We may all agree that 
laws should be just, that their content should be morally sound and that substantive rights 
should be protected within a society. The problem is that if the rule of law is taken to 
encompass the necessity for "good laws" in this sense then the concept ceases to have any 
useful independent function for the following reason. There is a wealth of literature devoted 
to the discussion of the meaning of a just society, the nature of the rights which should 
subsist therein, and the appropriate boundaries of governmental action. (...) To bring these 
issues within the rubric of the rule of law would therefore have an effect of robbing this 
concept of any function independent of such political theories. Laws would be condemned or 
upheld as being in conformity with, or contrary to, the rule of law in this substantive sense 




'Going beyond' the formal doctrine of the rule of law, makes us enter into the realm of such 
'essentially contested concepts' (and as observed by Wennerström conceptions thereof
200
) 
as human rights and democracy, which at their core coincide with the rule of law and 
overlap in meaning. As it has already been pointed to, in the context of the European legal 
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system, rule of law, sided with democracy and human rights, has been regarded as the 
underlying value, common for the Member States. In addition to this, since the Treaty of 
Rome, it has been considered as the bulk term for the legality of legal acts of the European 
institutions. And in subsequent development of the 'integration by law' approach, it was 
clearly placed as the concept instrumental for integration – following Waldron's 
argumentation – indispensable for integration for the lack of political tools and in absolute 
need of being accompanied by other values:  
'For Waldron, the focal concern of the rule of law considered as a solution-concept, from 
Aristotle through Hobbes and Dicey to Hayek, is 'how can we make law rule?'201. And, 
indeed, the various particular regulatory aspirations which we tend to find collected under 




 sense as a minimum over which 
we can all agree or at least over which there is significant overlapping consensus – invariably 
speak to this particular concern and how we might approximate the satisfactory answer. 
They speak, in other words, to the possibility of 'law being in charge in a society' in terms 
which contrast the rule of law favourably with the arbitrary, 'rule of men'.'
204
 
In the present study we are looking in fact for more than such overlapping consensus. We 
are asking: How can we make law rule within an external policy context? Or in a more 
detailed manner: Which qualities must the external policy posses for it to be coherent with a 
rule of law as a value enshrined in the Treaties and advocated by the commentators? What is 
necessary for the sake of the analysis, is thus the focus on the rule of law as presented 
formally, as this is the basic core of all theories searched for in more or less conscious 
manner by scholars analysing various policy fields. In addition, the focus on the formal 
conceptions of the rule of law is also the favoured one in the analysis of the externalisation 
of the term to the international plane.
205
 What will follow is the short account of what 
conceptions of 'thin' rule of law concept have been developed across time with a view of 
identifying sufficiently detailed common threads that ca be later searched for in the EU 
practice and mapped against the postulates concerning the external human rights policy.  
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2. Thin Theories of the Rule of Law 
The commentators of thin theories of the rule of law emphasise the two aspects thereof 
which will be examined in this section. Firstly, they emphasise the generic root of dinosaur 
Dicey’s theory. Secondly, they point to common core of all the theories.  
For 19
th
 Century work of Dicey the rule of law had three characteristics. The first one lied in 
contrasting the 'system of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of 
wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint.' Thus any form of restriction of an 
individual's rights can only follow the ordinary legal procedure before the ordinary courts.
206
 
The second component is that of equality of all before the law. The third component, highly 
disputed one, pertains to the claim that the common law system is better equipped to 
ensure rule of law to its citizens. Dicey points to the fact that the level of protection of 
individuals' rights is the product of a long process of adjudication and is not threatened by 
the whim of a legislator that could be the case in the continental system of law. The third of 
Dicey's conditions amounts to the requirement that the law creates sufficiently stable 
environment resulting from a long-term process (in this case adjudicative one). Thus, the 
foundations of the formal conception of the rule of law are based on the prevalence of law 
over arbitrary power, equality, and the stability of the system.  
Friedrich Hayek, writing in the post-World War II period specifies the rule of law conditions 
in the following manner: 'The government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and 
announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to see with fair certainty how 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances on the basis of this 
knowledge'
207
. The emphasis on certainty and predictability of the system refer to the 
Hayek's predominant theme of interest – that of free economy which needs to be 
functioning within a preset rules creating favourable environment for the thriving of free 
market.  
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, on the other hand devises eight virtues which are characteristic for law and which 
make up the rule of law.
209
 In order to extract them, he uses the parable of the king (Rex) 
who attempts to make law for his subjects but fails completely eight times because he: (1) 
tries to make particular rules for each and every person serving his or her particular needs; 
(2) does not announce them or publicize in any other way, therefore, nobody knows which 
rules to follow; (3) foresees the retroactivity of his rules; (4) makes rules which are difficult 
to understand and ambiguous; (5) makes rules which contradict one another; (6) enacts 
rules which cannot be followed; (7) applies the rules in an inconsistent manner; (8) alters the 
rules too frequently for his subjects to be able to rely on them.  
Thus, according to Fuller, through negative reasoning we arrive at rules which should be (1) 
general; (2) public; (3) prospective; (4) clear; (5) non-contradictory; (6) compliable; (7) 
consistently applied; (8) reasonably stable.  
Finally, we move to the most elaborated theory of Joseph Raz which was built on the 8 
principles of law identified by Fuller. Raz's theory provides also the basic explanation why 
the rule of law should be perceived from the 'thinner' perspective, by insisting that the 
concept of the rule of law is one of the series of virtues and should not be confused with 
them. Amongst those virtues he lists: democracy, justice, equality, human rights of any kind 
or respect for persons or for the dignity of men.
210
  
Craig refers to Raz's theory as a negative one just as Raz himself admits.
 211
 Since the state by 
means of law may impose any sort of governance conditions on its citizens, the rule of law 
makes protects the latter from the abuses of the state by imposing specific rules of the law. 
The law, according to Raz
212
, needs to be (1) prospective, open, and clear; (2) relatively 
stable. Furthermore, Dicey's first component of the rule of law concerning the judiciary was 
made more specific. Raz states that (3) law making should be guided by open, stable, clear 
and general rules; (4) independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; (5) principles of 
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the natural justice must be observed
213
; (6) courts should have review powers; (7) courts 
should be easily accessible; (7) discretion of crime-policing agencies should not be perverted.  
 Thus, what we can conclude from the most common developments in the theory of 
the rule of law is that we are looking at three sets of principles. The first one concerns the 
quality of the law – it needs to be general, prospective, open, and clear. Second set of 
conditions concerns the conduct of authorities exercising the power. These entail principles 
of law making, standards of ensuring security which is portrayed as the general principle 
pertaining to the assumption that laws must be observed. The third set of principles is about 
the tools with which individuals in the domestic contexts are equipped in order to be able to 
exert the control over the authorities. Here, they need to have access to courts, which are to 
be adequately furnished with competence to perform the review. Whilst accessing the 
courts, individuals need to have legal protection (principles of natural justice which are to be 
observed). In other words, every single theory is telling us that the non-arbitrary legalistic 
authority which acts in a transparent manner, adopts but at the same time is subject to 
clear, prospective, general laws. The laws are applicable in the equal manner (individuals are 
in the same manner subject to laws). The control mechanism is accessible and consists in 
courts performing judicial review in pre-determined conditions guaranteeing that the review 
takes place in an independent manner, and rights of individuals in the process of the review 
are guaranteed. 
Had the European Union been a state, and had we spoken about a policy within an internal 
domain of the authority of the structure, the above mentioned features would have sufficed 
for the conduct of the analysis. Yet, we are looking for criteria of evaluation of the external 
(human rights) policy, thus automatically we are entering the realm of international law. 
Furthermore, we are not speaking about a state – we are speaking about the European 
Union which throughout its existence has been developing successfully a new type of a legal 
order, with a particular, autonomous, characteristics. Thus, in order to determine what our 
benchmarks are, we need to consider also the impact of rule of law in international law, and 
the contribution by the EU itself to the value.  
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3. The Rule of Law in International Law 
As we have seen, conceptions of domestic rule of law are numerous. Theorists have been 
extremely prolific in determining what makes the exercise of power legal and what are the 
safeguards of the legal systems which are guided by the rule of law. Yet, the same notion in 
the realm of international law has remained undeveloped. Tamanaha, in fact, famously 
noted that whilst the conceptions of the rule of law applicable to domestic contexts have 
had a long history and grew to be established within the discourse on the statehood and 
underlying systemic values, the project of the rule of law in international law has just 
started.
214
 Indeed, the globalisation processes and the development of the body of 
international law have changed the setting. It is more and more necessary to have an 
equivalent of the rule of law in the international context.  
There is a number of arguments evoked in favour of the development of the rule of law in 
the international dealings. The first one concerns the proliferation of the areas of 
international law, or, in more general terms, areas which due to their trans-border 
implications required global regulation. Furthermore, together with the increase in the 
number of areas which underlie international legal regulation, the sovereignty of states (and 
particular legal orders) has been eroding. This process has been underlined by Jacobs
215
 who 
in his analysis went even further claiming that the place of sovereignty is taken by the values 
and concepts around which legal systems concentrate. Importantly, Jacobs theory brings us 
to the final argument in favour of more vivid introduction and consolidation of a rule of law 
conception in the international law realm. Sampford indicated that 'separation of 
constitutional law and international law is breaking down'
216
, and this is indeed true and 
connects well with Jacobs argumentation. It is stating the obvious – one could say.  
Yet, despite stating the obvious the Rule of Law concept has a long way to go to the 
elevation of the concept from domestic to international level. And the elevation has gained a 
specific name – the rule of law is to be externalised
217
. This term has been defined as 'the 
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process by which a feature characteristic that exists within the inside set is projected or 
attributed to circumstances or causes that are present in the outside space according to an 
internal-external dichotomous structure'
218
. 'Externalisation'  is manifested by national 
courts directly applying international law thus contributing to the international rule of law – 
enhancing principles of access to courts and those of enforcement of law.  
Externalisation of the rule of law concept into the external plain poses some obvious 
problems. The first one concerns the source of authority. As Arthur Watts
219
 observes, in the 
international law realm instead of one legislator, there are many. These are states which are 
sovereign, and thus have wide discretionary powers that, if taken to extreme, may be 
arbitrary. The function of international rule of law is to curtail those discretionary powers 
which, given the vast and diverse body of international law rules, has been definitely 
happening.
220
 This should be easier as, following the reasoning of Jacobs and Sampford, 
international law has been taking on the specific characteristics of domestic systems.  
If all of the above is true, the Raz's argument seems to be more convincing – it is the 'thin' 
conception of the rule of law that proves more useful for the analytical purposes.
221
 It 
establishes clear criteria that should be followed in an international context; criteria that 
come in place of the concepts which hitherto have been determining the international law 
relationships and thus allowing for claiming legitimacy of international law as such. At the 
same time, the criteria adding to the practices provided for by international law rules, 
deliver a necessary regulatory minimum coming into place of the eroded sovereignty, whilst 
leaving its remaining part almost intact. 
Again, we would apply the ‘thin’ theory of the rule of law to the pursuit of human rights 
objectives. Somehow, however, the commentators have been harmoniously claiming that 
the very protection of human rights is an indispensable component of the criteria. In other 
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words, human rights are also one of conditions for the attainment of rule of law in the 
international sphere. Tamanaha reverts the reasoning and brings us back to the 'core' of the 
concept: 
'The rule of law, at its core, requires that government officials and citizens be bound by and 
act consistently with the law. The basic requirement entails a set of minimal characteristics: 
law must be set force in advance (be prospective), be made public, be general, be clear, be 
stable and certain and be applied to everyone according to its terms. In the absence of these 
characteristics, the rule of law cannot be satisfied.'
222
 
Referring to criteria Tamanaha describes as to constitutional underpinnings, Zifcak
223
 
enumerates the following elements of international rule of law: model-constitution of 
treaties to which the nations should strive; judicial review; effective mechanism for 
resolution of inter-party disputes; enforceability of decisions and judgements of courts and 
tribunals; incorporation of human rights which should 'inform and infuse the law governing 
the work of every international organisation exercising significant power and authority'
224
. 
David Kinley, on the other hand, separates the rule of law from human rights but emphasizes 
their inter-dependency and states that: 
'Instead, my conclusion is that the rule of law on its own is not and will not be sufficient to 
provide even for minimal human rights protection. Still less can it be sufficient so long as the 
concept of human rights remains essentially contested in terms of nature, content and 
implementation, and so long as human rights share the globalization stage with economic 
actors. Where rules proclaiming human rights are supported by a broad, social, political and 
economic determination to promote them, rather than pulling themselves up by their own 
bootstraps, as it were, then the rule of law would truly facilitate their global promotion and 
protections. The necessity of this relationship is as true at any one instant as it is across time 
when the form, nature, and the circumstance of these supporting structures change.'
225
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Ultimately, as we can see even thickening of the rule of law conception requires 
determination of the formal components of the theory. From the earlier discussion, quoting 
after Stephen Beaulac
226
 we can extract three groups of rules (similarly as in case of Raz's 
theory). The first group is composed by rules pertaining to legal norms - adequate creation 
and application of norms, promulgation and publication; universality and sovereign 
equality
227
. The second group of rules refers to the system of accountability - adjudicative 
enforcement of rules normativity
228
; the existence of the Court of General Jurisdiction
229
, 
and the possibility of judicial review of all legal acts issued by international institutions
230
 in 
an independent and impartial manner. Finally, the third group of conditions of the rule of 
law refers to the conditions enabling the review and empowering the party that initiates the 
procedure – accessibility, though it is not clear whether we are speaking of the accessibility 
of the court for traditional international law actors, or the new ones – NGOs, or individuals.  
As it is clear from the above brief analysis, the task of externalisation of the rule of law to the 
level of contemporary international law seems very difficult because of the characteristics of 
this area of law and its extreme fragmentation
231
. It seems that within the traditional system 
with the rather uniform substantial composition and states as sole actors, rule of law would 
not even aspire to what it may be in the internal realm. The fragmented and fluctuating 
regime we have nowadays makes it difficult to determine to whom and to what extent the 
three groups of conditions apply. 
Even in the context of human rights law perceived as the part of international law, we 
actually can speak of externalisation only to a limited degree. Despite claims for universality, 
even human rights regime is a very fragmented one, with various levels of accessibility of 
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different actors. As Matthias Kumm observes, in fact, the contribution of internationalisation 
to the international rule of law depends very much on the area of the fragmented 
international law we are referring to.
232
 
In fact, there exists no generally accepted definition of the rule of law functioning within the 
context of international organisations. Neither specialised, nor regional organisations have 
created a definition which would be widely accepted, nor did the UN diffuse a particular 
understanding of the concept influential enough to gain the wide recognition. The UN has 
been emphasising in the period before underlining its role in the promotion of the rule of 
law, that it was unable to create culturally generally applicable conception of the rule of law, 
as this would amount to 'legal imperialism'.
233
 
Despite the above, when addressing the post-conflict situations (in 2004, in the context of 
East Timor and Kosovo) Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan thus referred to the rule of 
law: 
'[The rule of law is] a concept at the very heart of the Organisation's mission. It refers to the 
principle of governance to which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, 
including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally 
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in 
the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.'
234
 
The UN thus referred to the rule of law in the domestic context, as well as that of 
international one. The area of UN rule of law endeavours has been subsequently 
substantially developed after the 2005 World Summit.
235
 The outcome document though, 
noting the UN commitment to the value of the rule of law, was rather superficial on the 
actual meaning of the concept in the international plane relying heavily on the intuitive 
understanding thereof by the members of the UN.
236
 The states are thus reminded of their 
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existing and potential international obligations (which pertains to the principle of clarity, 
prospectivity and transparency of norms), principle of equality (thus combating 
discrimination), judicial review (and therefore reference is made to the role of the ICJ), the 
position of the UN with reference to the rule of law (thus strengthening its external 
competence with relation to the concept). Subsequent report whilst determining the 
methodology to be adopted by the UN
237
 explained which are the three 'baskets' of rule of 
law activity. The first of the baskets focuses on the rule of law on international level; second 
on the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations; the third one on the rule of law in 
the context of long term development.
238
 The two later ones concentrate on influence on 
domestic activity of the states and are of lesser importance for this analysis (even though 
they are very important from policy-making point of view). The first one, instead, tells us a 
lot about the UN understanding of the rule of law in the international law context, thus the 
context of external policy of its member states. To a certain extent this ‘basket’ contains a 
collected wisdom from all three. 
The subsequent reports state clearly which are the engagement terms of the UN with 
reference to the international rule of law with the due regard given to the UN own capacity 
of ensuring it on international stage. It is emphasised thus that the UN possesses judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(a) Reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law and to 
an international order based on the rule of law and international law, which is essential for peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation among States;  
(b) Support the annual treaty event;  
(c) Encourage States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to all treaties that relate to 
the protection of civilians;  
(d) Call upon States to continue their efforts to eradicate policies and practices that discriminate against 
women and to adopt laws and promote practices that protect the rights of women and promote 
gender equality;  
(e) Support the idea of establishing a rule of law assistance unit within the Secretariat, in accordance with 
existing relevant procedures, subject to a report by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, so 
as to strengthen United Nations activities to promote the rule of law, including through technical 
assistance and capacity-building;  
(f) Recognize the important role of the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations, in adjudicating disputes among States and the value of its work, call upon States that 
have not yet done so to consider accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with its Statute 
and consider means of strengthening the Court’s work, including by supporting the Secretary 
General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of 
Justice on a voluntary basis.' 
237
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mechanisms comprised of not only the ICJ, but also ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, monitors 
human rights obligations and advises on rule of law related issues in mediations, whilst in 
extreme cases provides direct protection.
239
 Effectively, the report emphasises the 
enforcement capacity inherent of the UN as international organisation pertaining to the title 
of rule of law guardian and promoter. As to the actual meaning of the rule of law in the 
international context, the UN Charter is reminded and the obligation imposed on the United 
Nations Organisation is to 'establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained'
240
. Nevertheless, the report shies away from determining the specific areas at 
stake – it invites the member states to the discussion and reiterates the UN obligation to 
assist them in meeting their international obligations and observing international standards 
(of human rights), and strengthening internal institutions entrusted with rule of law tasks. 
Only in the two last reports on strengthening and coordinating UN rule of law activities
241
 
the content of the conception of the international rule of law adopted by the UN is given 
substance. The focus is placed on (A) Codification, development, promotion and 
implementation of an international framework of norms and standards; (B) International and 
hybrid courts and tribunals and non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms; and (C) Non-
judicial accountability mechanisms (monitoring, fact-finding commission etc). All in all, the 
UN picture gives us also the concrete understanding of the rule of law, which departs from 
the clean 'thin' conceptions as quoted above. In fact, the reading of the UN documents 
concerning the rule of law leaves the impression of the UN not being capable of separating 
the rule of law objectives from other values that fall under its competence. International 
framework of norms and standards is to be developed by the organisation – it is not only 
about ensuring clear-cut conditions for their implementation. Furthermore, the UN is still 
not ready to sufficiently scrutinise itself from the perspective of the rule of law – none of the 
documents refers to the position of the UN Security Council legal acts and their 
enforceability.  
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Nevertheless, the UN work on human rights thrives – in 2011 the indicators for human 
rights
242
 were published and since 2007 the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group 
has been overlooking the coherence of the rule of law approach across the UN agencies. It is 
also the source of guidance notes of the Secretary General on addressing the issues 
concerning rule of law in the variety of UN activity contexts. In 2011 the Guidance Note
243
 
concerning the strengthening the rule of law on international level. Here the determination 
of activities is sourced in the principles common for the members of the UN. These are: 
a) 'The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;  
b) The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;  
c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in 
accordance with the Charter;  
d) The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter;  
e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;  
f) The principle of sovereign equality of States; and  
g) The principle that States shall fulfil in good  faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the Charter.'
244
 
On the basis of the above principles the framework for action was defined. The UN activities 
concerning the rule of law on the international level should encompass: 
1. 'Promotion of the uniform and consistent application of international law; 
2. Promotion and awareness-raising of treaties;  
3. Assistance in the progressive development of international law and its codification; 
4. Teaching and dissemination of international law; 
5. Technical assistance on international law matters; 
6. Coordination and cooperation with other organizations active in international law 
matters;  
7. Support to international dispute settlement mechanisms; 
8. Establishment and assistance to the international and hybrid accountability and 
justice mechanisms and their successor residual mechanisms; 
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9. Exercise of rights and obligations resulting from the international juridical personality 
of the Organization (privileges and immunities).'
245
 
The United Nations work in the area of the rule of law is surely becoming more intense. 
There is a lot of effort to determine the organisation's approach to the concept. The thus 
developed conception is clearly operational and intertwined with other policy fields lying at 
the core of the UN action. Judging on the basis of the current situation we can see that the 
rule of law for the UN has two benchmarks: compliance with international obligations, and 
accountability mechanisms (judicial review and dispute settlement). The generality of the 
two areas provide direction to the study, yet on their own they are not sufficient as the 
conceptual base for the broad analytical framework.  
Probably the other attempt at benchmarking international rule of law that is worth the 
mention is the one undertaken by the World Justice Project. The idea that underlies this 
effort amounts to a normative statement that every nation has its strengths, weaknesses 
and areas for improvement that should be tracked down. The Project defines the rule of law 
as a system based on four principles:  
− ‘The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law. 
− The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and fair, and protect fundamental rights, 
including the security of persons and property. 
− The process by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, 
fair and efficient. 
− Access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical adjudicators, 
attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient number, have 
adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.’
246
 
The project measures data on the basis of nine indicators corresponding to various 
dimensions of the rule of law.  
1. Limited government powers. 
2. Absence of Corruption. 
3. Order and Security. 
4. Fundamental Rights.  
5. Open government. 
6. Effective regulatory enforcement.  
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7. Access to civil justice.  
8. Effective Criminal Justice. 
9. Informal Justice.247  
The composition of each of the measured indicators is further broken down into a number of 
areas.
248
 Interestingly enough, the Index does not consider the European Union as the target 
of its measurement
249
 – clearly the index is about states and nations ruled by particular 
governments in a comprehensive manner. Whilst the methodology behind indicators are 
beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note, the use the World Justice Project uses 
its indicators. As it seems the rule of law, as measured for the purposes of evaluation and 
understanding the long term change within specific states, can be only taken into 
consideration provided that the image is comprehensive – it takes into consideration all the 
dimensions where the authority is exercised. The EU is, from this point of view, a very 
difficult case study, since many of its functions are delegated to the Member States as the 
result of the principle of subsidiarity, whilst in the area of external relations, many of the 
outlined dimensions find no application. From this perspective, the comprehensive and 
concrete attempts to define and benchmark rule of law are of no great use from the 
perspective of tracing the legal criteria for policy evaluation.  
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IV. The EU and the Rule of Law 
In the search for a benchmark for the evaluation of the EU external human rights policy we 
scrutinised solutions offered for the domestic and international legal contexts. The analysis 
of the rule of law conceptions has been given shape from the outset by the widely spread 
and developed critiques of the external human rights policy of the European Union. It needs 
to be underlined that the criticism is directed at the European Union given that it is the main 
architect and the builder of the policy. In other words, the focus in this context is placed on 
the Union in the process of policy and rule making, and the Union in the process of rule 
application. In the external context we are dealing with two different environments. The 
internal one, governed by the quasi-classic internal rule of law conception and the external 
one governed by the rules and principles of international law. Whilst the lens of analysis in 
the former case is not problematic, the one in external sphere is a harder nut to crack. From 
the perspective of international law, we could be looking at the limited application of the 
rule of law in abstracto. However, in the light of the findings of the first Chapter, it is clear 
that the Union is expected and urged to go beyond the basic standard; to 'externalise' the 
concept that, presumably, guides it in the internal sphere. Let us see, therefore, what kind of 
approach the Union itself has developed to face the challenge of rule of law framework in its 
policies. 
The European Union has not made an effort to consistently use the rule of law, neither did it 
reflect in a focused manner on its potential meaning. Instead, the ideal has been treated 
somewhat instrumentally by the EU institutions in various policy contexts serving different 
purposes. Indeed, we do not even know what was the conception that the EU started 
from.
250
 Nevertheless, the conceptions of the rule of law functioning in the realm of the 
European Union policies and within its system of law originate from, though are not in any 
form exclusively ascribed to, the earlier mentioned conceptions of the common law rule of 
law; and continental Rechtsstaat and l’état de droit. As Wennerström observes, these roots 
are the part of the habitat of the EU legal system; they determine the Vorverständnis of the 
institutions functioning within and the rules that govern them.
251
 In Bordieu's sociological 
understanding they would form the legal habitus in which the European decision makers 
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developed the European structures. Wennerström further points that the influence of those 
national conceptions, according to him, is visible in the legal institutions developed within 
the system of law of the European Union. He concludes with reference to the constitutional 
conceptions: 
'If the strength of the constitutional system and the dominant position of the constitutional 
court are the main German contributions to the perceptions of the rule of law in the EU, the 
French contributions are both indirect, in having contributed to the German model and its 
emulation into the EC system, and direct, adding to the doctrine of principes géneréaux to 
the law developed by the European Court of Justice which (...) is one of the most important 
conduits for fundamental rights and the rule of law into EC law. In addition to this the 
principles of negative and positive Bindung (in spite of the German term used here) are 
perhaps even more a French contribution to the EC constitutional law and the administrative 
culture of the EC and the EU.'
252
 
The nationally based conceptions of rule of law thus serve as the map of migrating ideas 
rather than the conscious choice on the part of the Union of the particular road to take 
when adopting one uniform idea of rule of law. In fact, various language versions of the TEU 
treat the three national based original concepts as equivalents – leaving space both for 
interpretation as well as for the functional evolution of the EU conception.
253
 We should, 
therefore, perceive the development and the 'pick-and choose' approach visible in the 
development of the conception(s) on the European ground as an attempt to unify the 
habitats of the Member States' legal systems (general principles of the EU law) aspiring to 
the creation of the EU unique system of law.
254
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Various accounts point to different uses of the rule of law, yet they agree that there exist at 
least two conceptions of rule of law developed by the European Union – that for internal 
purposes and that for external dealings. Wennerström, for instance, distinguished between 
the concept of the rule of law developed for the internal use by the Court of Justice in the 
light of the Treaty provisions, that prevalent in the enlargement context, and finally that of 
the external policy.
255
 On the other note, Jacobs pointed to the correlation between the 
values associated with the rule of law and the idea of functioning of the market economy.
256
 
He searched for the principles of the rule of law in the jurisprudence of the Court, pointing 
to the concepts developed with time and amounting to the general principles of the Union 
law and values underlying the Union legal system.
257
 Thus the Court has developed the 
notion of the Community legal order which was to safeguard the proper functioning of the 
internal market and to guarantee adequate protection for the fundamental freedoms. The 
new legal order, to fulfil its function, was equipped with tools that are generic for national 
legal systems, though highly unusual for the system of international law (such as that of the 
European Communities at the beginning of their existence): direct effect
258
, primacy of the 
EU law
259
, the characteristic 'floating' self-determined jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
260
, 
and fundamental principles of law common to all the European systems.
261
 This has lead 
                                                                                                                                                                      
EU context usually the more straightforward continental approach to the legality principle is taken, yet things 
change when we speak of the EU sourced law applied in a legal context. There the legality composite of the 
national and EU one come into place, that being visible especially whenever direct effect of EU sources of law 
kicks in. Comp.: Maartje Verhoeven and Rob Widdershoven, ‘National Legality and European Obligations’ in 
Leonard F. M. Besselink, F. Pennings and Sacha Prechal (eds), The Eclipse of the Legality Principle of the 
European Union (Kluwer Law International BV 2011), at 55-72. 
The unifying element in approach represented by them lies in the functions the concept of legality assume with 
relation to the policies of the EU:  
‘-the democratic function of legitimating the existence of public authorities, their powers and the exercise 
thereof within the limits of the set legal rules; 
- the instrumental function of attributing public authorities with powers and responsibilities in line with 
preferences and the local situation, and in accordance with a prevalent distribution of powers;  
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some commentators to believe that the European Union conception of the rule of law goes 
beyond the formalistic 'rule by law', or in Jacobs's terms:  
'(...) the rule of law should be understood today as embodying the supremacy of the law, to 
ensure that the public authorities, including the former 'sovereign', are, where appropriate, 
themselves, subject to law. This will imply extensive judicial review including limited review 
of parliamentary legislation, based on a constitutional or quasi-constitutional texts; but also 
based on certain fundamental values especially fundamental rights.'
262
  
The conclusive remarks made by Jacobs correspond to the legal development of the 
European Union (and earlier the European Community). We see the rule of law, as it has 
been mentioned before, appeared literally in the Treaty of Rome, where it was used as the 
criterion for the evaluation of the legality of European Community acts by the Court of 
Justice.
263
 It's elements have been developed by the court and consisted in supremacy of law 
(including principles of legal certainty, principle of correct legal basis, and obligation to 
legally motivate legislative acts), principle of separation of powers, and judicial review. The 
Court has also developed substantive components of rule of law. These were fundamental 
rights, inasmuch they concerned legal protection, fair application of law (including the 
principles of equality and principles of proportionality) and the principle of effective 
enjoyment of Community rights.
 264
 
Surprisingly, however, the Court never referred to these principles as the ones constituting 
the EU understanding of the rule of law. Literally for the first time, it referred to the concept 
as late as in 1986 in the Les Verts case265 where the European Parliament was included in the 
group of institutions whose acts underlie legality review against the standard of the rule of 
law. The principle according to which all legal acts underlie the legality review – even those 
not formally included in the group enumerated in the Treaty, constitutes one of the 
indispensable elements of the rule of law definition – that of the equality as a principle of 
general application. As such this principle was developed separately by the Court as one of 
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the general principles of law embodying shared values common for all of the Member 
States. Apart from the principle of equality, the commentators enlist: the principle of legal 
certainty, the protection of fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality – thus 
indirectly implying the thick conception of the rule of law. Such approach to the rule of law 
reflects the awareness on the part of the Court that in the European architecture the 'notion 
of the rule of law also conveys the idea that the ultimate source of authority is no longer the 
sovereign in the shape of a monarch, or even in the shape of a Parliament; but rather certain 
values, or certain fundamental principles, which form an inherent part of a well-functioning 
of the system.'
266
 It also mirrors the belief in the fact that all manifestations of exercise of 
power are subject to judicial review. For this purpose the following need to be ensured: 
access to courts, fair trial and effective remedies.  
In sum, the Court has based its judgement on the domestic, loaded with meaning concept of 
the rule of law but translated it instrumentally
267
 into the legal system of the Union. It did 
not give the substantive depth to the concept, evoking instead the familiar notion of 




Subsequently, as the evolution of the EU and its legal system progressed, the ideal of rule of 
law was evoked in the Maastricht Treaty preamble
269
 and recognised as the objective of the 
common foreign and security policy
270
. As it seems, from the beginning the rift between the 
internal and external use of the concept has been established. The difference was named 
later on by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam where the rule of law was included in the 
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provision amongst the founding principles of the EU, maintained as the general clause 
criterion for the legality review
271
. At the same time, in the external realm, the rule of law 
became the explicit objective of not only the CFSP (article 11 TEU), but also of the 
development cooperation (Article 177 TEC). The Treaty of Nice retained the 'founding 
principles' and the legality review criterion of the rule of law which as observed by 
Wennerström had the same content in internal context as under the Treaty of Rome 
regime
272
, whilst enhancing the use of the concept in the external realm – according to 
Article 181a, it was to be an objective of economic, financial and technical cooperation with 
third countries. This provision was certainly added as the result of the advancement of the 
enlargement process and the assistance to the candidate states.  
The Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon have maintained this architecture, 
emphasising the underlying value character of the EU rule of law in internal dealings and 
with reference to the institutions. Also in external sphere the rule of law was upheld, yet 
again without the development of the meaning. This phenomenon found its reflection in the 
European Commission to place a sort of procedural boundaries as to how the rule of law is 
supposed to be enforced in the internal context, on the basis of Article 7 TEU.  
This lack of reflection on the exact meaning of the EU rule of law conception on the part of 
the executive branch of the institutions in the internal affairs of the European Union was, to 
a certain extent, short lived. Having declared the commitment to the rule of law as the 
founding value common for the Member States, the Union, once opening the enlargement 
process, needed to substantially determine what is the meaning of the value it claimed to be 
based on. The general statements preceded yet again the substantial reflection. Firstly, the 
1993 Copenhagen criteria
273
 have stipulated that the potential Member States are to respect 
rule of law determining thus the basis for their legal and political systems. These is the actual 
beginning of the practice of conditionality – the instrument which became the trademark of 
the EU enlargement. It is important to note that the rule of law conditionality has not been 
invented by the European Union. It had been in place before in Europe developed by the 
Council of Europe.
274
 Arguably, however, the EU conditionality was different inasmuch as it 
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was based on the actual, verifiable implementation rather than on political declarations.
275
 
The formal requirement was included later in the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 49 TEU). 
Similar approach has been adopted in the European Neighbourhood Policy Processes. The 
self-identification with the value and external self-presentation needed to be translated in 
the specific requirements as to the internal legal structure of the state which was to become 
one of the European Union. Thus, the Union's substantial perspective on the rule of law is 
encoded in the enlargement process and documents.  
Interestingly, whilst the internal meaning of the conception of the rule of law has been to a 
large extent developed by the European Court of Justice, in the context of external policy, 
the Court refrained from adjudication on the matter. In 1978 case Mattheus v Doego276 the 
Court declared itself incompetent to adjudicate on matters of enlargement. It was thus up to 
the Commission (which in this particular case requested clarification of Article 237(1) TEC – 
current Article 49 TEU) to clarify the concept that re-appeared in political Copenhagen 
criteria 15 years later. Responsible for accession negotiations and in charge of financial 
instruments, the Commission defined 'state governed by the rule of law' on the occasion of 
using those instruments. Wennerström in his extremely detailed account on elaboration of 
the conception of the rule of law by the European Commission quotes after the 'PHARE 
Programme for the implementation of the rule of law 1999-2001'that such state has 'a 
constitutional system whereby the different organs of the state are aligned and limited in 
such a way that the state cannot legally infringe on citizens' rights', and the main 
components of the system were to be: (a) the principle that all acts by public authorities are 
founded in and subject to the law (the supremacy of law); (b) a system of separation of 
powers; (c) respect for fundamental rights and freedoms; (d) independence of the 
judiciary.
277
 The enlargement process proceeded with the initial use of opinions (1997) 
prepared by the Commission at the request of the Council, and subsequently reports 
prepared according to uniform methodology. This uniform methodology applied in these 
instruments, in the absence of the definition of rule of law used by the European institutions 
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points to the most important elements of the conception from the European Commission 
point of view. Thus, the areas falling under the scrutiny were those which belong to the 
group of political criteria (as defined by the Copenhagen conclusions) and focus on the 
structure and functioning of three branches of government. Especially the post-1997 reports 
reveal more about actual focus in the rule of law practice of candidate states. Wennerström 
identified the following areas which were of interest to the European Commission: (a) 
supremacy of law; (b) separation of powers; (c) respect for fundamental rights; (d) 
independence of the judiciary; (e) measures against corruption.
278
 The resulting conception 
roughly corresponds to the internal one developed by the Court of Justice enriched by 
measures combating corruption (and therefore the foundations of the remaining four 
components of the rule of law) and has been re-applied in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
In a confusing manner, the supposedly most developed conception of the rule of law in the 
EU practice, created for the use of enlargement policy is not the only one functioning in the 
external realm. Wennerström distinguished also rule of law conception applicable in the 
broadly understood external policy field. Similarly to the rule of law of enlargement 
conditionality, the rule of law in external context appears in majority of instruments 
(accompanied usually by principle of observance of human rights) in the conditionality 
context. Obviously, the concept is in no way defined; it is treated as the statement of values 
on both sides and amounts to political declaration as it is demonstrated by the practice. 
Wennerström analysis of various policy fields – co-operation, development and the ESDP 
rule of law – identifies the major differences between them and the diminishing 'strength' of 
the conception which in the ESDP context consists of fragmented components of the EU 
internal rule of law conception (independence of judiciary, some fundamental rights to be 
guaranteed, anti-corruption).
279
 The manifestation of the searched rule of law ideal in this 
context does not provide us with any guidance for the purposes of the substantial analysis as 
the rule of law in these contexts shares the same characteristics as human rights in external 
policy of the European Union.  
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The inconsistency in the conceiving and application of the rule of law conception in different 
policy fields does not seem coincidental. Its 'pick-and-chose' approach in the external 
context can be criticised. It needs to be noted that this is no novel attitude – particular 
foreign policy fields which need reference to rule of law (such as development) work on the 
basis of the inequality of partners. In such contexts the EU rule of law functions as the 
lighthouse for the partner state rather than enforceable obligation. Wennerström 
concluding his extensive study of the use of concept of rule of law emphasised the lack of 
clarity and legal certainty resulting from such diversified use of the concept. I would not go 
so far in the evaluation. The well defined rule of law is to be present in the internal dealings 
of the European Union – it is a matter of its internal legitimacy and transparency. It seems 
that the EU could have not defined what could be meant by rule of law there as the internal 
legal system, safe for its underlying founding concept has been in the process of making. Yet, 
in external realm, the rule of law is as fluid as the general one in international context. It is, 
similarly, work in progress, thus insecurity of its meaning within different policy realms is 
something to be expected. Maybe as the external legal system of the EU policies matures, it 
will gain more and more solid characteristics.
280
 
V. Rule of Law Common Core – Benchmarks for Policy Evaluation 
The quest for identification of components of the rule of law is in fact the search of the 
understanding of what makes any EU policy legitimate inasmuch the underlying values are 
concerned, their transposition into policy instruments, and, finally, their enforcement. This is 
true not only for Petersmann and de Búrca’s notion of common values lying at the base of 
international constitutionalism.  
The area of human rights policy is bound to be difficult in this respect as requires that both 
values and objectives to be attained. As such, it has two dimensions: that of affirmation of a 
value and thus the quasi-absolute compliance with its content - and that of what goes 
beyond – its outer manifestation and promotion. Whilst internal human rights policy of the 
Union, as it stands under the current Treaty framework, may be regarded as 'on its way' to 
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fulfilling characteristics of those dimensions, the external one, is far from there, though the 
equipage of the policy itself is impressive. When we leave the safe and closely defined area 
of the EU independent and self-contained legal order, it becomes very difficult to evaluate 
the EU actions. It is somewhat natural to expect the EU to 'externalise' its internal policies 
according to its founding rules such as that of the rule of law, especially if we are speaking of 
something as universal as human rights. This is exactly what is epitomised in the criticisms of 
the EU external human rights policy presented in Chapter 1.  
In essence, because of the importance of both values (rule of law and human rights), the rule 
of law principles applicable in the internal context need to be 'externalised' for the purpose 
of delivering human rights related objectives. 'Externalisation' in this context, however, is 
not a straight forward process. There are two problems which are pertinent to determining 
the mode of externalisation, and thus, the rules underlying the process. First one relates to 
the double nature of the human rights within the EU legal order – human rights being both 
the value with which the EU is identified and the policy objective. This puts the European 
Union already in internal sphere as the violator and the active norm enforcer. What happens 
when we start evaluating the internal EU policies, is that the two positions overlap – it is 
therefore very difficult to evaluate the EU and the policy itself. Secondly, when we enter 
external policy realm, the legal setting changes substantially and similarly transforms the 
rule of law concept that is applied. This change, however, with reference to the EU does not 
seem to be so drastic as in case of the general international legal setting analysis. There must 
be something that makes the EU different from other international actors. The mode of the 
EU foreign policy appears to differ substantially from that of the traditional one of states 
(foreign policy mode). De Búrca, in fact, whilst proposing an alternative one – governance 
mode of the EU external policy – pointed to the constitutive nature of presence of milieu 
goals as objectives.
281
 If that is the case, 'externalisation' of the EU internal rule of law might 
be of useful analytical value, explaining at the same time the existence of double standards 
of evaluation – those towards the EU and those towards other international actors.  
From the rule of law perspective, we are speaking here again of two capacities of the EU. 
The first one is that of a norm creator (legislator) – the EU as the fluid constitutional 
construct, work in progress thus in need of new conceptions and modes of activity, so that, 
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with time, the particular type – the EU type – of the conception is brought together. In the 
external context, especially in bilateral EU – third country relations, the EU continues to 
perform as a legislator due to the pure objective reasons – it is simply more powerful. This is 
true for co-operation, development, neighbourhood, and enlargement policies. In few 
instances would the EU face an entity equally powerful. Here, as it seems, the standard of 
evaluation would be higher given the inequality of actors involved. It is, therefore, up to the 
EU legal order to ensure that the rule of law principles are ensured. On the other hand, the 
EU is subject to the rules which, once created, need to be enforced in an equal, and 
predictable manner. And should there be problems with such enforcement, adequate 
mechanisms should be ensured at the stage of rule creation, to resolve conflicts. The rule of 
law standard to be applied in the external sphere against the policy of the EU should address 
both sets of problems.  
Let us remind the criticisms in order to be able to relate them to the rule of law components 
identified in previous sections of this chapter, bearing in mind the above problematic issues. 
The call for legitimacy of the European Union external human rights policy is the call 
addressed to the EU – the legislator. It corresponds to the Court of Justice devising principles 
of the EU legal system. In EU terms, we are speaking here of the supremacy of the EU law, 
principle of separation of powers. This is also the underlying claim of the first dimension of 
the non-coherence scolding the unbalance between the internal and external policy fields. 
The other two dimensions of incoherence refer to the application and enforcement of the 
EU external human rights policy – it needs to be applied in an equal manner to all the 
countries, and it should fit into the hierarchy of policy objectives rather than conflict with 
them. Application and enforcement correspond to judicial review envisaged by the Union 
itself for its own standard of the rule of law, yet it goes beyond. The final element put 
forward by the EU is the observance of fundamental rights which given that we are speaking 
of human rights policy, is assumed. 
The internal conception of the rule of law as conceived by the EU does not give us sufficient 
guidance in terms of determining the benchmarks for further policy evaluation, yet it gives 
us the idea as to what the EU perceives as important for its internal dealings. From this point 
of view one could analyse the internal aspect of creation of the external human rights policy 
of the European Union.  
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Let us see how the identified criticisms fit the thin theories of rule of law. They commonly 
require non-arbitrariness, transparency, clarity, prospectivity, and generality. These are all 
conditions that refer to the process of norms creation – the EU as a legislator conceiving its 
policy in a legitimate manner guided by the principles of the EU law, and devising them in 
general manner thus applicable to both internal and external areas. The mechanism of 
judicial review should be ensured in case the legislator trespasses on norm creation 
principles. 
Subsequently, the principles are to be applied in equal manner to actors concerned – and 
according to assumed hierarchy of values that are equally in all circumstances. Thus the 
principle of equality governs the application of principles devised by the Union. Judicial 
review should apply if equality is not preserved. 
Finally, should there be the a misunderstanding concerning the application of norms, the 
mechanism should be made available allowing for conflict resolution.  
Such approach to rule of law components guides us in order to determine the benchmarks 
for further analysis. Hence, if we are to use the rule of law lens in order to analyse the EU 
external human rights policy tools, these are the categories ordering such analysis: 
Rule of law principles concerning policy/instruments/norms creation; 
− Non-arbitrariness, generality, prospectivity 
− Transparency 
− Clarity 
− Judicial Review 
Rule of law principles concerning application of the created norms; 
− Equality 
− Transparency 
− Judicial Review 
Rule of law principles concerning conflict resolution 
− Accessibility 
− Enforceability of decisions 
Neil Walker in his account of social significance of the rule of law refers to both the benefits 
the rule of law might bring if applied in the European Union context as well as the negative 
consequences if misapplied. 
'For a still emerging polity such as the EU, the relationship with the rule of law is more fluid 
and more dynamic. Put starkly, the untapped potential for the rule of law to make a positive 
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difference – and not just for the absence to make a negative difference – is greater in the 




It is obvious, therefore, that the above developed categorization of rule of law components 
extracted from the overview of rule of law approaches is not a final one. Yet, it provides 
critiques with clear criteria for evaluation of the policy. This, in a long run, may prove more 
useful in various policy areas. For the purposes of this study, the categorisation will be used 
as a tool to understand which concrete features of the external human rights policy are 
desirable, which are unattainable in the external policy context, and which, in practice, have 
developed in the forms not known in the constitutional structures defined by rule of law 
principles.  
                                                      
282





Chapter 3 – Identifying the Issue at Stake: Introducing the Toolbox of EU External 
Human Rights Policy 
DRAWING INSPIRATION  
from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed 
the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of law.283 
I. Introducing the Subject of the Analysis 
So far, we have analysed the underlying paradigm through which the EU external human 
rights policy is viewed and extracted the concrete legal demands that can be addressed at 
the policy at the stage of its creation, application and overview as performed by the courts. 
It is time now, to focus on what it is exactly that is to be analysed in the space of the Part II 
of this study. We are interested here in legal instruments which are consistently employed 
by the EU for the purposes of its external human rights policy. The introduction to those 
instruments must be preceded by establishment of the context within which the EU external 
human rights policy functions.  
This context will subsequently be analysed in detail from the perspective of the identified 
rule of law benchmarks. The focus here is on tightly defined margins where the EU can enter 
into international contractual obligations based on the competence ascribed to it. The 
choices of means to act are, on the other hand, made within legal system’s boundaries, yet 
given the external outlook of the instruments, outside of the main frame where the 
existence and execution of competence is discussed. This might be perceived as the reverse 
to the situation discussed in the 1990s with reference to the gap between the Community 
and the CFSP pillars.
284
 Possibly the ‘capability-expectations gap’ has been filled, albeit not in 
a manner which was advocated. 
Against this context, the brief presentation of the toolbox will ensue. It will be performed 
with the purpose of categorising the tools on the basis of two simple criteria: who are the 
legislators for such instruments and subsequently who are their addressees.  
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Thus made categorisation will form an introduction to Part II where benchmarks will be 
applied in a systematic manner to each of the toolbox's categories. 
II. The Context – Constitutional Architecture of the Treaty of Lisbon 
1. Principles and Objectives in External Human Rights Policy – what Function 
for Human Rights? 
The objectives to be attained by the human rights policy of the European Union are the 
starting point of the analysis. Ultimately, they inform us about the framework of the policy 
and, therefore, what is the functional approach characterising the EU when pursuing its 
objectives in this field. 
Even if an essential element of EU’s identity and ethos
285
, the notion of human rights is not 
approached in a uniform manner. They function as values, principles, objectives both in 
internal and external setting.
286
 And depending on whether we are speaking of the 
substantive content of the policy or the manner in which it is enforced, human rights gain on 
various characteristics.  
On the face of it, human rights are more of an organic baseline from which the Union is 
supposed to act – in fact the 'respect for human rights' is supposed to be a founding value of 
the EU, as pronounced by Articles 2 and 3 TEU, the principle which is to be respected and 
upheld according to Article 21 TEU (and 7 TFEU) and an area to which the EU is to contribute 
through its actions – thus, effectively, an objective. As Williams argues commenting on 
internal meaning of 'respect' we can only speculate as to what it can be: 
'What then are the realistic implications of identifying "respect" as the operative 
institutional command? Does it imply a responsibility to act as a moral agent in relation to 
human rights, dictating an active or positive obligation? Or does the principle merely possess 
a passive or negative nature, one that forbids the EU institutions from violating human 
rights, but does not impose upon them a greater duty to promote and enforce human 
rights? The jurisprudence of the ECJ would seem to support a more restrictive 
interpretation. In Opinion 2/94 on Accession by the EU to the ECHR the Court famously, if 
ambiguously noted that "[n]o Treaty provision confers on the EU institutions any general 
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power to enact rules on human rights". At the same time it acknowledged the declaratory 
importance of respect for human rights in the EU, noted that "fundamental rights form an 
integral part of the general principles of law" and maintained that "respect for human rights 
is (...) a condition of the lawfulness of EU acts". 
Beyond the ECJ, the development of a wide spectrum of fundamental rights texts, legislative 
rules, institutional practices, supported agencies, and applied resources testify to a broader 
and deeper conception of the commitment to "respect" than a purely negative connotation 
would allow. Perhaps here we find the basis for an ethical struggle, a central tension lying at 
the heart of human rights in the EU's institutional ethos.'
287
 
It seems that deriving operational command from the phrase 'respect for human rights' is an 
overstatement. Nevertheless, it illustrates well the  lack of clarity as to what function human 
rights are to play in the policies of the European Union. We need to look further into the 
Treaty of Lisbon provisions in order to uncover at least partially what kind of meaning we 
should derive from human rights related policy goals. 
As discussed already in Chapter 1, the Treaty has specified goals which in the light of Union's 
origins could be regarded as presenting hierarchy (Article 3(1) TEU). All three objectives – 
peace, the Union's values and the well-being of its peoples – are to be promoted, similarly as 
interests and values which are to be upheld in relations with the wider world (Article 3(5) 
TEU). The verb 'promote' confuses the picture. Does it mean that the EU is supposed to be 
merely an advocate for peace and values both internally and externally? The positive action 
included in this term seems to be very static – it is more of a situation in which the EU 
presents itself as the entity which has achieved the three objectives and thus is legitimised 
to urge other actors to follow suit. It seems as if the EU was to advertise the method of its 
integration, such as was facilitated with the use of the three elements enshrined in 
Article 3(1) TEU. 
Only then Article 3(5) takes the human rights business further. It imposes a much harder 
obligation on the EU – it is supposed to take action to endorse, sustain, or even defend 
(these are some of many synonyms of the word 'uphold'
288
) the values and interests. In 
addition, it is to contribute to inter alia protection of human rights. The pairing up of values 
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and interests is reminiscent of concerns present in any of the policy fields which have 
external implications (the only external policy exception that comes to mind is the 
development policy where it is believed that development and human rights policies are 
complementary if not conducive for one another). Security, migration, trade interests are to 
be subject of the "endorsing, sustaining or defending" alongside with values of the EU. The 
nexuses are searched for but usually the results are disappointing – human rights and other 
values of the EU usually need to give in when faced with more loaded in terms of economic, 
political, or military value interests. The exact function of human rights is, therefore, 
ambiguous. Frequently it is either determined elsewhere in the Treaty or is to be worked out 
in practice of the policy. Thus, the nexus between security and human rights is that of a 
traditional nature where human rights work as a conception limiting the power of an 
international entity – the European Union. Formally, however, there is no reference to 
human rights in particular provisions of the TEU concerning the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (Chapter 2 TEU), though the nexus is visible in provisions concerning the AFSJ 
and its external dimension where the objective of the policy area (predominantly security
289
) 
is to be pursued 'with respect for fundamental rights'. Furthermore, the nexus between 
migration (and thus a part of the AFSJ) and human rights is even of bigger importance as it 
reflects the abstract and concrete border creation – the development of the common 
identity of states belonging to the European Union and, therefore, the issues connected with 
belonging; inclusion and exclusion.
290
 Here, human rights help to define who is the 'other' 
and what kind of worldview this 'other' is to share if, he is to belong to the exclusive EU-lead 
club. Therefore, the proclamation of values constitutes the means of separation of 'us' from 
the rest of the world – in extreme case it could be taken to Schmittian idea of human rights 
determining who is Europe's friend or foe
291
. The provisions on common commercial policy 
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contain reference to the context of principles and objectives of the external EU's action 
(Article 207(1) TFEU), yet no specific stance is taken as to the position of human rights in the 
EU and world trade regime.
292
 Similarly, the development cooperation is placed within the 
context of objectives and principles of the EU external action with a difference that given the 
mixed character of the competence in the area, the reference is made to the obligations 
made by the Member States under the auspices of the United Nations (see: Articles 208(1) 
and 208(2) TFEU respectively). What is interesting in those general formulations as to the 
role of human rights, is the presence of the 'context' of objectives and principles. Particular 
policy fields exist against this context, which is taken for granted. Yet neither promotion not 
upholding are fully passive in their nature – they require action and going beyond the 
borders of the Union – both in physical and metaphorical terms.  
Summarising, human rights presence in the external policy of the EU constitutional basis is 
determined by obligations to 'respect' and to 'promote and uphold'. The response to 
Williams' questions as to whether respect entails refraining from abuse or positive action 
should be affirmative.  
The Union's context involving undertaking activities brings us to the second level of the 
analysis. The EU is to act – to shape the context whilst at the same time maintaining its 
(image of) values and interests and defending them. The question is: how is it to act?  
Article 21 TEU provides us with a partial answer to this question: 
'The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in 
the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries and 
international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the 
first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular 
in the framework of the United Nations.' 
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Article 21 TEU confirms the earlier conclusion about the obligation to act on the part of the 
European Union – it strongly states that the EU 'seeks to advance' the principles that are 
behind EU's creation. Secondly, it determines the EU's commitments to principles lying at 
the base of the Union's development – the Union is to be guided by principles of democracy 
(hence participation and transparency), rule of law (in this context perceived internally), 
human rights (especially their universality and indivisibility), equality and human dignity – all 
this in the context of the UN Charter and international law. For the attainment of the 
objectives of external action the EU is supposed to develop relations only with the countries 
which share the same principles (hence the essential elements clauses obligatory in EU 
agreements entered into with third countries). Article 21(2b) TEU reiterates the described 
obligations emphasising bigger efforts to be made.
293
 Also in external sphere, there is a 
requirement of consistency of actions (which immediately evokes the question: why not 
coherence).
294
 Overall, the EU, as far as the manner of realisation of the objectives is 
concerned, is bound by the principles that determine its actions internally. This statement 
reflects the previous considerations on 'externalisation' of the EU values.  
As we saw in this section, it is extremely difficult to determine the exact function of human 
rights provisions in the basic constitutional texts of the European Union. They are, firstly and 
foremostly, underlying values which, for the purpose of operational action remains a 
declaration of fact, rather than intent. Secondly, they are to be treated as a principle behind 
actions – they are functional in determining the standard for activities undertaken by the 
Union and its institutions. Finally, they constitute one of the objectives which are to be 
pursued alongside with other policies' objectives with, however, one limitation. The EU 
clearly states that it is to contribute to the respect of human rights on equal basis with other 
international law entities – it is an obligation of means – not an obligation of result. Yet 
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again, the means through which the EU is to pursue its human rights objectives come to the 
forefront. 
2. The Treaty Architecture – Competence, Balance of Powers, and Institutional 
Setting 
With reference to the constitutional design of the EU external human rights policy, the 
Treaty of Lisbon continues determination of the policy issue and accomplishes two 
objectives advocated by the critics. Firstly, the Treaty determines (albeit, arguably in a partial 
manner) competence of the Union with reference to human rights. It, therefore, adds to the 
determination of the division of powers between the European Union and the Member 
States. Secondly, it introduces particular institutional arrangements which are to improve 
the exercise of foreign and human rights policy.  
The clear cut determination of the EU competence, especially in the area of external policy 
has been a long-lived postulate. The importance thereof has been emphasised especially 
against the background of the doctrine of implied powers that, depending on the EU CJ case 
law, would take a slightly different form.
295
 In particular, it responds to the Opinion 2/94
296
 
and the limited competence on the part of the Union to entertain human rights objectives. 
In doing so, however, the Treaty makers demonstrated a very incoherent approach. Possibly 
the only clear power has been granted to the EU, through Article 6(2) TEU, to accede the 
European Convention for Human Rights. Otherwise, in external and internal policy, the EU’s 
human rights powers remain somewhat blurred.   
Internally, the formally exhaustive division of competence between the states and the Union 
included in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 3 -5, was supposed 
to prevent the free will, functional widening of their scope by the institutions and above all 
by the Court. It can be claimed that such architecture was to confirm the ripe form of the 
Union which in its design has taken an unprecedented form of a supra-national organisation 
and therefore continued to evolve in an unpredictable manner. Had human rights powers of 
the Union been of general nature, they would have been included in the list. Yet, this was 
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not the case, hence every single action undertaken by the Union needs to be equipped with 
a specific legal base. Articles 8 – 10 TFEU provide for such in the areas of equality, non-
discrimination, and a range of social rights, yet these are possibly the sole mainstreaming 
clauses. At the same time, one could argue that Article 67(1) TFEU whilst obliging the EU to 
create the Area of Freedom Security and Justice as the compliment to the Single Market, 
grants the EU the general competence to provide for the protection of fundamental rights. 
This is furthermore accompanied by Article 3(6) TEU (ex Article 2 TEU): 'The Union shall 
pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are 
conferred upon it in the Treaties.' The overall Lisbon Treaty picture does not convey the 
impression of completeness (and therefore coherence) of the EU internal human rights 
competence.   
Possibly, the only cross-cutting horizontal provision of Treaty value concerning internal 
human rights refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and its implementation – but here 
fundamental rights act as the limit to the EU action; not as the basis for one. Article 51(2) of 
the Charter determines the fields of its application. It states: 
'1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, and to the Member 
States only when they are implementing the Union law. They shall therefore respect the 
rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their 
respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in 
the Treaties. 
2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond powers of the 
Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as 
defined in the Treaties' 
The clear prohibition of going beyond what the Treaties provide for clearly prevents the 
possible development of comprehensive human rights policy on the basis of Charter's 
provisions. If this is so, how should one read the recommendation to the addressees of this 
paragraph? What is respecting of rights, observing principles, promotion and application 
thereof if not the general scheme of the policy? Finally, what remains is the long standing 
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question about the AETR doctrine and the distinction between internal and external 
competence inasmuch as its standing still prevails?
297
 
The doubts uttered can be rather unequivocally refuted with the help of the Treaty text. For 
the Treaty of Lisbon, despite presenting a ‘patched’ approach to the EU internal human 
rights policy, has equipped the Union with a clear one in external field. There, according to 
Article 3(5) TEU, the EU is empowered to ‘promote and uphold’ its values and contribute to 
the protection of human rights. Or, in the wording of Article 21(2 a and 2b) TEU: 'The Union 
shall define and pursue common policies and actions (…) in order to: Safeguard its values, 
fundamental interests, independence and integrity; Consolidate and support democracy, 
rule of law, human rights, and the principles of international law.’ 
The area of external action in its nascent, coherent, form is further defined by 
Article 21(3) TEU
298
. Under the Treaty of Lisbon it encompasses: CFSP, CSDP, Common 
Commercial Policy, Cooperation with Third Countries (Development Cooperation and 
Economic, Financial, and Technical Cooperation with Third Countries), and Humanitarian Aid, 
Restrictive Measures, and making of any international agreement ‘where the Treaties so 
provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the 
framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is 
provided for in a legally binding Union act, or is likely to affect common rules or alter their 
scope (Article 216(1) TFEU).’ The codification of the doctrine of implied powers
299
 from the 
perspective of the organisation of the Treaty makes all of the areas of Union action part of 
the external action to which the obligation to pursue objectives envisaged in Articles 3(5) 
TEU and 21(2) TEU apply.   
As a matter of illustration of the lack of difference in setting once the Treaty of Lisbon had 
been adopted, let us recall the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It 
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does not seem that the decision about the legal basis under which this agreement would 
have been made, had been different under the Nice Treaty.
300
  
Hence, on the face of it the Treaty of Lisbon changes of competence arrangements does not 
seem to have much of an impact on practice of making external human rights instruments. It 
remains to be seen how will the EU make use of the general external human rights 
competence which surprisingly does not stretch on internal sphere of its activity.    
Similarly, it remains to be seen whether the Member States of the Union will accept the 
general competence in EU external human rights matters as the basis for the control of their 
actions. Can the altered external human rights setting affect the exercise of the 
constitutional principles of the European Union? In the light of a very unclear internal 
competence context, it seems that there is not much potential for the EU to discipline its 
Member States when they act abroad. Consequently, clearly pre-emption will not take place 
(unless on the legal basis connected with a different policy field) solely on human rights 
grounds; it is also highly unlikely for the EU to use the principle of loyal cooperation against 
its Member States in this context.  
The last accomplishment of the Treaty of Lisbon with relation to the external human rights 
policy is creation of the European External Action Service (‘EEAS’) and the Union High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (‘High Representative’). Yet both the scope of 
the competence assigned to the HR and the composition of the EEAS reflect the problems 
outlined above and brings further ones to the light. The open architecture of the EEAS has 
permitted the maintenance of the pre-Lisbon inter-pillar and post-Lisbon division between 
the CFSP and other areas of Union activity.  
Indeed, the publications on the EEAS
301
 emphasize that there are three groups of issues 
associated with the  problematic nature of the new institution and its very delicate position 
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distorting the balance of powers within the European Union. Firstly, there appeared a 
question of the actual task of the EEAS and its relation to other institutions; secondly, there 
were doubts about its composition and procedural functioning; thirdly, the position of the 
EEAS to provide a lead in external policy matters. Clearly, all the three issues will have an 
effect on the EU external human rights policy which shall be in demonstrated in Part II of this 
study. In terms of the institutional changes, what draws attention apart from the 
appointment of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the European 
Union is the appointment of the EU’s Special Representative for Human Rights in the person 
of Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis
302
. The tasks of the Special Representative are fairly limited and 
encompass his contribution to the current policy, its implementation and coherence as well 
as enhancement of dialogues with third countries’ governments and regional 
organisations.
303
 It is notable that the EU's Special Representative for Human Rights is 
neither a well known politician, nor does he wish that his activities are very visible.
304
 The 
body responsible for implementation of the mandate remains the European External Action 
Service under the leadership of the High Representative.  
Inasmuch as the Treaty of Lisbon provides for the three major, above described institutional 
reforms, the changes from the point of view of the EU external human rights policy are only 
a tip of the iceberg. Soon after her appointment did the High Representative initiate the 
consultation process aiming at reshaping the EU external human rights policy; activity which 
brought about further changes; complementary to the ones that took place on the basis of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Their more detailed analysis can be found below in Part II of this study; 
for now let us see what was the substantive result of the process of reshaping of EU external 
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human rights policy and the manner in which it affects both the perception of institutional 
changes and of the use of instruments.  
III. Identifying the Issue and Policy Analysis – Strategic Approach to Human 
Rights in EU External Policy 
It was a direct consequence of the Treaty of Lisbon institutional changes that the discussion 
about revisiting of EU external human rights commenced. The High Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, initiated the more or less formalised 
consultations already in 2010.
305
 What followed was the stream of recommendations, 
speeches, letters, and other documents authored by EU institutions and civil society 
organisations with the view to producing the most comprehensive strategy possible.
306
 Yet, 
the first informal draft of the HR’s and Commission’s Communication circulated in October 
2011 was particularly harshly criticised.
307
 There were two reasons for this: the first one was 
procedural, second one substantive; and as it seems the former affected the latter. 
Procedurally, the problem lied in the timing. The first informal draft of the Communication 
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was apparently delivered to the European Parliament and the Member States at least on 
18 October 2011 making it very difficult for the authors of the Communication to take into 
account all the comments made by the stakeholders in the brief period preceding the actual 
adoption of the Communication on 12 December 2011.
308
 Substantively, because the 
stakeholders did not manage to make their voice heard, the Communication was described 
as lacking a fresh look at the role and standing of human rights in EU external relations.  
Nevertheless, the Communication
309
, labelled as the beginning of the discussion on what 
was to become the Strategic Framework to be adopted on 25 June 2012
310
, was published by 
the High Representative together with the European Commission on 12 December 2011. 
Catherine Ashton emphasised, by now famously, that ‘the protection and promotion of 
human rights is a silver thread running through all EU action both at home and abroad’.
311
 
The ‘silver thread’ metaphor for human rights is used interchangeably with ‘guiding 
principle’ which is to be translated into a ‘joined up approach to policy’
312
. Such description 
does not give the answer as to how human rights are to be treated in the wider scheme of 
the foreign policy of the European Union. The Communication could be described as yet 
another window-dressing approach, had it not been for the subsequent actions and a 
number of rather interesting proposals.   
The document succeeds in addressing the policy challenges and emphasising principles to be 
employed. Unfortunately, the effort manifested by the High Representative and the 
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Commission has not been much elaborated upon in the process of drafting of the ‘EU 
Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’ that was adopted by 
the Council on 25 June 2012.  The following sections will present the policy approach of the 
Union with respect to the EU external human rights policy and indicate which issues have 
been indicated of prime importance and how, subsequently they are to be put into life 
according to the Strategic Framework. 
It is important to note that the Communication starts off with an assumption that human 
rights as enshrined in international treaties are the basis for the EU action; it is the EU 
responsibility to implement them.
313
 This approach confirms the universality of the object of 
the policy: it is the concern of the EU to make human rights reality in their universal, 
indivisible form through the most effective (in a given context) means. At the same time, the 
binding character of the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights and the imminent EU’s accession 
to the European Convention for Human Rights are recognised as direct triggers for the 
revisiting of the total of the EU external human rights policy.
314
  
The Communication, in fact, focuses on revisiting mechanisms, processes, and structures. 
The proposals are made in a very diplomatic manner emphasising four areas through which 
responses to human rights challenges are addressed. 
‘– On external delivery mechanisms – would not a bottom-up, tailored, country-based 
approach, coupled with cross-cutting worldwide campaigns on specific themes achieve 
better the human rights and democracy objectives? 
– On process – how can the EU become more joined up across the whole range of its policies 
and Institutions, and externally when working with international partners, NGOs, regional 
groupings and international organisations? 
– On internal structures – should we place priority on the completion of a network of human 
rights and democracy focal points across EU Delegations worldwide, and a standing 
capability in the Council on external human rights and democracy issues?’
315
 
Therefore, the EU in order to address the challenges is to:  
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(1) Focus on the delivery of human rights through tailoring approaches to specific needs 
in the field and specific countries; the delivery is to be done following a campaign-




(2) Provide for a joined up approach to policy where democracy and elections, 
development cooperation, human rights clauses, trade policy, information and 
telecommunications policy, business and human rights, conflict prevention, crisis 
management, counter-terrorism, freedom, security, and justice are to work take a 
360 degrees coherent approach from human rights policy perspective;  
(3) Build strong partnerships through multilateral cooperation, contributing to 
international justice, developing cooperation with regional organisations, making 
impact through dialogue, and responding to serious violations.  
(4) Create an internal human rights synergy for human rights through involving European 
Parliament, Member states, creating a standing capability on human rights and 
democracy in the Council of the EU, and building a culture of human rights and 
democracy. 
Roughly, the above described responses on the part of the EU correspond to the various 
facets of incoherence as described in Chapter 1. The tailor based approach (1) explains the 
vertical incoherence in treatment of third countries. In fact, the Communication addresses 
this issue, albeit in a veiled, example-based, manner:  
‘Thus, while the overall objectives of the EU’s human rights and democracy policy remain 
valid and unaltered, an approach that seeks to match objectives in a country with the 
realities on the ground is more likely to deliver concrete results than a one size fits all 
approach. Tailor made country strategies covering human rights and democracy should 
therefore be an integral part of the EU’s overall strategy towards that country. This will help 
to prioritise and rationalise work, especially of EU Delegations and Member State Embassies, 
whilst better drawing on the relevant mix of EU tools and instruments and working in the 
areas most likely to deliver lasting improvements and change. That is not to say that the EU 
should, not for example, condemn the use of the death penalty in a country that continues 
to apply it, rather that this should not be the sole focus of EU human rights work when 
other areas might deliver change.’ (emphasis added)
317
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The joined up approach (2) reflects the need for horizontal coherence amongst various 
policies, whilst creating an internal synergy for the benefit of human rights (4) refers to the 
internal/external divide both in their horizontal (difference in policies) and vertical (different 
treatment of 3rd countries versus the Member States).  
Building strong partnerships for human rights interationally (3) refers to the widely 
understood tools that are to be used for the pursuit of human rights objectives. Defined in an 
imprecise manner, they recognize, however, the pro-active approach where the EU is to create 
partnerships; and reactive approach where it is to respond when things go wrong. It is clear 
that the HR and the European Commission have identified policy issues in line with the 
standing criticism against the EU external human rights policy.  
Whilst the Communication amounted to an invitation t  a general discussion on human rights 
in EU external policy, it is the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy318 that determined in concrete terms what is both the general vision of the 
policy and what are the objectives. In addition, it announces the appointment of the EU 
Special Representative for Human Rights Policy. The value added of the document is 
undisputable inasmuch as it is a first ever to address the total of human rights external policy 
in a comprehensive manner. As it seems it meets the demand for such an address through 
basing the general vision of the policy on three pillars:  
(1) making the external human rights policy an integral part of all – without exception – 
policies of the EU319, yet with particular attention paid to its priorities320;  
(2) making human rights a joint responsibility: of EU institutions; EU and its Member States, 
and EU and its partners – both in bilateral and multilateral settings321; 
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(3) giving a face to the human rights policy by annou cing the appointment of the Special 
Representative for Human Rights.  
The vision of the after all existing human rights policy seems splendid; the only problem is 
that it is to be placed on the top of existing instruments – within a well-established field. The  
obvious focus is placed on 97 actions under 36 headings that follow such vast vision. Do they 
really bring something new to the field? If we analyze the proposed actions, what emerges is 
the following picture322:  
1. The vast majority of the initiatives concern the implementation by the EU both for its 
internal and external purposes of international standards originating from the 
international forums.323 Internally they are to be translated into guidelins; externally 
either into actual initiatives or positions that are to be taken by the EU when acting 
multilaterally or bilaterally.  
2. There is a big emphasis placed on assessment of implementation324, subsequent 
learning and accountability mechanisms that are refl cted in the Strategy wording as 
impact assessments, benchmarks, planning, evaluation and reporting. 
3. The importance of institutional aspects of implementation of the Strategy are 
recognized. Actions aiming at achieving synergy in activities undertaken by 
institutions, Member States325 and EU partners are complemented by training and 
tools offered to EU officials working in the area326. 
4. ‘Effective use and interplay of EU external policy instruments’327 referring to the 
better development of working methods ranging from dialogue, targeted support, 
incentives, and restrictive measures receives somehw little attention partially because 
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it is addressed indirectly through other headings; partially because the focus of the 
strategy is reflecting inadequacy of human rights toolbox the EU has at its disposal.  
5. The Strategy, finally, recognizes the insufficient k owledge lying at the disposal of the 
EU; it also identifies the loopholes of the policy (albeit there are not many of them) 
and advocates patching them.328 
It is rather telling that over 30 of the headings put forward in the Strategic Framework refer to 
the implementation of international standards and esuring compliance with them by the 
European Union itself. The document is truly about the European Union facing the various 
facets of incoherence and defending itself against criticisms. It does so above all through 
making the principles such as legitimacy, transparency, accountability, evaluation and 
learning operational. The tools through which this objective are attained are a mix of the 
established ‘dialogue, targeted support, incentives, and restrictive’ measures and the internally 
applicable soft measures that are reflecting the internationally advocated standards.329 
This overview gives us the idea as to what it is exactly that one needs to look for when 
addressing the issue of how this particular policy objectives are to be attained and where 
should we apply rule of law and other principles that emerged in this puzzle. The following, 
and last section of Part I, in this study will systematize the ‘standing body of EU policy on 
human rights and democracy in external action’ from the point of view of how each of those 
instruments are adopted and the legal effects they have. This systematization will permit us to 
perform the analysis of whether particular elements of the body at stake fulfil the classical, 
rule of law criteria standing behind accusations of incoherence as unfolded in the first Chapter 
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IV. The Overview of the EU External Human Rights Policy Toolbox 
The ‘instrumentarium’ making up the body of human rights policy in EU’s external action can 
be considered an established field. The available instruments in traditional perception are 
well summarised by Rosas:  
‘At the level of instruments and legal norms, one can distinguish between so-called 
autonomous (unilateral) Union legal acts, on the one hand, and international agreements on 
the other. Relevant Union autonomous acts include regulations of a general nature 
instigating financing programmes for democracy and human rights, more specific 
instruments concerning a certain region or sector which may include a human rights-related 
component, instruments relating to unilateral trade preferences as well as decisions taken in 
the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter, CFSP). In fact, legislative 
acts imposing economic and financial sanctions (‘restrictive measures’) normally require a 
preceding CFSP decision. Sanctions are often, but far from always, based on binding UN 
Security Council sanctions resolutions.’
330
 
Hence, on the one hand for the purposes of the external human rights policy, the Union uses 
international agreements – either bilateral or multilateral ones. As the Action Plan 
demonstrates, on the other hand, the EU can’t seem to get hold of what exactly this 
instrumentarium is. In parts of the document it is referred to as: ‘guidelines, toolkits and 
other agreed positions and the various financial instruments’
331
; in other as ‘dialogue, 
targeted support, incentives, and restrictive measures’
332
. 
The above outlined discursive inconsistency in presentation of the EU external toolbox may 
be irrelevant from the practical point of view, however, illustrates the challenge of ensuring 
the coherence and taking on the leadership position building on the legacy of the slow 
development of the policy field. Yet, on the basis of the actions undertaken as the follow-up 
to the Action Plan we can identify what the EU itself perceives as fundamental part of the 
body of the EU external human rights policy. Furthermore, given that our ultimate search 
follows the rule of law path, we will be able to systematise the instrumentarium in a manner 
which will permit us the swiftest analysis of the toolbox from the rule of law principles 
perspective.  
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The analysis is based on the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 
in 2012 which outlines the actions undertaken by the Union on the basis of the 2012 Action 
Plan and points to the instruments that were chosen as implementing measures. 
333
 
Amongst the actions, in part, in line with Alan Rosas’s distinction, we should distinguish:  
- Unilateral Measures that are adopted for internal purposes whose addressees are 
Member States and the EU institutions (guidelines and regulations implementing 
international standards); their external component consists in their applicability to 
the EU institutions actions when performed in the realm of external policy; 
- Unilateral Measures that are adopted for external purposes directed at third 
countries and civil society both within the EU and outside of it (financial instruments, 
trade measures, sanctions, diplomatic measures including those taken in order to act 
on the international forums); 
- Bilateral and multilateral measures (chiefly international agreements but also 
regional policies instruments and human rights dialogues). 
Let us introduce those instruments briefly before they are analysed in depth from the point 
of view of rule of law principles referring to their adoption, application and available 
recourse to judicial measures that will ensue in the Part II of this study.  
A. Unilateral Measures that are adopted for internal purposes whose 
addressees are Member States and the EU institutions 
Unilateral measures taken by the European Union for internal purposes are clearly those 
that have been adopted in order to make amends for the external-internal divide. Whilst on 
the one hand this group of instruments is of lesser importance from the point of view of this 
study, they shall be regardless analysed from the point of view of the set criteria. Such 
analysis may be the entry point to the conclusion that inherently any policy of the Union 
may be guilty of similar crimes as the EU external human rights policy.  
Those instruments include the following: 
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- Guidelines (for instance on impact assessment, freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion and belief) directed at the EU institutions (either all of them or particular 
ones of them) acting internally and externally;  
- Reporting, assessing, methodology and knowledge building, planning and 
programming documents that complete the strategic EU external policy framework 
in both substantive areas (i. e. death penalty) and with regard to geographic regions 
or concrete states. 
Generally speaking we are moving here within the discretion area left to the institutions so 
that they can ensure that their capacity is sufficient in order to meet the set goals. 
Interestingly, progress on development of those instruments is infrequently put at display, 
leaving this inward looking body of EU external human rights policy chiefly to the intra- and 
inter-institutional dealings.  
B. Unilateral Measures that are adopted for external purposes directed at 
third countries and civil society both within the EU and outside of it 
This group of instruments includes the following: 
- Unilateral trade measures such as GSP plus incentive arrangement;  
- Legislative instruments adopted in order to implement international human rights 
norms. 
- European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy as the flagship financial 
instrument dedicated solely to attainment of human rights purposes;  
- Other financial instruments functioning for the purposes of specific policy fields such 
as the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument or TAIEX used in the enlargement 
context; 
- Sanctions adopted in the form of Council’s decisions. 
All of the above instruments though adopted in internal EU context, produce effects for 
external actors and as such constitute much more of a genuine foreign policy tools than the 
ones included in the first group. The first four of the analysed instruments are adopted in the 
form of regulations which makes them subject to internal rules of the EU that apply to all 
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unilateral EU measures regardless of where do they produce their ultimate effects. 
Obviously the process of their adoption is of interest and its politics resembles that of 
adoption of sanctions. Clearly those regulations as a part of the former Community tools are 
very much different in terms of the context from the CFSP measures.  
C. Bilateral and multilateral measures 
The last group of instruments subject to our analysis consists of: 
- International agreements whose object is human rights; 
- International agreements and contained therein human rights clauses; 
- Multilateral policy frameworks based on soft law arrangements such as action plans 
used for the European Neighbourhood Policy or conditionality of the enlargement 
process. 
The last group indicates the context within which other tools function and for this purpose 
proves that the general notion of a policy tool cannot be considered in a particular; outside 
of the context manner. 






Part II – Instruments of EU External Policy Under the Rule of Law 
Scrutiny 
Throughout the world,  
women and men demand to live lives of  
liberty, dignity and security 
 in open and democratic societies  
underpinned by human rights and the rule of law.334 
Part II of this study focuses on with what is analysed within the ambit of the EU external 
human rights policy. It offers a systematic analysis of the external human rights policy 
instruments in the light of rule of law principles identified in Chapter 2. The results of the 
analysis will be put into perspective through two means.  
Firstly, they will need to be set against the wider policy framework (offered by the 
preambular text of those instruments). This approach will permit us to evaluate how much 
of the actual policy falls within the scope of traditionally imposed rule of law paradigm. The 
broader policy framework provides a wealth of information as to what are the purposes - 
and conflicting at times objectives – need to be fulfilled within the scope of a given policy 
instrument.  
Secondly, the perspective that needs to be taken into consideration is that of the legal 
sphere where those instruments are both created and subsequently function. It is of 
importance for the purposes of this study whether the creation of those instruments 
exhausts the possibilities offered by legal systems. In other words, it is of importance 
whether the European Union and the international legal systems permit for taking the rule 
of law paradigm further; alternatively: whether these legal systems and their limits force EU 
institutions to seek creative solutions and alternative routes in order to attain policy 
objectives.  
The fact that we are dealing here with instruments that operate at the border line between 
the EU internal legal system and the external international legal system adds to the analysis 
at least two additional angles. On the one hand, it required that the applied rule of law 
principles are of more generic nature; such that could be applicable both to the internal and 
external sphere. Chapter 2 contains a lengthy analysis of which principles should be taken 
                                                      
334
 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (11855/12). 
136 
 
into consideration, there is no need to repeat them here. Yet, the mere need to search for 
such set of rule of law benchmarks that would be applicable to this particular legal context 
illustrates very well the difficulty of understanding and evaluating any external relations 





incoherence that has been diminished largely after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Still, 
this incoherence will continue to exist as long as there are doubts as to the EU general 
competence in the area of fundamental and human rights and the self-standing character of 
the Charter for Fundamental Rights.  
At the same time, wherever legal systems intersect it frequently occurs that what is 
permitted in one legal system cannot be realised in another one. This is where limits of legal 
systems at stake force innovation and creativity on the part of legislators and executors. In 
particular, as we know from the case law of the CJEU ‘(w)ith regard to the implementation of 
the provisions of the Treaty, the system of internal Community measures may not (...) be 
separated from that of external relations.’
337
  
Human rights policy internally is intertwined strongly with ensuring the rule of law within the 
EU's realm. The rule of law internally is manifested by ensuring sufficient guarantees of the 
state (or as in this case – the EU and the MSs) being bound by human rights in an equal 
manner, that they are transparent, clear and accessible, and, finally, that the power of the 
EU and its MSs is not exercised arbitrarily.
338
 Externally, as we have seen none of those 
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guarantees apply, yet the internal process of the Union does follow principles derived from 
the broadly understood rule of law enriching them with further ones both characteristic of 
the legal system of the EU (such as the direct effect or principles of supremacy and 
proportionality) and operational ones referring to instruments this system has developed for 
the attainment of its goals (participation, local ownership etc.). Externally, outside of the EU 
realm the conditions of the rule of law do not apply in the same manner – they are different, 
yet reflect similar principles (disputed widely in the literature)
339
, since they apply to other 
entities – predominantly states and international organisations. The mentioned principles 
encompass the non-arbitrariness in the exercise of power (and thus principle pact sunt 
servanda, and the general trend to establish legal bodies, entities subject to rules, 
international organizations etc.), supremacy of the law thus created (hence the principle of 
within the law of the EU), and finally: the equality before the law (bringing us back to the 
discussed before issues of double standards and coherent use of the policy). These are basic 
principles applicable in the relations between entities of international law – which are, in 
human rights language, sovereign actors and main duty bearers.  
At the same time, the area of human rights carries with itself particular challenges. Firstly, 
the binding international legal human rights framework exists – the challenge is to force 
states to observe it. There, the international agreements which have the highest legal status 
                                                                                                                                                                      
'The reliance and emphasis placed on law has built an unspoken acceptance of notions of modern Western law 
and its processes so as to establish order, clarity and a degree of certainty for the settlement of disputes and 
for planning by those constituents who are affected  by its application. It enables expectations to be given 
some degree of shape. This is a common attribute ascribed to law across a range of legal philosophies. Even 
amongst legal pluralists or post-modern analysts there is recognition that the force of law necessitates a 
degree of certainty within at least local or systemic parameters. Otherwise, the charge of arbitrary decision 
making is raised to undermine the whole premise for a particular system of law and the political order over 
which it is supposed to rule.  
But notwithstanding this necessary quality, law in the EU has had to evolve, as already suggested, within 
geographical, political, philosophical and constitutional environment that remains steadfastly conditioned by 
uncertainty to the point of indeterminacy. It has had to respond to significant debate and shifting patterns in 
political direction, in perceived threat, in economic conditions, in geo-politics, in demographics, and in 
constitutional structure. So we have law that has been provided with few constitutionally-fixed coordinates. 
How then can those values preferred politically and thus supposedly to be applied through law be protected so 
as not to go beyond reasonable uncertainty and become indeterminate in content and tone? 
(...) 
We appear to be no nearer a considered understanding of the contribution of law to the values and the make-
up of the institutional ethos of the EU or vice versa. In particular, no captivating philosophy for the Union or of 
its law has emerged. And, more importantly, no developed discourse or established institution-specific theory 
of substantive justice has been evident.' Williams, The ethos of Europe : values, law and justice in the EU, at 13-
14. 
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and binding force. But even if the external sources of law are to have the primary effect, 
they are in no way to be enforced internally if sovereignty is to be observed. And, above all, 
decisions about the enforcement of international agreements are down to political actors 
and processes.  
If we think 'rule of law' type of instruments for the EU external policy, we should be looking 
for instruments which have the characteristics of the law – the legal rules are to determine 
the full process and all the options and have to be equally applicable to all entities with 
whom the EU has been maintaining relations. As such, the creation and the use of those 
instruments should be independent of political will on both sides of the relationship. This 
means that the architecture of such instruments should foresee some sort of review and 
accountability mechanism. Since, in almost all the cases human rights obligations included in 
cooperation agreements constitute reiteration of the earlier made commitments, this 
requires participation of third countries in the development of the commitment of the third 
country that takes place
340
 in a transparent manner.  
Judging from the literature on the subject
341
 these are the qualities of the external human 
rights instruments we are looking for, and this is a premise from which their use has been 
evaluated. In other words, when human rights are concerned, especially if we speak about 
the historically long lived abusers such as the European Union and its Member States, we no 
longer accept the international law framework which seems way to weak for the type of 
obligations at stake. The Union, is expected and, at least according to its own rhetoric: 
wishes to act as a human rights enforcement agency. It has taken the functional approach 
and has been taking the rule of law in international relations more and more seriously, yet 
within the limits of what can be done imposed on it by its own legal order. What resulted, is 
an evolving matrix of instruments which attempts at fulfilling the above described 
characteristics, whilst alleviating the negative effects of the above all internal political 
process, and enhancing the participation of external actors.  
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The combination of the two sets of legal regimes marks the space within which the EU can 
act; the space to which the rule of law criteria devised for a less complex national systems 
normally apply. The architecture of this space has, as a consequence, two somehow 
contradictory phenomena: on the one hand, they do not permit to fulfil some of the 
postulates connected with the rule of law paradigm because of, what may be called, 
structural problems. On the other hand, this problem is amended for through proliferation 
of instruments that formally go beyond what the two legal systems permit without directly 
contradicting them. In other words, going beyond the set limits leads to deadlocks in some 
aspects and innovation in others.  
Graph No 2: Rule of Law Sieve: from Deadlock to Innovation 
 
The image of the sieve is to be kept in mind throughout the study brought about in the 
following chapters. Neither the international, nor the European legal systems are complete, 
therefore, they permit for a certain degree of flexibility. Flexibility is permissible only if it 
follows the principles entrenched with the process; process that follows a paradigm close to 
the rule of law, but possibly a broader one – the one that responds in a better way to 
challenges and demands of an altering foreign policy.  
As any international actor the EU with reference to human rights (or any international law 
issue) has as its disposal unilateral measures which produce effects external to its legal order 
and international norms it creates in collaboration with other international actors – 
multilateral and bilateral instruments. Both sets of instruments either follow the 
requirements of the legal systems or whilst encountering the deadlock ‘sieve through’ the 
system through the use of informal forms of collaboration.  
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Hence the principles we are looking for should be found in the procedures the EU employs in 
the creation of the two types of instruments. Obviously their presence is in no means 
obscure and can be traced at various stages of those procedures as provided for by the two 
legal systems at stake. 
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On Methodology  
Before moving on to the analysis of particular types of instruments through the lens of rule 
of law paradigm, I would like to make a comment on methodology of categorisation of 
instruments.  
Analysing the fulfilment of the rule of law criteria by various instruments at disposal of the 
EU is a difficult task largely because much of what the institutions are doing lies beyond 
reach of an average citizen. One either needs to be there and conduct field research 
observing each step taken by delegations, or rely on staff’s accounts. Both methods of 
gathering information frequently go beyond reach of experts conducting studies due to 
financial and political reasons. The assessment of the policy is usually based on the systemic 
data – rarely does it go into details of actual day-to-day practice.  
This study focuses solely on what is a public information in the area of the EU external 
human rights policy. The choice of instruments described is drawn from the instruments 
mentioned in the 2012 EU human rights strategy; yet the particular aspects of instrument 
creation, application and conflict resolution are based on the availability of the information 
on the issue. Hence, for every single aspect, three instruments are selected which can be 
analysed through the basic lens of this study – rule of law paradigm. The complete overview 
of an instrument’s practice would require a separate study – of a smaller scale; a study 
which may, in the future complement the present one.  
The classification of the instruments draws on the 2012 EU Strategic Framework
342
 and 
updated on the basis of the 2012 EU Human Rights Report
343
. It is the first comprehensive 
instrument produced by the EU institutions that demonstrates the total of EU external 
human rights initiatives. The classification distinguishes from the actions included in the 
Action plan unilateral instruments adopted for internal EU purposes and those adopted for 
external EU purposes and bilateral/multilateral. It identifies further two groups of actions 
whose objective is not to create a new instrument (i. e. guidelines), neither are they 
supposed to attain actions’ objectives with the use of existing instruments (i. e. promotion of 
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a specific set of rights with the use of the European Instrument for Human Rights and 
Democracy).  
These are, firstly, actions amounting to introducing institutional changes within the EU 
institutional structures; changes that needed to be introduced in order to facilitate the EU 
external human rights objectives. Such actions involve either creation of an additional body, 
or a section of body (such as the Brussels section of COHOM), conducting training sessions 
(usually directed at members of EU delegations and missions), or development of new 
arrangements in the manner the EU functions externally (for instance through rearranging 
collaboration with the Member States). The second group of actions (named ‘Other’ in the 
Annex) consists of actual events and initiatives that are obviously conducted within the 
budget and use of existing instruments, yet within their discretion. Examples of such actions 
include campaigning on specific issues or gathering and publication of contact details of EU 
human rights focal points. These actions, even though possibly much more interesting 
substantively, cannot be assessed from the procedural point of view and will not be, 
therefore, included in our analysis in a manner other than recalling their undertaking at the 
instrument enforcement stage.  
Following a brief introduction of each of the types of instruments, their fulfilment of rule of 
law criteria will be tested on the basis of the criteria selected in the earlier part of this study. 
In order to illustrate the extent to which the rule of law criteria are fulfilled, with relation to 
each of the sets of criteria a set of three concrete instruments is selected which 
subsequently undergoes a more detailed scrutiny. The selection is guided by three 
considerations – firstly, the selected instruments together must give the broadest picture of 
how the rule of law principles are fulfilled; secondly, their selection is connected with the 
availability of written sources referring to them (this is particularly true for the application of 
instruments); finally, at the end of the analysis of each of the sets of instruments an attempt 
is made at presenting the fullest, yet condensed picture of the EU external human rights 
policy. 
The analysis will follow the rule of law benchmarks concerning the creation and application 
of instruments at stake, yet with a slight modification. In order to avoid repetition, each of 
the chapters will be finalised with general observation on the role of the court in relation to 
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specific instruments. The section thus devoted to courts will encompass observations on the 
availability of judicial review both at the stage of creation and application of instruments as 





Chapter 4 – Unilateral Instruments adopted for Internal Purposes Addressed at 
the EU Institutions and their Staff, Member States Foreign Ministries, and Other 
Actors 
I. Setting the Scene 
The category of unilateral instruments adopted for internal purposes of the European Union 
in relation with international obligations comprises many items. Yet, it largely gathers 
instruments adopted by the EU in reaction to the external-internal human rights policy 
divide. These instruments serve two general goals. Firstly, they contribute to an internal 
‘capacity’ building for the purpose of attaining external human rights objectives. They 
facilitate institutions’ tasks in these aspects through gathering knowledge on human rights 
related problems, international standards and the thorough knowledge of policies and 
stages where such problems could be best addressed. Alternatively, they provide guidelines 
step-by-step indications for the institutions and their staff (and sometimes third parties as 
well) to follow when acting in external policy field. Secondly, the unilateral instruments 
directed at the institutions contribute to the image building of the EU as a human rights 
actor thus depriving the internal-external incoherence claim of its edge.   
Table 3 provides the list of those activities following the 2012 EU Framework
344
 set against 
the background of what the EU has achieved since its adoption as provided for in the 2012 
EU’s Human Rights report
345
. 
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These instruments (even though named in a non-systematic manner
347
) can be divided into 
two broad categories: classical policy making and evaluation instruments (programs, plans, 
reports, impact assessment methodologies), and guidelines to be applied by the Union, its 
Member States and their officials and other entities
348
 in external activities
349
. The former 
group, in the EU jargon is referred to as the preparatory documents and as such figures in 
the Eur-lex depository; the latter are adopted by the Council following the approval by the 
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European Council. Importantly, both categories of instruments are in theory non-binding 
and, therefore, soft law measures. Yet, as far as they concern the institutions, the 
preparatory acts bind them imposing a specific standard of action. The acts of highest 
significance are those directed not only to the institutions themselves, but also to wider 
public.
350
 The importance of the audience will be raised again below and for this purpose 
distinguishing between two sets of instruments will be necessary. Given that the preparatory 
acts and guidelines take a slightly different route in the rule-making process, the analysis 
thereof shall be kept separate where necessary. It needs to be noted, however, that apart 
from related category of programmes and plans of action
351
, the unilateral instruments did 
not serve the purpose of adopting legislative acts – importance of the difference will be vivid 
in the next chapter.  
Let us proceed to the analysis of those instruments from the perspective of the aspired 
standard of rule of law. The analysis shall be illustrated with examples drawn from 
instruments represented in the Table No 2.  
II. Rule of Law Principles Concerning Instrument Creation 
When recalling standards of rule of law principles concerning instruments creation (non-
arbitrariness, generality, prospectivity; transparency, clarity and the availability of judicial 
review), it is somewhat obvious that it may be easier to attribute characteristics of some of 
those principles to a given instrument than others. In the particular context of unilateral 
instruments that are adopted for internal purposes of the Union, the analysis of the 
presence of particular principles is made more difficult by the fact that the legal character of 
those instruments is still being explored. The recent scholarly analysis point, inter alia, to the 
manner in which constitutional setting affects those instruments.
352
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Let us begin with the criterion of generality and non-arbitrariness. It is important to note 
that from the international law perspective all of the human rights instruments should be of 
general and non-arbitrary application. In fact, the majority of initiatives on the part of the 
Union are about importing the general and non-arbitrary norms into its legal system. 
Interestingly, through such importation the EU binds only itself and its staff with those 
norms thus above all emphasising the fact that it is also subject to them and that all of its 
agents are equally bound by them. Those norms, more than anything, contribute to the 





 serve this purpose.  
This having said, we need to pay a little bit more attention to both the form in which those 
standards exist in international practice and the manner in which the EU implements those 
acts. International standards are either embedded in international conventions to which the 
EU is a party (the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), international 
conventions to which the EU is not a party (up till now European Convention on Human 
Rights), and international non-binding human rights related instruments (such as the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights). Whilst we shall deal with the 
implementation of EU’s own international obligations stemming from international 
agreements in chapters below, the other two sets of standards are of more interest to our 
analysis at this stage.  
Both through implementation of standards stemming from international conventions to 
which the EU is not a party and those coming from non-binding instruments, the EU 
becomes the part of the international community. Somehow as it seems, because this 
international community already includes the EU Member States, it is sufficient if the EU 
implements the standards in its own actions. In addition, given the non-binding nature of the 
very international standards, the EU is not compelled to use legal instruments which would 
surpass in their effects those on international level – instruments-sources of the said 
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standards. The question echoing the criticisms and the elevated expectations towards the 
Union comes to one’s mind: could the EU go further in its mostly voluntary aspiration to join 
the international club of human rights actors? Of course it could
355
 - would a most straight-
forward answer be. Nevertheless, it does not seem so straight-forward. In pragmatic terms, 
whenever the EU is taking a unilateral action in binding terms, the question of the 
competence and the relationship with the Member States emerges. In other words – even if 
the elevated standards of the EU action were to concern only the EU institutions (as the 
guidelines seemingly do), it would have been impossible to insulate them from any sort of 
interactions with Member States actions and their legal systems. This supposition has 
already had its practical demonstration in the manner in which the Charter for Fundamental 
Rights is applied, despite being addressed only to ‘the institutions, bodies, offices, and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member 
States only when they are implementing Union law’.
356
 If the Member States acting on the 
international arena have chosen a specific manner of international standard formulation, is 
the EU legitimised to go beyond? These considerations have an impact on the discussion of 
generality and non-arbitrariness of human rights norms to be implemented by the European 
Union. Let us assume that the international human rights norms as developed in a particular 
legal form (international agreements, guidelines etc.) by  international organisation 
associating the majority of states form our general non-arbitrary benchmark. Would 
implementation of such norms (without affecting their content) in a more advanced legal 
form affect the perception of generality and non-arbitrariness? It seems that any alteration 
of those internationally agreed standards poses questions as to the fulfilment of those 
standards: Why this and not other legal form? What impact would this have on the content 
and end recipients and beneficiaries of these norms? From the perspective of the generality 
and non-arbitrariness of the unilateral measures falling within this category, it seems clear 
that the maintenance of international legal form of a given instrument is a safer solution. 
And since the Union follows the form set by the UN and other international organisations 
setting the standards, both generality and non-arbitrariness is attributable to the unilateral 
instruments addressed internally.  
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Similarly, prospectivity seems to be an easy criterion for evaluation, yet here also at least 
one doubt as to its fulfilment emerges. Most of the preparatory documents are adopted as a 
follow up to various EU strategies and subsequently reviewed. Yet, frequently, the EU does 
not manage to perform all of the foreseen activities and as a result they are adopted 
towards the end of a foreseen period. This is the case, for instance, with the democracy 
reports within all of the pilot countries.
357
 Whilst the prospective aspect is obviously not lost, 
the subsequent review cannot be fully performed not permitting to assess fully the 
prospectivity of those instruments.  
As for the clarity of the norms included in such instruments, there are at least two aspects to 
be taken into consideration. Firstly, since they serve the implementation of international 
norms, substantively they should follow those norms thus transmitting the image of EU not 
only implementing international measures, but also fitting coherently in the international 
system of human rights protection. The norms may be assumed clear as they are a 
reiteration of existing instruments that, as it can be claimed, have been given clarity within 
the context where they have been adopted. Within the unilateral instruments at stake, we 
will find those implementing Human Rights Based Approach to Development (objective 10), 
international humanitarian law standards (objective 12), promoting ratification and 
implementation of Rome statute (objective 27). At other instances, the EU implements 
concrete international legal acts, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (objective 30), UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (objective 
25), or the UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace, and Security (objective 
12).
358
 In other words, the norms are clear inasmuch as the international norms are clear. 
This leads us to a second consideration: What if those norms are by no means clear? This 
may be the case if we consider the ‘pure’ human rights norms such as those enshrined in the 
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European Convention for Human Rights. There, the Strasbourg Court fills those rights (their 
limitations and procedural conditions) with meaning that further determines their 
application in national legal systems. Could this be a case with the unilateral instruments of 
the EU at stake? The unilateral instruments that are internally addressed take the 
international human rights norms and translate them into the executive, internally 
applicable provisions. The executive nature of such provisions specifically requires that they 
are in a ‘ready to use’ form – not only easily applicable by institutions, but also permitting to 
perform assessment of those institutions’ actions. Again, let us recall the sample of 
documents quoted above.  
Human Rights Based Approach to Development (HRBAD) as the UN generated manner of 
incorporating human rights into the development practice has always been mostly an 
internal initiative of the UN agencies. Notably, the reason why the HRBAD has been 
developed was the legitimacy crisis on the part of those very agencies. They needed to 
develop internally a number of instruments to, firstly, guide their action, and, secondly, 
assess them in the light of fulfilled human rights obligations. As the result, a number of 
agency-specific operational instruments have been developed rendering the HRBAD very 
blurred.  It is within such context that the EU needs to elaborate its own take on the HRBAD. 
The process is ongoing, hence it remains to be seen whether the EU is capable of enhancing 
the clarity of the picture.  
In terms of implementation of concrete international legal acts, the situation seems to be 
even less complicated. Let us take the example of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (Objective 30) which in the external relations context is particularly 
valid in the development cooperation. There, the EU Commission has adopted two working 
documents: the 2012 Guidance Note for EU Staff: Disability Inclusive Development 
Cooperation
359
, and the September 2013, a Sixth Disability High Level Group Report on the 
Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The latter is 
to serve the alteration of development programmes in the framework of the European 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020. 
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To sum up, the clarity of norms in the unilateral instruments at stake depends largely on the 
same quality to be attributed to the international instruments from which the EU ones 
originate. Yet again, the above reasoning applies pertaining to whether the EU could 
implement those instruments in a better, clearer manner. Yet again, the answer would be 
similar – it could have, yet, such step would have serious implications for its internal legal 
order. On the other hand, as we could see on the example of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, wherever the EU could have shaped the content of the 
norms at the international level, it would have certainly done so.  Hence, it cannot be stated 
that the EU fulfils in a complete manner the clarity requirement with reference to the 
internally addressed unilateral instruments. To give it justice, however, the reasons why this 
is the case are convincing if we consider the legal systems context and their interactions. 
Finally, possibly the biggest problem posed by the preparatory acts and guidelines is that of 
transparency of adoption procedures. Volume 19 of the European Law Journal dealt with 
the extent to which constitutional principles of transparency, democratic participation and 
openness applied to the preparatory acts. On the one hand, the procedural aspects are clear 
since all of the institutions have their rules of procedure, on the other, they are extremely 
difficult to follow given various stages of their creation and extensive involvement of civil 
society. 
Let us analyse three examples of instruments at stake in order to better understand if and 
how transparency principle may apply to them and the extent to which it is visible. We shall 
focus on three instruments: sectoral guides for the effective implementation of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; European Commission Staff Working 
Document ‘Trade and Worst forms of Child Labour’ of 30 April 2013, and the EU Guidelines 
on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion and belief of 24 June 2013. These 
documents were selected in order to analyse three ways of arriving at the final outcome. In 
the first case the European Commission assigned (outsourced) compilation of a handbook to 
a think tank; in the second case it acted on its own accord. Finally, the Guidelines represent a 




However, before dealing with those three processes, we need to recall the approach the EU 
has taken towards transparency in its decision making inasmuch as it concerns the drafting 
and elaboration of preparatory acts.  
Transparency in the European Union institutions refers predominantly to three general 
issues: clarity of processes and participation in them through open consultations, thus 
connected access to institutions’ documents and information about who participates in both 
formal and informal decision making processes. All of the three aspects of transparency have 
been widely debated with the view of reforming generally conceived access to documents 
and transparency since 2008.
360
 The most important one from our point of view – access to 
documents
361
 is still being decided with the European Parliament awaiting the decision of 
the Council’s first reading position.
362
 Hence, the current access to documents is granted on 
the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents
363
. According to the regulation a third party can request access to the EU 
document understood as ‘any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in 
electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating 
to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the institution's sphere of 
responsibility.’
364
 Hence, all of the reproducible output of the EU institutions should be 
accessible for the EU citizens. The problem identifiable easily with reference to preparatory 
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acts we are discussing here is fairly simple – we do not know how many of these documents 
are drafted, as internal procedures of institutions (apart from rules of procedure and codes 
of conduct) are nowhere to be found. In addition, especially the staff documents and 
guidance notes are to be produced by the Commission and/or the High Representative in a 
very ad-hoc manner; it is not clear if, when, and where consultations take place and how 
exactly is the process structured. Let us see on the example of the three selected 
instruments the extent to which transparency is visible in the stage of creation of EU 
unilateral human rights instruments directed at its own institutions and other EU bodies. 
1. Sectoral Guides on Human Rights and Business 
The three sectoral guides were elaborated in implementation of the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights. Their creation was deemed as one of the priority actions of 
the Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility.
365
 In December 2011 the European 
Commission selected  two think tanks - the Institute for Human Rights and Business and Shift 
– to conduct the drafting and consultation process for the three Guides. The process of 
drafting the guides was maintained transparent and open by the selected research 
institutes. It was to commence with the selection of sectors which ensued in February 2012 
following the setting up of the objective criteria on the basis of contributions from various 
stakeholders.
366
 The research phase of drafting of the Guides consisted of confidential 
interviews with stakeholders and desk-research followed by preliminary release of the first 
draft for the public comment in December 2012. In the meantime, two roundtables with 
participation of stakeholders and the Commission took place. The consultation
367
 phase 
came to an end in January 2013, and the three Guidance documents were submitted to the 
European Commission in April 2013 for publication.
368
 
The case of the three guides proves that even if the process of drafting is outsourced from 
the Commission, a think tank commissioned with the task is obliged to act in an open and 
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 For consultation documents, visit: http://www.ihrb.org/project/eu-sector-guidance/consultation-
documents-and-reports.html. 
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transparent manner. Steps taken are, therefore, documented with result of each of them 
published and accessible to public. At the same time, however, the manner in which 
consultations and drafting are conducted is not proceduralised; though it takes place 
according to the usual project management format. 
2. European Commission Staff Working Document ‘Trade and Worst forms of Child 
Labour’ of 30 April 2013
369
 
European Commission Staff Working Document ‘Trade and Worst forms of Child Labour’ was 
prepared ‘at the invitation’ of the Council expressed in Council’s Conclusions on Child Labour 
adopted on 14 June 2010.
370 
The process of drafting of the document, unlike its origins, is 
much less transparent.  
The website of DG Trade recalls the document only with reference to  the expert seminar (3 
October 2012) and a meeting with civil society (10 October 2012). The former meeting took 
place with participation of experts of international organisations and academia (inter alia: 
'Understanding Children's Work' (WB, ILO, UNICEF), University of Florence, Department of 
Labor, US,  IPEC, UNICEF, OECD)
371
. The latter meeting involved organisations of 
stakeholders.
372
 Otherwise, the repositories of the documents (and therefore the only 
openly accessible source of information on the EU legislative and non-legislative process) 
refer either only to the final version of the Working Document
373
, or they refer to it within its 
own structures of decision making, as in the case of the European Parliament which received 
the document on 23 May 2013.
374
 Clearly adoption of an informal Working Staff document 
by the European Commission had to take place on an informal basis, however, it would be 
interesting to know who adopts these types of documents. If such document was to be 
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adopted by the Commissioners, then should the voting be needed, the majority would need 
to be established on the basis of the rules of the Treaty and the principle of collegial 
responsibility could have been applied.
375
 Article 8 of Commission’s Rule of Procedure 
stipulate in addition that “majority shall be required irrespective of the tenor and the nature 
of the decision”.
376
 Yet, the Minutes of Commission’s agenda
377
 do not report on the Staff 
Document – it simply wasn’t discussed that day which means that it must have been 
adopted within DG Trade – with applicable rules unknown.  
Clearly, the process of adopting the Staff Working Document is not very transparent. Whilst 
one can understand the internal nature of both deliberation, approval and application of this 
instrument, it would be useful to understand how this types of documents come about.  
3. The EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion and 
belief of 24 June 2013
378
 
The last of examples at stake involves one of the sets of EU guidelines adopted in 2013; 
interesting inasmuch as the process of their adoption goes back to 2009.
379
 They have been 
revised by the European External Action Service, yet no documents from the drafting process 
are openly available.
380
 Whilst there is no information about the consultation process
381
, 




                                                      
375
 See, in relation to preparatory acts: CJEU, Case C-137/92 Commission v BASF and Others [1994] ECR I-2555, 
paragraph 62: ' According to settled case-law, the principle of collegiality is based on the equal participation of 
the Commissioners in the adoption of decisions, from which it follows in particular that decisions should be the 
subject of collective deliberation and that all the members of the college of Commissioners should bear 
collective responsibility at political level for all decisions adopted (Case 5/85 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1986] 
ECR 2585, paragraph 30; Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1986] ECR 2859, and Case 
137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others, cited above, paragraph 63)'. 
376
 European Commission, Rules of Procedure, OJ 2000 L 308/26, as subsequently amended.  
377
 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10060/2013/EN/10060-2013-2044-EN-F1-1.Pdf.  
378
 Union, ‘EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief of 24 June 2013’. 
379
 Draft Council Conclusions on Freedom of Religion or Belief of 11 November 2009, 15510/09, COHOM 250, 
PESC 1488, COPOL 72. 
380
 Though they can be requested according to the rules in force. See: Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of 30 May 
2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ(2001) L 145/43-
48 ibidand Decision of 19 July 2011 on the rules regarding access to documents, OJ(2011) C 243/16. 
381
 See: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/consultations/index_en.htm. 
382
 See, for instance: Input to the drafting process of EU guidelines on the Freedom of Religion or Belief. 
158 
 
Once the draft had left the European External Action Service, its path is much easier to 
follow.
383
 The European Parliament, following the initiative of the Laima Liucija Andrikiene 
under the Rule 121 of Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament
384
 deliberated on the 
issue drawing on the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee
385
. Finally, the Parliament 
adopted a Recommendation to the Council on the draft EU Guidelines on the Promotion and 
Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief (2013/2082(INI))
386
.  
Clearly, the Recommendation to the Council played a role in subsequent deliberations – it is 
hard to determine the extent to which the action on the part of the European Parliament 
was taken into account by the Council for the unavailability of various versions of draft 
Guidelines.
387
 Nevertheless, the final draft was adopted on 24 June 2013 which makes the 
process relatively short even if it’s initiation was to be counted back to the adoption of the 
Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy on 25 June 2012.  
The three selected processes of adoption of preparatory acts paint a very diverse picture of 
transparency in the area of unilateral instruments directed at the EU, its institutions, bodies 
and Member States. Whilst it is true that they are directed at the institutions acting in 
external field, the processes of adoption vary and cannot be followed in a transparent 
manner. It is possible to request access to documents both from the High Representative as 
well as the Council, yet the process is extremely time consuming. Furthermore, in case of 
present documents, the mere need to request access to documents  would not have existed, 
had the procedures been clear and accessible. Otherwise, the path that needs to be taken 
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during document creation is simply out of reach. Clearly, the leeway in political debate is 
important, yet if we consider that such debate takes place within the realm of human rights 
– and therefore apparently common traditions of the EU Member States - any sort of secrecy 




III. Rule of Law Principles Concerning Instrument Application: Transparency 
and Equality 
Assessing rule of law principles concerning instrument application is a harder task than 
understanding whether the unilateral internally directed instruments of EU external human 
rights are construed in line with rule of law criteria. The difficulty of this task lies in the fact 
that we need to define what in this context instrument application means. Normally, this 
(and the possibility of judicial intervention) would be dependent on a legal form of such 
instruments and the legal effects they may cause. A few thoughts on this matter shall be 
presented before focusing on the particular instruments.  
Whilst it is a conventional view that the instruments at stake are of preparatory nature, their 
actual classification defies the usual categories to which the instruments belong. Of help to 
focus the discussion on actual systematic instances of instrument application will be to 
exclude from the discussion instruments addressed at the general public. Framed as 
guidelines elaborated together with and addressed at the representatives of businesses, in 
terms of their content they could be conceived of as recommendations. As such they are to 
be applied on voluntary basis and have scarce legal value. In fact, it would be very difficult to 
determine which legal effects would such instruments produce vis-à-vis third parties. They 
are not there to be orthodoxically observed, they are offered to the members of the 
business as a proposal. From this point of view, they should be considered as non-legal 
instruments. And as such they are not and cannot be regarded as instruments whose 
application can be assessed.
388
 
The remaining instruments present a different case study: the two organisational groups 
include joint proposals from the High Representative, notes to the Delegations and 
Commission Staff working documents. These instruments contain either operational 
guidance on their behaviour, or build the knowledge necessary to execute EU obligations. 
Their application therefore consists in either taking into consideration of the findings 
brought about by those instruments in the decision making by the Commission or in the 
actual use of those instruments in the practice of the Commission, EEAS, and the EU 
Delegations in the field. 
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In terms of the form, the instruments within this group do not belong to any of the 
categories listed in Article 288 TFEU: they are not considered as legal acts. Nevertheless, 
they provide guidance to the institutions and these institutions are supposed to apply them. 
Their form is decisive inasmuch as even tracing their impact is concerned.  
1. Transparency and Equality in instrument application 
The principles of transparency and equality in case of application of the instruments at stake 
should be considered collectively as the latter is dependent on the former. Basically without 
transparency we cannot assess equality.  
The imminent problem appears with reference to these instruments as far as their 
application is concerned. Most of them, referred to as guidelines or guidance notes for the 
staff, indicate content to be taken into consideration when making other decisions. Hence, in 
order to trace their application, we need to understand whether the institutions at stake 
recall the guidelines in their internal documents, or, other publications.  
Yet again three instruments shall be selected in order to paint the broadest possible picture 
and illustrate best problems of their application. The first of the instruments are the 
guidelines. We shall deal with the oldest guidelines evoked in the Action Plan - the 2001 EU 
Guidelines on Torture, as updated on 20 March 2012 and the study for the European 
Parliament published in 2007 and updated in 2009, and the 2008 EU Guidelines on Human 
Rights Defenders
389
 whose evaluation was published in 2013
390
. The fact that they were 
adopted will make it much easier to trace their presence in the practice of the EU 
institutions. The second instrument: the Guidance Note for EU Staff: Disability Inclusive 
Development Cooperation of 2012
391
 is a sample of Commission internal document directed 
at EURAID whilst the third document – ‘Joint Working Document on Advancing the Principle 
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of Complementarity’ of 31 January 2012
392
 provides an example of an inter-institutional 
collaboration directed at the staff of both the EEAS and the European Commission.  
The implementation and the use of the 2001 EU Guidelines on Torture has been subject of 
the study commissioned by the European Parliament whose results were published in 
2007.
393
 According to the note summarising the study:  
‘It appears clear from the material collected, that most ECDs and EU Missions have neither 
entrusted a specific person with the task of ensuring the implementation of the guidelines 
per se, nor set any priorities on the basis of them. (…) Furthermore, most Missions do not 
appear to have received any specific instructions on how to use the guidelines. As pointed 
out by one representative in this respect, no instructions had been issued to the effect that 
their work should specifically or uniquely be based on the guidelines.’
394
  
It seems, therefore, that the Guidelines inasmuch as they were to specifically guide 
institutions were present, yet not much has been done in order to indicate the specific use 
for them in this particular context. This was altered once the review of the guidelines in 2008 
took place and introduced a number of operational indications – including monitoring and 
evaluation reporting for Heads of Missions. In line with the operational guidelines their 
content was to be implemented through: political dialogue, following on individual cases, 
including issuance of demarches, financial and technical assistance to stakeholders in third 
countries, cooperation with the Member States, inducing the creation of rehabilitation 
centres. Yet, all of the above initiatives are very much dependent on the awareness of the 
Heads of Missions and their team that has been apparently and in line with the report 
update seriously raised thanks to the efforts by the EU (in particular training) and the 
Member States. Furthermore, the accessibility of information on particular activities is very 
scarce – experts drafting studies for the European Parliament have relied chiefly on 
interviews with staff of the EU delegation (and that in selected countries only).  
The more recent 2008 Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders have been tremendously 
successful, providing a boost to the EU efforts towards popularising the knowledge about 
the EU human rights defenders oriented initiatives and ultimately urging also Member States 
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to contribute to the provision of temporary shelters for them (objective 18). Yet, even there 
a number of doubts arise. Whilst the implementation was to be overseen by the COHOM
395
, 
it is to be conducted ultimately by the EU Delegations. In general, since 2010 the main tool 
to be used by the EU delegations was supposed to be the Human Rights Country Strategies, 
which are in great part, however, unavailable. The delegates explain the secrecy of the 
strategies with the need to protect their own priorities but also particular human rights 
defenders. Nevertheless, at the moment apparently efforts are made in order to include the 
findings of the country strategies into the EU annual human rights reports.
396
 
In practice, it works in the following manner:  
‘Within the EEAS structure, responsibility for the Guidelines policy sits within the Human 
Rights and Democracy Unit and human rights policies are acted on across EEAS geographic 
desks. The geographic desks are involved in human rights defender activities as part of their 
work with their field colleagues in a given country, for example, in relation to individual 
cases raised during human rights dialogues, or a communication regarding a démarche 
undertaken locally on behalf of an HRD. The EEAS human rights policy desk and geographic 
desks have cross cutting activities and direct engagement with field missions, such as liaising 
with colleague on visa applications for HRDs or on pending EU programmes for HRDs at risks. 
Programme support and grant making for HRDs and civil society is available through the 
European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy (EIDHR) managed through the 
Directorate General for Development Cooperation - EuropeAid (DEVCO)2 and the EEAS.’ 
397
 
Yet again, the success of the Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (and other guidelines 
for that matter) depends on the awareness of delegations’ staff. For that reason  
‘(t)he EEAS provides human rights trainings for EUD diplomats twice a year to work toward 
the aim of mainstreaming human rights into external actions. Trainings are mandatory for 
HoMs, HoDs, and human rights focal points of EUDs. The Guidelines were described as 
mentioned in EEAS human rights trainings, but there are no ‘Guidelines focused’ trainings 
offered. The EEAS provides funding to the NGO Frontline to carry out two trainings per year 
on the implementation of the Guidelines in third countries, which involve HRDs, EUD and 
MSM staff. These trainings are designed to support the interface between HRDs and EU 




The picture that emerges from this very brief overview of Guidelines implementation and 
application is a rather chaotic one. Whilst Guidelines with time tend to be more specific as to 
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which actions need to be predominantly taken, initially they simply exist – their impact on 
policy enforcement is scarce. Only with time, following, the initial surprising (sic!) realisation 
that if not promoted, the mere existence of the guidelines is neglected by the staff, the 
institutions start exerting pressure on its personnel. Only then, with time do guidelines 
become an element of the day-to-day practice of the EU delegations staff following the 
extensive trainings that take place both at the headquarters and abroad. 
The same is true for a second document we have selected as the exemplary: the Guidance 
Note for EU Staff: Disability Inclusive Development Cooperation of 2012
399
 being a sample of 
Commission internal document directed at EURAID has not seen much of its practical 
application. The December 2013 European Parliament’s Briefing Paper on the 
Implementation of the UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities
400
 points solely 
to the trainings organised for both the Brussels-based staff and staff in delegations.
401
 
Obviously, given the focus on mainstreaming of disability concerns as the means of 
implementing of the UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the guidance note 
is just one of many initiatives that will take form in the coming months, yet as for now, its 
application seems to be of limited scope. 
Finally, concerning the last of the sample documents – the one to be applied in cooperation 
between the EEAS and the European Commission: the ‘Joint Working Document on 
Advancing the Principle of Complementarity’ in relation to complementarity between the 
ICC and the national criminal systems of 31 January 2012
402
, one cannot draw almost any 
conclusions on its application. To be more precise, there exists no data on its application in 
practice. This fact induced the Human Rights Watch to address the letter to the High 
Representative and the Commissioner for Development indicating the weakness of the 
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Toolkit (lack of operational annex, or monitoring) and the ways through which these 
weaknesses could be addressed.
403
  
The purpose of the Document is to ‘provide guidance to the staff of the EU institutions, 
relevant ministries of EU Member States, and EU Delegations as well as embassies of EU 
Member States around the world, which they can also use in contacts with third countries 
at all levels.’ (emphasis as in the original document).
404
 In case of this particular document, 
content is of importance. Namely, the document is more of the knowledge building piece 
offering a state of play overview for the area of criminal justice, measures and obligations 
which can be referred to. It provides a series of logical questions to be considered by 
addressees – yet similarly to the Sector Guides implementing the UN Principles on Business 
and Human Rights the application of the Complementarity Toolkit is voluntary. In such form, 
its application cannot be monitored.  
The provided examples allow for a conclusion that application of the instruments falling 
within the category of the unilateral ones, adopted for internal purposes is not monitored in 
a sufficient manner for it to be assessed. The mere presence of the documents is supposed 
to be a proof of the EU’s compliance with the set standards; or commitment to their 
promotion. Obviously, many of the instruments were adopted recently hence possibly there 
is not enough data to draw from in order to assess their application. Similarly as on the 
international level, once created, the guidelines can be referred to as standards. The 
voluntarity of such reference brings back the question of their legal form; yet importantly 
the standards bind above all their own institution. If we analyse the extent to which the 
institution is bound, than we can see the commitment to training of its own staff and, at the 
same time, at least rhetorical iteration of various instruments – forming a narrative repeated 
on the occasion of every staff document, every report, and official publication. The actual 
application would need to be assessed on actual initiatives and priorities of heads of 
missions – we should get more information on the matter when assessing the application of 
the EU financial instruments in Chapter 5. 
                                                      
403
 Human Rights Watch: Letter on Recommendations concerning the EU Complementarity Toolkit. 
404
 Joint Staff Working Document on Advancing of the Principle of Complementarity: Toolkit for Bridging the 
Gap Between International&National Justice, op. cit. 
166 
 
The unfortunate conclusion of the analysis of rule of law principles concerning instrument 
application is the inability to evaluate the fulfilment on equality principle – a direct 
consequence of inability to trace transparent actions on the part of the Commission and the 
EEAS. What remains is the belief based on the findings of the European Parliament’s reports 
that the documents at stake find their way into the everyday practice of the EU staff, and 
that the implications of documents’ content will have a horizontal effect across policies and 
institutions. 
IV. Role of the Court: Availability of Judicial Review and Rule of Law Principles 
Concerning Conflict Resolution  
 Given that the instruments we are dealing with in this section are of operational value their 
implications can be solely visible if a concrete legal action undertaken by the EU staff is 
evaluated through the lens of standards set by the instruments at stake here. We could 
consider them as being a form of the preparatory acts of the institutions - yet even in this 
case their position amongst reviewable legal acts is more than doubtful. The CJEU 
pronounced that preparatory nature implying prospectivity of a measure that is to be 
adopted in the future does not allow for reliance on such in the court proceedings.
405
 If we 
were, therefore, analogously to apply case law on preparatory acts to the acts at stake in a 
present analysis, we would be forced to give an outwardly negative answer as to their 
reviewability by the Court.  
So far, in the case law of the EUCJ there has been no mention of any of the above outlined 
instruments neither in the context of judicial review, nor in the context of conflicts they 
could have given rise to. Hence, it is possible to consider how and in which manner could the 
Court approach such instruments when exercising its control function. 
                                                      
405
 EU CJ, Case C-60/81, IBM vs Commission,11 November 1981 [1981] ECR 2639, at para 12. See, also: General 
Court, Case  T-184/04, Sulvida – Companhia de alienação de terrenos, Lda vs the European Commissioni, 13 
January 2005, at para 14: ' Moreover, a mere proposal for a directive, such as the applicant is demanding from 
the Commission, on cross-border transfers of seats of companies with share capital and of partnerships would 
not be an act producing binding legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, but a purely 
intermediate preparatory measure. Such a measure is not a measure which may be the subject of an action for 
annulment under Article 230 EC, and the failure to adopt such a measure may likewise not be challenged by an 
action for failure to act under Article 232 EC (Case 90/78 Granaria v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1081, 
paragraph 12 et seq.; orders in Case T-167/95 Kuchlenz-Winter v Council [1996] ECR II-1607, paragraph 20 et 
seq.; Case T-175/96 Berthu v Commission [1997] ECR II-811, paragraph 18 et seq.; and of 1 December 1999 in 
Case T-198/99 Buchbinder and Nöcker v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 11).' 
167 
 
The final rule of law principle relevant for the process of instrument creation is that of the 
availability of judicial review. In concrete terms, what we are interested in here is whether (if 
at all) the instruments at stake can be subject to review. Should this be the case, we shall 
secondly deal with grounds for review relevant from the point of view of instrument 
creation. 
Clearly, when speaking of judicial review, we need to treat the review from the international 
law perspective. The review, furthermore, can be performed only within the perimeters 
determined by the Treaties. The European Union legal order offers the review of legality of 
measures that is to be performed by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
General Court. Article 263 TFEU
406
 clearly provides for the conditions under which the act 
can undergo a review. Should the action brought on the basis of Article 263 TFEU be well 
founded, the Court will declare the act void in a definite manner (Article 264 TFEU).  
There are five conditions under which an act can be subject to judicial review: Firstly, the act 
must be issued by a body which is amenable to judicial review. Secondly, the act has to fall 
within the category of those open to challenge. Thirdly, the person or a body bringing the 
action must have a legal standing to do so and point to, fourthly, the grounds for illegality as 
provide for by Article 263(2). Finally, the challenge to the action has to be brought within the 
time limit as stipulated for in Article 263(6). Since we need to understand here whether acts 
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at stake would be subject to judicial review, let us consider the bodies amenable for the 
judicial review and the categories of acts that could be subject to it.  
The bodies are enumerated in Article 263 TFEU and comprise the Commission and the 
Council – including legislative acts other than recommendations and opinions - and the 
European Central Bank. These are also the European Parliament, European Council and EU 
bodies, offices, or agencies but with reference to acts intended to produce legal effects vis-à-
vis third parties. As far as the second group is concerned, they can lay their own conditions 
pertaining to actions brought by legal persons against acts of these bodies.  
Ratione personae, in theory the conditions for the reviewability of the acts at stake, are 
fulfilled, however, ratione materiae this is not the case. Subject to review are the acts that 
are either of legislative nature (with exception of recommendations and opinions), or those 
that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. Clearly, the unilateral 
measures addressed at the EU institutions do not fall within the first category, even if we 
expand it following the EU CJ case law and include other sui generis acts of either binding 
force or producing legal effects.
407
  
According to the standing doctrine developed by the CJ EU in ERTA case, the action for 
annulment can be filed against ‘all measures adopted by the institutions whatever their 
nature of form, which are intended to have legal effects’
408
. It is, therefore, the content, not 
the form of the act
409
 that the Court is concerned with, yet with an important implication 
according to which applicant’s ‘legal position’ must be affected. What is, furthermore, 
important is that the act is of final, not preparatory character. 
From the point of view of the instruments at stake in our discussion, the information about 
the form could bring some hope to such instruments’ assessment from rule of law 
perspective. Clearly, the written operational guidance and guidelines could be subject to 
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judicial review by the Court. They are definitely of a final character and within their content 
contain clear indications as to the standard of behaviour of the EU bodies. The doubt 
appears, however, if we scrutinize the ‘intended legal effect vis-à-vis third parties’ condition. 
In our case – is there an intent of creating a legal effect? Who would the affected third 
parties be? Would they be given locus standi before the Court? Purely hypothetically, any 
legal or natural person for whom the act (of regulatory character) would be of direct and 
individual concern could instigate the proceedings before the Court. This may refer to any 
third person beneficiary of EU action in a third country within a development policy scheme, 
or an NGO dealing with one of the issues covered by the said instruments. In any case, it 
would require a very favourable interpretation of the ‘direct and individual concern’ and an 
extensive focus on gathering evidence with almost unbearable burden of proof. One could 
expect that the privileged or quasi-privileged applicants: a Member State, the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission would act as watchdogs on behalf of individuals 
affected. Yet, ultimately, it would take on one hand a skilled lawyer to make a successful 
case in the context at stake.  
To this date, the EU CJ has not addressed this issues and there has not been a case 
requesting the review of one of the unilateral instruments addressed at the EU institutions. 
Possibly, the mere lack of such case indicates the conviction that such instruments are not 
subject to the review by the Court. Yet, given the previous case law, it would be safer to 
state that the question of judicial review on the basis of Article 263 TFEU remains an open 
one. 
V. Rule of Law Assessment 
The above performed analysis reveal a number of rule of law shortcomings that burden the 
unilateral instruments addressed at the EU institutions. At the instrument creation stage the 
criterion of transparency is not fully met, which is also the case at the instrument application 
stage, thus making the assessment of the equality principle impossible. Finally, the role of 
the court as outlined in the above section has proven very limited. It would be very hard to 
speak of the high standard of the rule of law observed by the Union with respect to the 
unilateral instruments adopted for internal purposes. Yet, many of the issues addressed in 
this chapter evolve around the legal form of the instruments at stake. They all belong to the 
category of soft measures; measures also directed very much internally. Their application is 
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(with a few exceptions) an internal matter of the institutions and their staff. Such 
observation provokes further questions as to the extent through which such internal matter 
is internally monitored and enforced. These issues, however, belong to the content matter, 
largely politically and organisationally determined by units within the Commission and the 
EEAS. Though one could argue that due attention paid to all the preparatory documents 
could in theory be a part of the professional conduct and subject to disciplinary proceedings 
according to the rules of assessment of the EU staff.  
Somehow, we are facing here a paradoxical situation where the adoption of the guidelines 
specific for different areas of human rights policy is not accompanied by a strategically 
planned and implemented application. The preparatory documents analysed with this 
chapter tend to ‘exist’ in a rhetorical layer of EU’s activity – they are not to produce effects 
from the point of view of the wider public. They are a manifestation of EU’s engagement 
with the topic – not its elaboration or contribution to the topic. The actual use of the 
guidelines is to take place in the actual practice of EU staff and institutions – practice that by 
now needs to mainstream at least ten different (though not necessarily conflicting) 
objectives such as implementing gender based approaches, combating torture, promoting 
freedom of speech, or encouraging endorsement of the ICC’s activities.
410
 The principles of 
the rule of law possibly will matter at this later stage. Clearly, the fulfilment of the rule of law 
criteria is inaccessible given the current legal and organisational architecture of the EU. Are 
the EU institutions aware of it? Do they strive for amending the situation? 
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Chapter 5 – Unilateral Measures adopted for External Purposes Directed at 3rd 
Countries and Members of the Civil Society 
I. Setting the Scene 
The second category of instruments have been classified for the purposes of our analysis as 
the unilateral measures adopted for external purposes the EU addresses at third countries or 
members of civil society (both individuals and organisations).  
By means of a preliminary comment, it seems that the task of evaluation of the present 
instruments is a much easier one. The reasons for such assertion are rather straightforward: 
Above all, instruments at stake in the present chapter are binding in nature, adopted in the 
form of regulations, hence their creation and application are governed by all the normal 
rules applicable to any legislative (ordinary) Union acts. It may be even stated that since the 
majority of these instruments governs the allocation of funds, standards applicable to the 
availability of information on how these funds are spent are much more rigid raising thus 
transparency of instrument application (in particular). What is more, these instruments are 
directed at the wider public – specific groups of addressees identified in an objective manner 
in the content of these instruments. The bottom up approach in inducing the application of 
an instrument to a given addressee forces the EU to draft the rules in a very clear and 
transparent but cautious manner. For the same reason we could even venture the statement 
that the availability of information in relation to application of the present instruments is 




The evaluation of this set of instruments is not deprived of its difficulties. Above all these 
instruments do not exist in a void - they are complementary to the international agreements 
permitting the EU either to enhance the obligations binding on it on the basis of such acts, or 
to enforce them, especially inasmuch as the development cooperation obligations are 
concerned. This means, that in the general scheme of the policy, the use of the majority of 
these instruments (with the exception of the GSP+ regulation and Council common position) 
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are either instrumental for or conditional upon the existence and actual use of other 
instruments.  
Let us present briefly the type of instruments we are dealing with before their analysis 
commences.  
As in case of the previously examined category, the overview of these instruments is drafted 
on the basis of the 2012 EU Human Rights Strategy
412
. Table No 3 provides the exhaustive list 
of unilateral instruments of the EU directed at third states and the Members of the civil 
society that have been included in the Strategy. It needs to be noted, however, that it is not 
a totality of all the instruments used in the area. The Strategy simply did not take into 
consideration financial instruments used in the frameworks of the accession and 
neighbourhood policies. Their sophistication and the complex current political situation
413
 
explains why they have not been recently in the centre of attention and, therefore, not been 
included in the Strategy. 
Table No 3 - Unilateral Measures adopted for External Purposes Directed at 3
rd
 Countries 
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In fact there are only two types of instruments that are classified for the purposes of this 
study as unilateral measures directed at the 3rd countries and the members of civil society. 
These are regulations and common positions.  
The Report, for the first time refers to the Common Foreign and Security Policy instrument - 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on Arms Exports. Unlike the financial instruments 
that belong to the realm of external relations - the external dimension of the former I pillar, 
the common position is of a completely different character and belongs to the traditionally 
conceived foreign policy framework. Even though the distinction between pillars has been 
abolished under the Treaty of Lisbon framework, the characteristics of specific instruments 
has been maintained. Hence, when scrutinising instruments: common positions under the 
rule of law lens, it is hardly possible that the conclusions are positive. That is true, in 
particular as some would refer to common positions as international law instruments - of 
coordinating rather than legislative nature. In addition, apart from restrictive measures 
targeting individuals, the CJEU cannot undertake the judicial control of such measures.
415
 For 
these reasons, the CFSP common positions will be left out from the analysis in this Chapter - 
we will refer to them briefly in the final part of this study.    
The Report
416
, amongst legislative acts, names the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR)
417
, the reformed GSP Regulation
418
 and the update of the Regulation 
1236/2005 on trade in goods which can be used for capital punishment or torture
419
. In 
order to provide the sample of instruments at stake we shall deal with the EIDHR and the 
GSP plus as the most interesting and most advanced pieces of legislation at stake.  
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The mentioned reports and strategies refer also to other financial instruments, hence it is 
pertinent that we recall all of them at this stage, especially that we are dealing with series of 
legal acts adopted recently - on 11 March 2014. The financial regulations have been 
consciously aligned with one another and one horizontal regulation was adopted providing 
for the rules of their implementation. The group comprises of the European Stability 
Instrument
420
, Pre-Accession Assistance Instrument
421
, European Neighbourhood Policy 
Instrument
422





European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
425
. Notably, the common rules for 
implementation of these instruments have been laid down in a separate Regulation for the 
implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action
426
. The last of the 
cited legislative acts will provide us with the information on procedural aspects of 
implementation of these instruments, whilst the regulations contain general substantive 
provisions concerning the scope ratione materiae and ratione personae of their application.  
The unilateral instruments directed externally - at third state, individuals and entities in 
these third states - are usually such that are used in administration of assistance offered by 
the European Union to third countries. These instruments are either a form of lex specialis to 
the international agreements that form the basis of cooperation and Union's dedication of 
funds for the development cooperation that is supposed to be undertaken under these 
agreements
427, 428
, or they form the basis of providing assistance within the broader 
frameworks of cooperation, not necessarily governed by international agreements, as within 
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 or neighbourhood policy
430
, or permit for granting financial 




. In the first case the EU provides 
assistance within the pre-established contractual frameworks, in the latter two, they require 
voluntariness on the part of addressees of these unilateral measures. It is up to those states 
to decide whether their wish is to reach out for financial assistance, terms and conditions 
obviously apply. All of the regulations are implemented on the basis of the mentioned 
implementation regulation and are structured in a similar manner: Following the Preamble 
which customarily addresses the principle governing the EU external action, and sets the 
objectives for each of the instruments. Interestingly, each of the instruments refers to the 
policy framework within which it operates. Each of them contains also relevant provisions on 
coherence in the assistance and imposes an obligation (!) on the Commission  to ensure 
establishment of such coherence. Acting within the scope of the financial instruments, the 
Commission is also equipped with a power to adopt delegated acts in order to implement 
each of such instruments. Such acts are of interest for the purposes of our study - these are 
the above mentioned strategies and reports. 
The general objectives and addressees of each of the instruments are represented in the 
table below. 
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The particularities of each of the sets of objectives and groups of addressees has been taken 
into consideration in the horizontal regulation in Article 5, however, the general idea of how 
these instruments function, remains binding in all the five contexts. With this awareness we 
may focus on the analysis of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
rules concerning its adoption and implementation and the judicial control - especially that, 
only in its and the Peace and Stability Instrument's context the access to the assistance is 
open to the wider public.   
The second of regulations that will be the focus of our analysis is the one establishing the 
Generalised System of Preferences.
433
 The GSP arrangement has been functioning since 
2006, currently on the basis of the Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences 
and repealing Council Regulation. This unilateral arrangement of the European Union allows 
developing countries for nonreciprocal preferential access to the EU internal market. Yet, 
from the EU external human rights policy, the core of that regulation lies in the so-called 
GSP+ scheme – a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good 
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governance. The special incentive arrangement provides for suspension of value-added 
duties on specific products provided that a developing country is considered to be 
vulnerable, and 'has ratified and effectively implemented all the conventions listed in Annex 
III' and 'gives an undertaking to maintain the ratification of the conventions and their 
implementing legislation and measures and accepts regular monitoring and review of its 
implementation record in accordance with the implementation provisions of the 
conventions it has ratified'.
434
 The GSP regulation draws the attention to yet another 
characteristic feature of the EU unilateral instruments. The mentioned above voluntarity is 
complemented by the proceduralization of the implementation stage. This will also be given 
a due attention in the section III of this chapter devoted to the Rule of Law principles 
devoted to norms application.  
Finally, the Report refers to reports and strategies that form a part of the picture, however, 
in their form they resemble the Chapter 4 category of instruments - Unilateral Measures 
Adopted for Internal Purposes and Directed at the EU Institutions and the Member States. 
Yet, they fulfil a different function inasmuch as they are instrumental for the implementation 
of mentioned regulations and adopted as delegated acts by the Commission on the basis of 
relevant provisions contained in such regulations.  
Having presented the varied architecture of the group of instruments at stake, let us move 
on to the manner in which they are created - and answer the question as to whether these 
comply with the principles concerning rule of law creation; how they are implemented - and 
investigate the fulfilment of the rule of law norm application criteria. Finally, let us focus on 
the extent of judicial control available and actually exercised in relation to the instruments at 
stake. 
                                                      
434
 Op. cit., Articles 8 and 9. There are two groups of conventions to be ratified under the GSP+ arrangement 
(Part A – Core Human and Labour Rights UN/ILO Conventions and Part B – Conventions related to the 
environment and to governance principles).  
179 
 
II. Rule of Law Principles Concerning Instrument Creation 
The rule of law principles concerning instrument creation refer our investigation to the 
treaty provisions that determine adoption of legislative acts - such as regulations, and 
common positions. Unlike in case of the instruments scrutinised in Chapter 4, it is much 
easier to attribute to these instruments features of the rule of law categories at stake. That 
is true, of course, inasmuch as once could deem the EU legislative process compliant with 
the principles of rule of law regarding norms creation which we consider as undisputable 
under premises of this study.  
And so, both regulations were adopted in line with articles 209 and 212 TFEU (for the EIDHR) 
and Article 207 TFEU (for the GSP Regulation) on the basis of ordinary legislative procedure. 
Article's 289(1) TFEU ordinary legislative procedure stipulates that '(t)he ordinary legislative 
procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of 
a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission. This procedure is 
defined in Article 294.' Article 294 TFEU provides in greater detail for the specific steps in the 
process of adoption by the Council together with the Parliament of the legislative act. The 
process involves proposal by the Commission, followed by two readings' sessions in the 
Parliament - aided, need be, by the Conciliation Committee - and voting in the Council 
according to the general rule of qualified majority
435
. Since it is not the purpose of this study 
to evaluate the general EU legislative procedure, hence, we will not dwell into whether it 
permits for satisfactory, from the Rule of Law perspective, results. Let us, however, consider 
the extracted features of the rule of law in relation to the two regulations at stake.  
It is important to note, that both the EIDHR and the GSP regulations are a part of the wider 
framework within which they are placed by relevant references to the Treaty articles. The 
EIDHR is a measure of development cooperation (Article 209 TFEU) as well as of economic, 
financial and technical cooperation with third countries (Article 212 TFEU), whilst GSP is one 
of trade measures adopted on the basis of Article 209 TFEU. Hence principles contained 
therein as well as the objectives the two instruments strive to achieve, fit into the categories 
of objectives broadly defined in these articles. That, and procedures at stake referring to 
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transparency permit for a conclusion that transparency condition is fulfilled for the 
instrument creation stage in this category. That conclusion is further strengthened by the 
prospectivity of the two regulations which are adopted in cyclical terms - coinciding with 
either budgetary procedure or long-term trade planning. 
At the same time, since both the EIDHR and the GSP regulations are limited in time of their 
application, it is clear that they are renewed once their term of validity elapses. For the 
EIDHR this term coincides with the terms of EU financial perspectives which brings into the 
discussion of transparency additional dimension introduced by particularities of the EU  
budgetary process - at least inasmuch as the mere fact of prolongation of assistance within 
this instrument is concerned and the actual figures that are provided for therein.  
GSP+ arrangement is an implementation of the 2004 Commission Communication 
Commission Communication ‘Developing countries, international trade and sustainable 
development: the function of the Community’s generalised system of preferences (GSP) for 
the 10-year period from 2006 to 2015’ sets out the guidelines for the application of the 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 2006 to 2015, yet the 'the scheme 
should continue to apply for a period of 10 years from the date of application of the 
preferences provided for in this Regulation, except for the special arrangement for the least-
developed countries, which should continue to be applied without any expiry date.'
436
 The 
Preambular declaration is reiterated in the text of the regulation determining that 'The 
scheme shall apply until 31 December 2023. However, the expiry date shall neither apply to 
the special arrangement for the least-developed countries, nor, to the extent that they are 
applied in conjunction with that arrangement, to any other provisions of this Regulation.'
437
 
The content of the two regulations is also of general, non-arbitrary nature - the financial 
assistance or preferential treatment is to be granted to anyone who fulfils the objective 
criteria. For EIDHR the addressees of the assistance are: civil society organisations, human 
rights defenders, victims of repression and abuse
438
, whilst for the GSP Plus arrangement, 
these are defined in Article 9(1)
439
. In both cases the categories of entities are clearly 
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defined, though in case of the EIDHR the subject matter of financing will matter on grounds 
of specific tenders announced.  
Finally, it seems that the obligations imposed by the two regulations are clear - and they 
distribute the tasks in an even manner: a beneficiary/third country needs to prove to the EU 
that it fulfils the conditions, whilst the EU will examine them granting or not the assistance 
(be it of financial or trade preferential type).  
The general conclusion as for the fulfilment of rule of law criteria for regulations used by the 
EU in its external relations is overall positive, however, with one reservation. The creation of 
norms in this context is clearly the result of a long standing process of negotiation between 
the Union and 3rd countries and members of civil society. Yet, the mere process of adoption 
of regulations is, in its nature one sided for it is only the Parliament and the Council that can 
adopt a regulation. Justly so, for these are the EU institutions that administer the European 
Union funding. Though this statement dangerously echoes the realist critique of the EU and 
its external relations pursuit of human rights objectives, it had as its purpose pointing to the 
fact that the imbalanced setting of a donor v recipient of aid is to a certain extent amended 
by the EU through introduction of stringent procedures ruling norms application. Despite the 
standing imbalance of actors, the financial instruments represent a shift in an approach 
where the EU administers funding in exchange for human rights action. One could say that it 
eliminates an obstacle and creates incentive to abide by human rights standards. Or - in 
other terms - it administers the possibility to live up to such standards - if we conceive of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international 
trading system, as defined in Annex VII; (b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VIII (the ‘relevant 
conventions’) and the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions (the 
‘relevant monitoring bodies’) do not identify a serious failure to effectively implement any of those 
conventions; (c) in relation to any of the relevant conventions, it has not formulated a reservation which is 
prohibited by any of those conventions or which is for the purposes of this Article considered to be 
incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention. For the purposes of this Article, reservations shall 
not be considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of a convention unless: (i) a process 
explicitly set out for that purpose under the convention has so determined; or (ii) in the absence of such a 
process, the Union where a party to the convention, and/or a qualified majority of Member States party to the 
convention, in accordance with their respective competences as established in the Treaties, objected to the 
reservation on the grounds that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention and opposed 
the entry into force of the convention as between them and the reserving state in accordance with the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; (d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain 
ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof; (e) it accepts 
without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by each convention and gives a binding undertaking 
to accept regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the provisions of the 
relevant conventions; and (f) it gives a binding undertaking to participate in and cooperate with the monitoring 
procedure referred to in Article 1.' 
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human rights as a luxury only the developed part of world can afford (and even then - not 
fully).  
III. Rule of Law Principles Concerning Instrument Application: Transparency 
and Equality 
In examining the instrument application frameworks we shall address the manner in which 
the EIDHR and the GSP regulation incorporate the principles of transparency and equality. 
Yet again, transparency should come hand in hand in the application of these instruments, 
however, this is not always a case.
440
  
In both cases, however, there is a factor that should substantively enhance both the 
transparency and equality in instrument application - namely the extensive use of 
procedures for the attainment of the goals of regulations. These procedures are not perfect, 
yet they represent a clear attempt to enhance both transparency and equality of the use of 
measures at stake. 
In case of the GSP+ the procedure is initiated by an eligible (vulnerable) country which is to 
file a written request to the Commission accompanied by extensive information concerning 
the ratification of conventions (Article 9)
441
. The Commission examines the request; at the 
same time it takes account of information gathered by European bureaus and agencies and 
takes decision as to granting the arrangement to a given country. The requesting country is 
to be notified of the decision, if it is negative it may require reasons as to why it was not 
granted the special incentive arrangement. There exists no reviewing procedure as to this 
decision though the requesting state having knowledge as to what were the reasons of the 
decision do file subsequent requests.  
The above described procedure illustrates the positive conditionality adopted by the 
European Union while conducting its relations with third countries. The GSP provides also for 
the negative conditionality – i. e. the possibility to suspend the incentive arrangement in 
case inter alia the said conventions are violated (decision made on the basis of the 
observations of monitoring bodies) or the goods exported had been manufactured by prison 
labour (Article 15(1)). There is also a possibility to suspend the arrangement if a state fails to 
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provide administrative cooperation required for policing requirements of the arrangements 
provided for within the framework of the GSP (Article 16). Such withdrawal is safeguarded 
by the clauses which oblige the Commission to beforehand undertake specific steps provided 
for by Article 16(3)
442
. The suspension of the arrangement may not exceed the limit of six 
months. Once this time elapses, either the suspension is lifted, or the above described 
procedure is conducted. Importantly, according to Article 16(4) of the Regulation 'Any 
Member State may refer a decision taken in accordance with paragraph 3 to the Council 
within one month'. The Council may review such decision and change it within another one 
month.  
As for the EIDHR, under the Horizontal Implementing Regulation
443
 the procedure takes the 
following sequence:  
1. The Commission adopts annual action programs for financing and supporting 
measures (Article 2(1)) adopted in accordance with the examination procedure 
referred to in Article 16(3) subject to exceptions specified by Article 2(3). 
2. The financing is conducted in the form of the types of financing envisaged by 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, and in particular: (a) grants; (b) procurement 
contracts for services, supplies or works; (c) general or sector budget support; (d) 
contributions to trust funds set up by the Commission, in accordance with Article 187 
of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012; (e) financial instruments such as loans, 
guarantees, equity or quasi-equity, investments or participations, and risk-sharing 
instruments, whenever possible under the lead of the EIB in line with its external 
mandate under Decision No 1080/2011/EU, a multilateral European financial 
institution, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or a 
bilateral European financial institution, e.g. bilateral development banks, possibly 
pooled with additional grants from other sources. 
3. Article 4(3) of the Regulation stipulates that 'any entity entrusted with the 
implementation of the financial instruments as referred to in point (e) of paragraph 1 
shall fulfil the requirements of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 and comply 
with Union objectives, standards and policies, as well as best practices regarding the 
use of and reporting on Union funds'. Hence no further information on the 
procedures are provided by the Regulation. 
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The provisions of the Horizontal Implementing Regulation provide also for monitoring 
(Article 12), annual reporting (Article 13) and consultation (Article 15). 
It needs to be noted that if we follow the logic of the EU administering the financial 
assistance creating thus possibility to enhance the human rights standards in third countries 
where the aid arrives, then we must eye the assistance granting procedure as a procedure 
aiming at not only providing for clear conditions under which such aid is granted, but also 
fully informing the beneficiaries of the means through which they can act. There the EU 
institutions (in this case the Commission) act as if they were administrative bodies in the 
national legal context.  
Hence, for the purposes of duly informing the recipients of the assistance, the European 
Commission has produced a number of documents which are to aid the beneficiaries in using 
the procedure. Thus there exists and extensvie Practical guide to the new GSP trade regimes 
for developing countries (December 2013), which provides a step-by-step checklist for the 
beneficiary state following the regime and availability thereof. Similarly, the Commission for 




Obviously, procedures are just a part of the picture; what is important is their application. 
This is done within the broader framework of human rights, development etc. policies, yet 
on the basis of annual programs and strategies which are adopted by the Commission on the 
basis of the basis provided for by the Regulation.
445
 The reports emphasise above all the 
engagement of the EU under the EIDHR with the civil society, and individual human rights 
defenders, though it is difficult to trace the latter due to the confidentiality of information 
on who they are. The 2013 Report on Human Rights claims that the EU provided support to 
the civil society activists and human rights defenders in more than 100 countries.
446
 And 
they have become the focus of the EU action following the 2012 Communication of the 
Commission 'The roots of the democracy and sustainable development: Europe's 
                                                      
444
 European Commission, Procurement And Grants for European Union external actions - A Practical Guide. 
(2014). 
445
 See, for instance minutes of the Consultation Meetings with civil society organisations on EIDHR 201 Annual 
Action Programme which took place on 2 October 2009 as well as on EIDHR 2011 Annual Action Programme 
which took place on 27 September 2010. See also: EIDHR 2011-2013 Multiannual Indicative Planning. See the 
Factsheet: EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, Luxembourg, 25 June 2012, as well as: 
Annual Action Programme 2013 for the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to be 
financed under budget line 19 04 01 of the general budget of the European Union" 
446
 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2012 (Thematic Reports), at 13.  
185 
 
engagement with civil society in external relations'.
447
 Generally it is hard to determine 
whether the use of the financial instruments such as the EIDHR fulfils in their application 
rules on transparency and equality. The data in these aspects is limited, and very much 
based on the activities of the Head of Missions. They are the one's responsible for both 
drafting calls and selecting grants (depending on the amount at stake, also together with 
Evaluation Committees).  
The GSP+ is not an arrangement that is very much appreciated by the academics dealing 
with human rights aspects. It is considered inefficient, yet at the same time it has been 
prolonged until 2023 marking thus the cautious content on the part of both the EU and third 
countries with what it offers. In fact, the overall impressions of this instruments is that whilst 
they may not affect the existing situation, they can deter the states from adopting measures 
infringing upon human or labour rights.
448
 
As for the GSP Regulation, its application frequently leads to a situation where a third 
country proves to be dissatisfied with the outcome of the procedure. Given the lack of 
access to the Court of Justice, as it was explained above, the Commission has developed a 
detailed appeal procedure. Even though the procedure itself gives the impression of being 
biased (whilst there are two different institutions giving their opinions - they are both the EU 
ones), it is ultimately immaterial as the request for granting of the special incentive 
arrangement can be re-submitted and granted at a later stage. The lack of definitive answer 
at this stage makes the lack of judicial control a bit more acceptable. 
IV. Role of the Court: Availability of Judicial Review and Rule of Law Principles 
Concerning Conflict Resolution 
Chapter 4 has already outlined the extent of the judicial control that could be exerted over 
the unilateral instruments. In this Chapter we are dealing with legislative instruments, hence 
the usual rules as to judicial review performance apply - this time not in a hypothetical 
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manner. The usual critique of the narrow scope of such review not permitting access to 
courts to individuals can be applied as well to this area, however, we will leave this aspect 
aside examining the extent to which the judicial review is accessible within the legal system 
of the EU, and if so, the substantive content thereof.  
As far as judicial controls with relation to the unilateral measures directed at third parties 
are concerned, we can speak of two types of controls that the CJEU performs. The first one 
refers to the control of legality of measures (1) and the control of individual cases (2). In the 
rule of law terms, the first type of controls refers to the norm creation stage, whilst the 
second type of control to that of norm application.   
It needs to be underlined that there is relatively little case law referring to the financial 
instruments and the GSP that has been decided by the Court, and that it is disappointing in 
its content from the point of view both as far as the control of legality and of individual 
situation are concerned.  
As for the legality, the case that has been decided by the CJEU concerns - and it is of course 
not surprising - the matter of legal basis. In the particular context of case C-403/05 
Parliament v Commission449 the dispute concerned the Philippine border controls which 
were to be financed by the EU on the basis of Council Regulation (EEC) No 443/92 of 25 
February 1992 on financial and technical assistance to, and economic cooperation with, the 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America (OJ 1992 L 52, p. 1), as amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 807/2003 of 14 April 2003 adapting to Decision 1999/468/EC the 
provisions relating to committees which assist the Commission in the exercise of its 
implementing powers laid down in Council instruments adopted in accordance with the 
consultation procedure (unanimity) (OJ 2003 L 122, p. 36; 'Regulation No 443/92'). 
Specifically, the European Parliament challenged the decision taken by the Commission 
approving a project relating to the security of the borders of the Republic of the Philippines 
to be financed by budget line 19 10 02 in the general budget of the European Communities 
(Philippines Border Management Project, No ASIA/2004/016-924). In the view of the 
Parliament, the measure pertained to the fulfilment of the objective to fight terrorism which 
should be dealt with under the CFSP legal basis and falls outside of the measure in question. 
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In fact, the CJEU decided that the financed measure could not have been undertaken under 
the regulation at stake. The case itself is yet another of the long string of cases in which the 
Commission attempts to expand the limits of its competence and use the development and 
trade measures to pursue the CFSP objectives. The Court, in fact, observes sharply in 
paragraph 65 that analogous choices on the part of the Commission are immaterial for the 
case for it is essential that legal basis is chosen on case-by-case basis; in a conscious manner. 
The present case provides an example of the Court's attempt to ensure above all 
predictability of the content of laws as well as protecting clarity of provisions - this time 
concerning objectives and the manner in which they are fulfilled.   
The control by the CJEU of individual cases is similarly infrequent, but provides us with 
invaluable information about transparency of the EIDHR implementation. In case T-17/10 
Steinberg v Commission450 the applicant requested the annulment of the Commission 
Decision which partially refused him access to certain documents relating to funding 
decisions for grants to Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organisations under the 
‘Partnership for Peace’ programme and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR). The case is very informative as to the extent to which the Commission 
considers that it is obliged to disclose the proceedings concerning grant applications to the 
public. Mr. Sandberg requested hundreds of documents to which the Commission replied 
with thorough analysis of the content of such documents in order to disclose to 
Mr. Sandberg only the ones that could not have harmed third parties - and especially the 
beneficiaries of the EU financial assistance. The Commission in refusing such access relied on 
Article 4(1) of the Public Access to Documents Regulation
451
 which provides for mandatory 
exception to a general rule on access to documents of the European Parliament, Council, and 
the Commission. Such access is to be refused by the institutions if it was to undermine the 
protection of '(a) the public interest as regards inter alia public security; (b) privacy and the 
integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community legislation regarding 
the protection of personal data.' In the present case the data concerned 'not only the 
persons working for the NGOs at issue and the other recipients of grants, but also the 
persons involved in the selection and evaluation process of the various projects 
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. The Court found Commission's position justified and dismissed the plea made 
by Mr. Steinberg in its entirety.  
It must be emphasised for our purposes that Mr. Steinberg received volumes and volumes of 
information with exception of actual information on individuals and NGOs acting within the 
Partnership for Peace programme, evaluators of projects and individual scales and grades 
given to the projects. Hence, if need be the access to the information is granted to 
individuals on the basis of the Public Access to Documents Regulation, subject to terms and 
conditions contained therein.  
The Court, in this context exerts control over whether the right to access to documents - 
including transparency, is dully enforced by the institutions with a caveat that it can only 
annul the decision of such institution - it is not up to the General Court to 'issue directions to 




As we can see in none of the two exemplary cases are complaints made in relation to the 
human rights abuse. They concern predominantly the manner in which the EU legal 
framework permits the performance of broadly understood legality control of instruments at 
stake. From this point of view, the mere presence of judicial control does not provide for 
much of the value added to the pursuit of ultimate goal of human rights promotion and 
upholding. Yet, it makes a difference from the point of view of the fulfilment of rule of law 
criteria.  
It needs to be noted, that in the light of the limited accessibility of the Court for conflict 
resolution purposes, another institution should be brought to our attention here. Given the 
inability to challenge particular measures before the CJEU, individuals and civil society 
organisations bring their claims to the European Ombudsman who on a number of occasions 
passed decisions in relation to the procedure of granting financial assistance on the basis of 
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 Such claims refer to the maladministration on the part of the 
institutions. In addition, the Ombudsman makes the recommendation to the institution as to 
the area where improvement of its practices is necessary.
455
 
V. Rule of Law Assessment 
It seems that from the point of view of rule of law criteria, the financial instruments and the 
GSP+ regulation fit in very well within the EU based rule of law system. They are created 
according to the ordinary legislative procedure, subject to review by the CJEU. They are 
applied subject to fairly stringent procedures contained in these instruments and at least 
one of the rule of law principles - transparency is controlled by the Court. We are lacking 
clearly the conflict resolution provisions, however, the procedures, at least to a certain 
degree, remedy the situation.  
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Chapter 6 – Bilateral and Multilateral Measures 
I. Setting the Scene 
The multilateral/bilateral instruments include international agreements and the soft law 
frameworks that have been devised by the Union in part for the preparation of the 
formalised cooperation, in part for the creation of a more solid platform in which the impact 
on third countries takes place. With reference to the human rights approaches, the EU in this 
context acts as a ‘sovereign authority whose rulings are acknowledged as final’
456
. Political 
scientists point to argumentation and persuasion as necessary tools for the socialisation of 
the concepts promoted through policies. Soft law measures can be considered as legally 
delimited frameworks where such argumentation and persuasion takes place. As the result, 
the ‘carrot and stick’ on the part of the EU as perceived as a rational cost-benefit analysis, 
may give way to the principled belief. As the result the third country adopts the same 
approach as the EU towards a promoted value.
457
 
Sensu stricte the legal  binding multilateral/bilateral measures employed by the Union for 
the purposes of its external human rights policy are limited to the international agreements 
that incorporate the so-called conditionality clauses. Yet, to limit the discussion only to those 
instruments would exclude the extensive conditionality mechanisms developed within the 
accession process and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Obviously, it is true that the 
ultimate goal of the Union is to enter into an international agreement with a third country, 
content of which needs to take on board human rights considerations as well as provide for 
the tools to execute the relevant provisions. Yet, before this agreement is made, what comes 
first is an extensive, strategically determined framework within which conditionality and 
assistance based negotiations take place. Hence, what we are interested in this study is the 
whole process of an international agreement making and the formal frameworks that have 
been devised for it for the benefit of human rights objectives (inter alia). 
It is important to exclude from our discussion elements of the bilateral framework which 
belong purely to the realm of diplomacy: In the Table below these were marked separately 
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as including also the issues connected with political dialogue. This one, in Strategic 
Framework and Action Plans terms is to be strengthened for two general purposes: firstly, 
for the enhancement of the EU presence on international stage - and especially on 
international forums, and secondly, for the improvement of actual practice of 
implementation of human rights related objectives and provisions of international 
agreements. That latter objective is obviously of much more relevance to our considerations 
here and it has direct impact on transparency and equality of the process especially at the 
application stage. From this perspective, the existence and extensive use of the dialogue is 
good from the point of view of rule of law as it implies equality between the EU and its 
partners who are participating on the same footing in the process of not only norms 
(including those of international reach) creation, but also could imply participatory model of 
norms implementation. But this is a rather optimistic manner of viewing political dialogue. In 
reality, the ongoing process of negotiation may lead to enhancing the inequality and pushing 
forward specific interests of other character.  
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Even though dialogue is important, we shall not address it specifically in the course of the 
analysis of this chapter. Dialogue is a constitutive element of multilateral and bilateral 
practice of the international dealings, and regardless of the extent to which it is formalised, 
it cannot be considered as a separate form of instrument which could be assessed from the 
rule of law perspective.  
The Strategic Framework and Action Plan, in fact, does not provide for creation of further 
elements - it is more concerned with improvement of existing practices. If we eliminate all 
the diplomatic objectives it analyses, we are left either with the review and improved use of 
inter-acting instruments in a given field (for instance, objective 28 in relation to minorities' 
rights), or the focus on the inclusion of human rights clauses and their use through 
development of criteria. Curiously, the European Neighbourhood Instruments (action plans) 
nor accession positive and negative conditionality are not addressed in much detail, 
however, since they also function within more rigid frameworks, they should be at a centre 
of our attention here inasmuch as fulfilment by them of human rights criteria is concerned.  
Hence in the course of the next sections we shall address above all issues connected with 
human rights clauses and positive and negative conditionality introduced by means of action 
plans (that reflect to the large degree processes employed under the accession policy 
framework, without, however, the sanction consisting in delaying the accession). It needs to 
be noted that it is not our intention here to analyse the international agreements or action 
plans in much detail as it has been done elsewhere.
458
 The purpose of this section is to 
briefly these two instruments before proceeding to their analysis from the point of view of 
rule of law criteria.  
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International agreements substantively may have as their object either solely human rights, 
or deal with human rights as one of the matters covered by the agreement.
459
 International 
agreements providing for the basis of general cooperation, on the other hand, constitute the 
core of our attention and will be analysed in-depth in the subsequent sections.  
From our point of view the inter-action between international and European law matters 
inasmuch as the importation of human rights standards within an agreement is concerned. 
Especially human rights clauses serve two purposes – firstly, the reconfirmation of values the 
EU and the third country subscribes to. Secondly, the human rights clauses are included in 
international agreements in order to create the legal basis for human rights oriented action. 
They are treated there as the background within which ‘framework for cooperation’ is 
drafted. The position of international agreements is set within the EU legal order, yet the 
norms they incorporate not necessarily. From this perspective the determination whether 
the EU legal system is a monist or dualist matters. 
Human rights clauses appeared in trade and investment agreements signed by the European 
Community as late as in 1990s
460
; yet, their origin may be traced back to the 1970s. At this 
time, the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin substantially supported by the European Community 
STABEX fund
461
 intensified violent repressions over the Ugandan society. The European 
Community, fearing the loss of reputation, frantically needed to employ measures which 
would wash its hands clean of participation in atrocities committed under Amin's command 
which could have been well financed by the European aid funds. As a result, the European 
Community stopped providing this aid on the basis of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties which allowed for termination of an agreement in case of radical change 
of circumstances (the rebus sic stantibus clause). Yet, because this termination ground could 
easily be contested by an affected state, the Community recognised the need to include 
some sort of an equivalent of Article 62 VCLT into its trade agreements.  
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It happened for the first time in the cooperation treaty with Argentina of 1990 at the request 
of the partner state
462
. That development has been paralleled by the EU construing 
relationship with the Eastern European countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
463
 Very 
modest, declaratory, human rights clauses have been included in agreements ever since, yet 
the then prevailing form did not provide a specific basis for termination of an agreement 
which was searched for. The desired version of the clause was included later in the 1990s in 
agreements with the Baltic States
464
 and the quasi-final version – with Romania and 
Bulgaria
465
. And thus 'the human rights conditionality' took the form of a double clause 
construction endorsed by the Council and the Commission
466
 and the European Parliament
.
. 
The first clause – the "Essential Elements Clause" defines human rights as essential elements 
of the agreement; the "Non-Execution Clause" determines that violation of the Essential 
Elements Clause is a 'material breach' or a case of 'special urgency' which allows for 
adoption of unilateral measures (even an agreement's suspension or termination) by a party 
to an agreement. Such construction was included in the Lomé Convention of 1995 and 
served as a model for subsequent agreements made by the Community.  
The EU-Central America Association Agreement provides an example of how such clause is 
worded:  
‘Respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as laid down in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and for the principle of the rule of law, underpins the 
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With time the number of the Essential Elements Clauses increased substantially referring to 
the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or combating terrorism.  
The Cotonou
468
 and the CARIFORUM
469
 Agreements, which have substituted the IV Lomé 
Convention (at least to a certain degree) provide the most sophisticated example of Essential 
Elements Non-execution clauses as well as of elaborate alternatives to it.
470
 The Cotonou 
Agreement is particular also in the manner in which it provides for an innovative Non-
Execution Clause known better as 'the Article 96 procedure' - we shall deal with it when 
analysing the Rule of Law Principles concerning instrument application. 
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The second bilateral framework to be taken into consideration when analysing pursuit of 
human rights concerns by the European Union has been devised under the umbrella of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP uses Action Plans as core measures for 
differentiation its relations with neighbouring countries. It is important to note that plans 
are drawn jointly with the neighbouring countries concerned. They encompass the period of 
a minimum of three years, and are extended by mutual consent.
471
 The procedure of 
negotiating of and Action Plans is initiated by the European Commission which prepares the 
country report identifying priorities' areas and subsequently (upon being granted permit to 
open negotiations in close cooperation by the Council) negotiates Action Plans. Significantly, 
the initial draft comes from the Commission and therefore reflects the Community, rather 
than partner states' approach. Action Plans need to be approved by the Council before they 
are forwarded to the Association or Cooperation Council which subsequently adopts them. 
They consist of a list of actions to be undertaken with the priority given to those actions 
which are connected with implementation of agreements. Such Action Plans are adopted as 
recommendations and are therefore non-binding documents which reflect the Union's soft 
power – that of persuasion. In terms of substance, Action Plans address the whole range of 
issues which are of importance for the enhanced cooperation between the Union and 
partner states. They also include lists of tasks in the field of human rights and democracy. 
The exemplary Action Plan for Ukraine lists 12 areas under the heading 'Democracy, rule of 
law human rights and fundamental freedoms' including recommendation as to ensuring 
international justice or prevention of ill-treatment and torture. After the adoption of a non-
binding Action Plan, it is up to a neighbour state to implement it with the European 
Community's assistance granted within the framework of existing instruments – the ENPI 
and TAIEX. Progress in Action Plans' implementation is tracked by means of periodic reports 
prepared by the European Commission which indicate whether contractual relations with a 
given state may be furthered. As it has been indicated above, Action Plans encompass a 
period of three to five years – after this period they will be either extended by consent of the 
two parties, or renegotiated which allows for reviewing their scope and targets. 
Under the umbrella of New Neighbourhood Agreements, Action Plans are to be substituted 
by the New Practical Instrument which is to facilitate decision making between parties.  
                                                      
471
 Council Conclusions, 14 June 2004. 
199 
 
Despite being negotiated, it is, in fact, unclear as to what extent Action Plans are drafted in a 
bilateral manner and involve actual participation of partner states. If they did, then this 
instrument would be one of the most promising, also in the field of human rights - 
negotiated with participation of interested states, specific, with clear incentive of furthering 
cooperation. The obvious doubt which arises in this respect refers to the point at which 
cooperation cannot be furthered any longer. Another critical point concerns the non-binding 
nature of Action Plans. Their significance would be definitely much bigger, were they binding 
and negotiated under Article 300 TEC, but it seems that in case of Action Plans soft 
persuasion, rather than strong obligation seems to be the objective. 
Having briefly presented the two sets of instruments, it is time to move towards the 
evaluation of their creation from the point of view of fulfilment of rule of law criteria. To a 
certain extent, similarly to the unilateral measures adopted for external purposes, the 
analysis is made easier by existence of both international and EU legal rules according to 
which international agreements are made. Yet, the practice of the implementation of such 
agreements, due to the extensive use of diplomatic measures is somewhat blurred. From 
this point of view the proceduralization of political dialogue has a major value added to the 
transparency and equality of the process.  
II. Rule of Law Principles Concerning Instrument Creation 
As it was stated above, the rule of law principles concerning instrument creation should not 
be difficult to fulfil given an extensive procedural and legislative basis on which international 
agreements are made on the basis of the EU law.  
Thus introduced arrangements above all contribute to the transparency of instrument 
making. International agreements are made on the basis of Article 218 TFEU which contains 
a very detailed procedure of how the agreements are made; procedure which is to be 
applied to the three types of agreements the EU can make. Yet the procedure provides only 
the second step in determining clear rules concerning agreements. First, the form of an 
agreement needs to be chosen - and the EU has a wealth of options to choose from. These 




Association Agreements provide an all-embracing framework to conduct bilateral relations in 
order to attain trade purposes (hence progressively they will entail either creation of the 
free trade area, or customs union). According to Article 217 TFEU unanimity in the Council 
and the consent of the Parliament is required. These are agreements that  1) contain 
reciprocal rights and obligations (access to EU market in return for ie voluntary 
harmonisation of laws); 2) foresee common action and special procedure; 3) provide for 
privileged links between the EU and a third country; 4) are made from the perspective of the 
participation of a third country in the EU system. The examples of such agreements include 
the European Economic Area agreement between the EU and Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein, the former Europe Agreements between the EU and Central & East European 
countries, the Stabilization and Association Agreements between the EU and Western Balkan 
countries as well as currently negotiated Association Agreements with the ENP countries to 
create ‘deep and comprehensive free trade area’. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, 
according to Article 212 TFEU concern are such agreements that pursue the objectives of 
economic, financial and technical co-operation measures, including assistance, in particular 
financial assistance, with third countries other than developing countries, are consistent 
with the developing policy of the Union and are to be carried out within the framework of 
the principles and objectives of its external action. These agreements in terms of content are 
very similar to association agreements, however, are supposed to entail much less advanced 
level of cooperation. Yet it is unclear whether this is truly the case or whether the difference 
between the two types of agreements is of purely cosmetic nature. If the latter is true, then 
it is indeed intransparent why a specific choice of a measure is made. Finally, the last form of 
international agreements made by the EU are sectoral ones pertaining to particular issues. 
The most famous example of these agreements involve 16 sectoral ones made with 
Switzerland. 
From the human rights perspective, this distinction as to which agreement is made is 
important as the EU, following the recommendation by the Parliament
472
 and the critical 
opinion of the Inter-Parliamentary Committee of 11 October 2011, human rights clauses are 
to be incorporated in all the association and partnership and cooperation. Sectoral 
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agreements, as seemingly addressing issues that are of specific, concrete character, are left 
out from this category. This has already attracted critiques as in case of the Fisheries 
Agreement with Mauretania. 
In terms of content, apart from the above described human rights clause, the parties are 
welcome to extend the human rights obligations if they so please. And this is frequently the 
case which can be only welcome as good development - the silver thread appearing in 
practice of most important instrument making.  
As the example of such practice we can take, for instance the mentioned earlier CARIFORUM 
Agreement which is the first economic partnership agreement which includes provisions 
referring to specific aspects of non-state actors behaviour which may influence human rights 
and democratic principles elements of such agreements. The Agreement in its Article 72 
obliges the EC Party and the CARIFORUM States to undertake necessary measures to ensure 
that:  
'(a) Investors be forbidden from, and held liable for, offering, promising or giving any undue 
pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to any public 
official or member of his or her family or business associates or other person in close 
proximity to the official, for that person or for a third party, in order that the official or third 
party act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, or in order to 
achieve any favour in relation to a proposed investment or any licences, permits, contracts 
or other rights in relation to an investment. 
(b) Investors act in accordance with core labour standards as required by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998, 
to which the EC Party and the Signatory CARIFORUM States are parties.  
(c) Investors do not manage or operate their investments in a manner that circumvents 
international environmental or labour obligations arising from agreements to which the EC 
Party and the Signatory CARIFORUM States are parties.  
(d) Investors establish and maintain, where appropriate, local community liaison processes, 
especially in projects involving extensive natural resource-based activities, in so far that they 
do not nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the other Party under the terms of a specific 
commitment.' 
The Agreement imposes therefore duties predominantly on the Parties to the agreement 
who are to create such legal investment instruments which will act watch over investors' 
actions. Such provisions, in line with the Objectives of the Strategic Framework and Action 
Plan should be incorporated in all investment treaties of the EU.  
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From the procedural point of view, the EU is to follow Article 218 TFEU according to which 
the primary responsibility for the negotiations rests on the Commission or the EU High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy should the agreement concern Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. The procedure involves participation of the Parliament in 
situations determined by Article 216 TFEU,  in relation to:  
(i) association agreements; 
(ii) agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
(iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation 
procedures; 
(iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; 
(v) agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or 
the special legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required.  
The overview of the above measures permits for a conclusion that transparency was clearly 
an objective when the Lisbon Treaty was adopted. Still there remain some doubts as to 
whether, when and how the human rights concern enter the realm of international 
agreement making especially in relation to negotiations process. 
The procedure for adoption of Action Plans is much less rigid, however, given their soft 
character very advanced. Action Plans are 'to be agreed jointly with the neighbouring 
countries concerned. They should have a minimum duration of three years and be subject to 
renewal by mutual consent. Such action plans should be based on common principles but be 
differentiated, as appropriate, taking into account the specificities of each neighbour, its 
national reform processes and its relations with the EU. Action plans should be 
comprehensive but at the same time identify clearly a limited number of key priorities and 
offer real incentives for reform. Action plans should also contribute where possible to 
regional cooperation.
'473
 The procedure of elaboration of an Action Plan requires that the 
Commission puts forward the proposal – on the basis of the 2004 ENP Strategy Paper and 
country reports. Once the Council welcomed the proposal, the Commission completed the 
first set of draft Action Plans addressed at the neighbours with whom the EU had association 
or partnership agreements. The Commission sent the draft Action Plans to the European 
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Parliament, as well as to the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee 
of the Regions for information.
474
 Once Council approved Actions, they were to be endorsed 
by Association/Cooperation Council with each of the partners concerned having as their 
legal basis the existent agreements with the partners. 
The adoption of an Action Plan is therefore, a negotiated process with the Commission and 
requires an extensive dialogue reminding of negotiations of international agreements. As 
such it is not transparent, but it permits long term commitment which can be fairly easily 
adjusted to the requirements of the altered situation of attainment of pre-set objectives. It 
needs to be noted that as it was the case of the accession process, it is to large degree not 
the choice of instruments that will provide us with the information about rule of law but the 
frameworks within which they work.  
With reference to the clarity of obligations, there are two observations that need to be 
made. Firstly, if we simply concentrate on the mere issue of conditionality, it is not exactly 
clear what happens once the essential element is not observed by the parties. Clearly, in 
some cases there are procedures in place which determine the path that are taken (see 
Cotonou agreement), however, in most cases there measure used is the political dialogue. 
This means that conditionality has the suspension results very infrequently. Is this desirable? 
And is it clear from the emphasis placed on the inclusion of human rights clauses that this is 
the manner in which things should function? Secondly, as for the content of agreements, it 
needs to be observed that the EU frequently evokes various international human rights 
treaties in order to strengthen particular commitments. The reasons for evoking specific 
treaties are not openly stated, and the practice is extremely incoherent giving rise to further 
doubts as to whether this criterion is fulfilled.  
As for the prospectivity and generality of obligations, it seems that both international 
agreements and Action Plans fulfil the conditions of Rule of Law.  
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III. Rule of Law Principles Concerning Instrument Application 
We shall deal with transparency and equality  of the application of the two instruments at 
stake, by now customarily, together.  
Many of the above described solutions have had as their objective enhancement of the 
transparency, and therefore equality of the application of the instruments at stake. On the 
basis of international agreements with reference to human rights objectives there have been 
a number of innovative solutions employed. For instance, since 2003 permanent 
subcommittees were established under six agreements with a mandate to discuss human 
rights and democracy, and procedures have been devised in order to ensure better and 
more consistent human rights practice.  
In relation to the latter, especially the so-called Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement 
deserves attention.  
Article 96 provides for an extensive consultation procedure involving political dialogue 
between the Parties. The procedure is restricted in time and should be completed in the 
course of 150 days
475
. It is to commence whenever a Party considers that 'other Party has 
failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles 
and the rule of law referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9'. Should such situation occur, this 
Party is to supply the Council of Ministers with relevant information and invite the non-
compliant Party to consultations 'that focus on the measures taken or to be taken by the 
party concerned to remedy the situation'.476 The initiated consultations and the measures 
thus taken must fulfil requirements set out in Annex VII, attached to the Cotonou Agreement 
as the result of first revision of the Agreement. Only if consultations fail or 'in case of special 
urgency
'477
 may the Parties resort to the "appropriate measures". Those measures are to be 
applied proportionally and in accordance with international law. Article 96(2c) states clearly: 
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'In selection of these measures priority must be given to those which least disrupt the 
application of this agreement. It is understood that suspension would be the a measure of 
last resort'. 
Thus worded Non-Execution clause therefore echoes Article 62 VCLT lying at the foundation 
of human rights clauses as incorporated into trade agreements of the European Union 
including the most advanced sanction provided for by this provision – the suspension of the 
Agreement.  
Yet, even if the procedure itself is fairly elaborate and permits to address the human rights 
flaws in a fairly transparent and equal manner, the solution is not perfect and has  not 
permitted for elimination of this facet of coherence, as reported by Bartels.
478
 Yet, it created 
the basis for future practice aiming at attaining such objectives, even if by providing the 
basis of making clear decisions that will constitute the body of specific type of case law 
which once systematised will permit for creating a constant practice.  
Also in case of the Action Plans there are special  sub-committees set up under these 
agreements for monitoring. These sub-committees consist of representatives of partner 
countries, MSs, European Commission, Council secretariat. Monitoring performed by them 
comes in hand with that performed by the Commission which bases its recommendation as 
to the future contractual bonds on reports it thus produces. Since Action Plans set the 
objectives for the neighbouring countries, once such objectives are attained, Action Plans 
require adjustment. The alteration of scope and goals thereof is conducted on the basis of 
interim reports prepared by the European Commission. If a partner state does not agree 
with findings contained in the report or if it considers its progress to be greater (or smaller) 
than the Commission does, the only way it can alter an Action Plan proposed by the 
Commission is by negotiating. Yet, since negotiations are conducted on the basis of the 
proposal prepared by the Commission and approved by the Council
479
, the Commission has a 
limited possibility of extending its proposal because of the Union's institutional constraints. 
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The above presented considerations with reference to the transparency and equality of the 
two presented measures do not permit for refutation of the claim that the EU external 
human rights policy, and human rights clauses in particular, are applied in a consistent 
manner. Yet, the existence of more and more proceduralised frameworks marks the 
movement in this direction.    
IV. Role of the Court 
With reference to the role of the Court of Justice of the EU in the context of 
multilateral/bilateral relations there are three aspects that need to be given due attention.  
Firstly, we should focus on the traditional role of the court - international agreements are 
where issues of legality - and in particular - competence have been most frequently 
considered either in reference to an agreement as a whole or its particular parts.  
Theoretically, the Court should also oversee the implementation of agreements. Yet, as it 
seems, in many aspects the Court has been considered inadequate for the performance of 
the latter function, hence within agreements such solutions appeared which provided for 
alternatives to Court's jurisdictions. Similar solutions have been earlier scrutinised by the 
Court with various results.  
Finally, there are areas where Court cannot reach - it cannot for instance aid individuals that 
believe that practice connected with agreement implementations are incorrect or do not 
reflect the agreement. There alternative avenues of action emerge, albeit not with positive 
results.  
There exists an extensive case law of the Court which refers above all referring to the 
competence to enter into a given contractual relationship by the EU, or the legal basis 
chosen for such action. Needless, to say, in this aspect Court's biggest role was to define the 
competence of the EU in external relations, yet it is of smaller relevance for this study.
480
 
In the first case, the most notable examples involve Opinion 1/75 on Understanding on a 
Local Cost Standard where the Court was requested to assess whether the EU had a 
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competence to enter into an agreement on export aids where the CJEU for the first time 
provided the definition of an agreement, the opinion 1/94 concerning WTO agreement and 
Opinion 2/91 on the ILO convention. From the point of view of our considerations the most 
important case in this aspects was Opinion 2/94 which concerned the EU accession to the 
ECHR (2/94). Following the question by the Council as to whether the Communities had the 
competence to accede to the ECHR, and thus to deal with human rights issues, the Court 
pointed to the lack of the concurring stance of the Member States on the issue and to the 
insufficient legal basis in the Treaties. Given the lack of preliminary arrangements the Court 
proclaimed that it could not assess otherwise the compatibility with the Treaties. The 
opinion of the Court has been for a long time considered as the cornerstone of EU's inability 
to engage with the hard-core human rights arrangements; which is still a case today. 
However, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was given a specific 
competence to accede to the ECHR thus opening up this door for other human rights 
treaties.  
As for the review of the measures that have been adopted by the EU within the international 
agreements, the court has made its position explicit on a number of occasions with 
reference to the institutional arrangements and dispute resolution mechanisms which were 
to be created outside of the EU legal order.  
In the Opinion 1/76
481
concerning the establishment of the inland waterway vessels fund by 
Switzerland, the Community and its Member States the Court referred to creation of certain 
organs of the Fund, which would involve substantive participation of Member States and 
result in deprivation of the Union of its decision making power. Given such arrangements, 
the Court declared the agreement in this form as incompatible with the Community law. It 
stated that institutional arrangements involving the Community and its Member States are 
permissible only if they are not contrary to constitutional arrangements included in the EC 
Treaty.  
In the same opinion the Court addressed the issue of the possibility of establishing a tribunal 
with concurrent jurisdiction with the European Court of Justice whose members would be 
also the Members of the European Court of Justice. In the light of the above, the Court 
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expressed hope that in interpreting the text of such treaty there would be a small possibility 
of interpretations giving rise to conflicts of jurisdictions, or divergent interpretations. 
The ECJ only touched upon the issue of existence of two tribunals whose powers and 
composition
482
 are overlapping – they would be both in the position to interpret the 
Agreement establishing the fund – and therefore the act of Community institutions. Whilst 
the ECJ eventually declared the Agreement as incompatible with the Community law, it need 
not have bothered with answering with the latter question. Instead, it expressed doubts as 
to the compatibility of such arrangement with the Community law and hope that 
discrepancies in adjudication would be minor.
483
 
By means of Opinion 1/76 of 26 April 1977 the Court managed to determine the basis for its 
further case law with reference to any institutional/procedural frameworks to which the 
European Community might have transferred powers on the basis of agreements it entered 
into. 




 contributed to a large extent to the 
discourse concerning external executive bodies established by the force of an agreement as 
well as external, independent of the Community judicial mechanisms. The opinions concern 
directly the creation of the European Economic Area.
486
  
As it has been already mentioned, the draft EEA Agreement provided for establishment of 
two bodies which would parallel the Community ones – the EEA Council which was to give 
the political impetus to the cooperation and the EEA Joint Council which was to implement 
the Agreement and also provide the first instance of dispute settlement mechanism 
between the parties. In addition to this arrangement, the draft EEA Agreement created the 
EEA Court – an independent
487
 body which was also to deliver binding decisions concerning 
the interpretation of the Agreement. Furthermore, national courts of the EFTA states were 
given the possibility of requesting opinion of the European Court of Justice on issues 
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concerning the interpretation of EEA provisions which were identical with the provisions of 
the EC Treaty. The modalities of this procedure were left to the EFTA states. Obviously, this 
arrangement caused serious doubts as to its compatibility with the EU legal order, and 
therefore the Commission requested the Court's opinion with reference to, precisely, the 
EEA judicial mechanism.  
Before addressing the direct enquiry of the Commission, the Court defined the fundamental 
difference between the objectives of the EEA (attainment of free trade and competition in 
economic and commercial relations) and the EEC (creation of Internal Market and Economic 
and Monetary Union, but in a long term perspective, the European Union) which will 
influence the interpretation of the EEA Agreement in line with Article 31 of the VCLT.
488
 
Subsequently, the ECJ focused on implications concerning establishment of the independent 
judicial review. It observed that should the EEA Court attempt to define the notion of 
'Contracting Parties', it would directly affect the division of the competences in the European 
Community.
489
 Decisions thus made would have been binding on Community institutions 
and the European Court of Justice, given the position of such decisions in the hierarchy of 
European sources of law.
490
 Furthermore, similarly to the decision 1/76, the Court detected 
the danger in participation of the ECJ in the EEA Court – danger which would have 
threatened their objectivity and impartiality.  
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of preliminary questions which could be directed by 
national courts of the EFTA states to the ECJ – with this respect the Court decided that 
purely consultative position the Court would assume with reference to proceedings in front 
of EFTA states courts would go against its position as defined by the EEC Treaty and 
therefore constitutional principles of the Community law.  
As the result, the Court found in its Opinion 1/9 1of 4 December 1991 that '(t)he system of 
judicial supervision which the Agreement proposes to set up is incompatible with the EEC 
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 The EFTA states undertook to negotiate another draft agreement and 
incorporated most of the comments of the European Court of Justice. In turn, it approved 
the EEA Agreement
492
 in its Opinion 1/92
493
, accepting the changes introduced by the EFTA 
states and the Community as the result of subsequent negotiations. As the Court recalled in 
its subsequent opinion concerning the ECAA Agreement '(t)he Court has already 
recognised that an international agreement entered into by the Community with 
non-Member States may affect the powers of the Community institutions, without, 
however, being regarded as incompatible with the Treaty. As it found in its Opinions 
on the draft agreements relating to the creation of the EEA, such an agreement is 
regarded as compatible with the Treaty provided it does not alter the essential 
character of the powers conferred on the Community institutions by the Treaty'.
494
 
Despite the clear stance on the part of the CJEU as to the permissibility of creation of the EU 
external dispute resolution mechanism, such mechanisms continue to be inserted into the 
agreements. The Cotonou Agreement provides for an advanced dispute settlement 
mechanism which makes use of institutional framework envisaged therein. All disputes are 
to be submitted to the Council of Ministers or to the Committee of Ambassadors (should 
there be no meeting of the Council of Ministers at the time). Should the Agreement 
institutions fail to resolve a dispute, a panel of three arbitrators is to resolve a dispute. 
Arbitrators are to decide upon the procedure which is to be applied in a given dispute, yet if 
no such decision is made rules of Permanent Court of Arbitration for International 
Organisations and States should apply. Importantly, panel's decision is to bind Parties to the 
Agreement who are to take measures necessary to carry out the decision of the 
arbitrators.495 
Similarly to the Cotonou Agreement, the CARIFORUM has created a very elaborate dispute 
avoidance and settlement mechanism which, according to Article 203(1), in its scope 
involves application and interpretation of the Agreement and therefore disputes concerning 
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Essential Elements and Non-Execution Clauses as incorporated directly into the CARIFORUM 
from the Cotonou Agreement
496
. The dispute avoidance mechanism consists of consultations 
and mediation. The dispute settlement mechanism, on the other hand, is based on the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism, yet with some additional improvements (such as the 
publicity of meetings and reports). Findings of panels are binding for the Parties. The 
CARIFORUM Agreement provides also for the review mechanism of measures taken to 
comply with the arbitration ruling.  
Similarly, in search for an alternative, the individuals seek access to some sort of body which 
can address the issues connected with the implementation of the EU human rights issues. 
Yet again, the European Omubdsman is an addressee of such claims. For instance, in a recent 
one he addressed an issue of non-suspension of an EU-Vietnam agreement
497
 following the 
human rights abuses that took place in Vietnam. When finding the claim unfounded, the 
Ombudsman referred to the Commission evaluating the use of the suspension on the basis 
of principle of proportionality thus providing a theoretical measure through which the 
practice of agreement implementation can be addressed.  
V. Rule of Law Assessment 
From the rule of law point of view international and multilateral arrangements are of very 
uneven nature. On the one hand, they are extremely well provided for - with clear, precise 
and detailed rules of agreement making. Yet, these rules become diluted in the negotiation 
and dialogue process inherent for international norm creation and application. Nevertheless, 
the evaluation of the fulfilment of rule of law must be determined as positive.  
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Part III - Beyond the Rule of Law Paradigm 
Chapter 7 - Through the Sieve Effect of the Rule of Law Benchmarks 
What if the rule of law lens employed by so many authors is simply out-dated? What if it just 
fails to analyse the reality where the executive needs to react in a quick manner and 
requires, therefore, flexible legal instruments? What if the EU has already developed such a 
framework; it is simply overshadowed by the – no matter how well justified but inadequate 
for purposes at stake - constitutionalist concerns?  
The analysis performed in Part II was underpinned by the above-posed set of questions, and 
with the view of addressing them the image of the sieve has been introduced. During the 
analysis performed in Part II we have dealt with what was kept by the Rule of Law sieve. 
Now it is time to plough through all that was not included by it in search of the meaningful 
elements of the EU external human rights policy - such that would permit us to evaluate the 
policy in a more comprehensive manner.  
Of help in this process may be the political science outlook on the policy making and 
especially the circularity of the process. Some aspects thereof were mentioned in the above 
performed analysis; others went missing.  
The mere concept of the policy cycle can be viewed in multiple ways
498
 - from the basic five 
element format
499
 to eight component one by Bridgman and Davis
500
. Whilst the choice of 
the concept of policy cycle and its most important components can be disputed, addressing 
thus arising controversies is not my purpose here. Its utility, from the perspective of this 
study, presents itself in pointing to the direction which rule of law fails to take account of. 
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Needless to say, if we are to pursue the analysis of legal aspects of the EU external human 
rights policy, we will need to look for the adequate terms to approach the policy.  
Bridgman and Davis’s model of policy cycle, known also as Australian Policy Cycle, present a 
very detailed account of the stages of policy making. Importantly, it is emphasised that the 
circular model is not completely chronological. In other words, the policy cycle, once set in 
motion consists of a number of overlapping cycles: each focused on one or two sets of 
instruments. In the particular context of EU external human rights policy this is even clearer 
if we consider the fragmented context in which the objectives of our policy are addressed 
(development, commercial, migration policy) unified by the tool applied in a given context. 
The policy cycle should be by no means considered as a static phenomenon – it is a way 
more complex process. The details, however, point to the focal points important from the 
perspective of settings going beyond constitutionalism which take into account much less 
formalistic (and much more realistic) accounts of toolbox creation and implementation. 
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It needs to be noted that applied policy cycle does not need to follow all of the eight stages, 
in some cases the stages may overlap one another. Yet this way of envisaging the policy 
cycle permits for a fuller appreciation of instrument development and implementation. The 
policy cycle will provide to a certain extent a roadmap for the analysis of this Chapter. The 
table ascribes to each of the stages of the policy cycle, the existing EU policy and legal 
instruments  as well as the identified rule of law benchmarks. 
Table No 7: Policy Cycle Applied to the EU External Human Rights Policy 
 Stage in the Policy 
Cycle 
Rule of Law Benchmark (if 
applicable) 
European Union Instruments (that 
produce ultimately legal effects) 
1 Issue Identification  Treaty provisions (resulting from the 
lengthy historical process) 
2 Policy Analysis  EU Human Rights Strategy and the 
focus on existing instruments 
3 Policy Instrument 
Development 
Rule of law principles 
concerning norms creation 
Selection for Instruments ranging 
from bilateral binding ones 
(international agreements), through 
unilateral actions, to diplomatic ones. 
4 Consultation Rule of law principles 
concerning norms creation 
(but only to a certain 
degree) and application 
Depends on the instrument  
5 Coordination Rule of law principles 
concerning norm 
application 
Depends on the instrument  
6 Decision Rule of law principles 
concerning norms creation 
Depends on the instrument  
7 Implementation Rule of law principles 
concerning application of 
the created norms 
Rule of law principles 
concerning conflict 
resolution 
Depends on the instrument  
8 Evaluation Rule of law principles 
concerning norms 
application 
Depends on the instrument  
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 The above presented breakdown of the stages of the policy cycle when confronted with the 
rule of law benchmarks identified in Chapter 2 and applied to specific instruments in Part II 
illustrates the inability of the rule of law model to grasp the totality of the processes (also 
those highly formalised ones) that constitute the EU external human rights policy. It seems 
that, from the policy cycle perspectives, the Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy succeeds at identifying the policy problems and tools to address 
them. The Action Plan refers to them as the ‘existing body of EU policy on human rights and 
democracy in external action, notably EU guidelines, toolkits and other agreed positions and 
the various financial instruments, in particular the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights’
502
. Notably, the Strategic Framework and Action plan illustrates another 
important feature of policy cycle conceived of as analytical tool. Namely, unless coordinated 
in a very precise outward looking manner, mini-policies focused on a use of a specific 
instrument, will overlap and may be found at a completely two different stages of their 
implementation. This may have clear implications on the coherence of the overall policy, 
however, not such that could not be amended. The circularity of processes which constitute 
policy cycles and the fact that they do not require that all of the stages are fulfilled makes it 
possible for various cycles to come in tune; diverging the speed at which they progress if 
necessary. 
Table no 7 illustrates quite well how limited, even though essential, is information about the 
policy that is given to us by the sieve of rule of law. It is by all means essential as it provides 
for the boundaries within which the policy instruments operate and justly so. Therefore, if at 
the end of this study we are to arrive at any conclusions, as to whether the framework of 
evaluation should entail either rule of law or another theoretical framework, it needs to be 
stated that the answer should be that the two should be complementary.  They need to be 
complementary also for another reason, illustrated to an extent by policy cycle analysis - at 
stage 3 of the cycle where the choice as to instruments is made, this can be choice of one or 
more instruments. It is, in fact, one of the biggest shortcomings of the rule of law framework 
of analysis - whilst it permits to take account of the formal basis of interactions between 
different sets of instruments, it does not allow for qualitative evaluation of how they work 
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together. This is partially so, because the norm application stage is not mirrored by the case 
law in the area. And there is a bit of such interplay which could be illustrated by, in part 
objectives pursued by specific instruments (i. e. implementation of the provisions of the 
treaty especially from the financial point of view (eg ENPI); piercing the sovereignty veil 
addressing non-governmental entities and NGOs (EIHRD) and allowing for privileged 
treatment in addition to the obligations stemming from the treaty (GSP+)), but also in the 
choice of each of measures should come into play in a given context. The latter 
argumentation was scrutinised by the Ombudsman in his decision concerning the non-
suspension by the Commission of the international agreement made with Vietnam.
503
 
Interestingly, the choice of various instruments is noted by scholars, but not much attention 
is paid to premises on which such choices are made. It is as if the Commission was always 
acting on the basis of some pre-conceived interest scheme which is way more complex and 
strategically planned than we could possibly understand, or as if the choices made by the 
Commission were completely random. Rosas observes in this vein:  
‘Behaviour deemed to be in violation of the human rights clause may lead to the suspension 
of unilateral financial assistance or of trade preferences, or the operation of an agreement. 
Sometimes funds are frozen, travel bans imposed on the leading circles of a particular 
regime, and/or arms exports prohibited, as demonstrated by the recent sanctions against 
the Qadhafi regime in Libya. Sometimes a carrot in the form of financial assistance can 
function as a stick as well: for instance, support for a non-governmental organisation may be 
viewed as an unfriendly act by the regime in power in the recipient country.’
504
 
None of the choices above seem to be either random or forcing a specific EU-friendly 
solution. The question appears as to whether, and if so, which principled reasoning the 
Commission uses (such as the use of principle of proportionality - see the above referred to 
decision of the Ombudsman on Vietnam Agreement
505
) and what kind of implications it has 
over policy choices. 
What the Sieve Does not Catch 
The below sections will present short observations as to what was left outside our earlier 
considerations. These observations are arranged according to the group of instruments we 
                                                      
503
 European Ombudsman, Complaint No 933/2004/JMA, decision of 28 June 2005 , op. cit. 
504
 Rosas, ‘Is the EU a Human Rights Organisation?’, at 13-14. 
505
 European Ombudsman, Complaint No 933/2004/JMA, decision of 28 June 2005, op. cit. 
218 
 
had analysed before, thus they build to a certain extent on the comment pertaining to inter-
connectedness of instruments as stated above.  
With reference to the unilateral instruments directed at the EU institutions and its Member 
States (Chapter 4), the important part of instrument creation consisted in the consultation 
with various stakeholders, as well as inherent evaluation process of instruments that in part 
have already been in place. Interestingly, the consultation process contributes in this case to 
the attainment of the objective of transparency. As it has been demonstrated above, 
frequently the information on consultations can be found on the sources belonging to the 
NGOs, whilst they would be inaccessible (or lost) within the archives of the EU institutions. 
Furthermore, these are the NGOs that push for the introduction of monitoring mechanisms 
inducing further the accessibility of information and transparency. Hence, the actions of the 
NGOs have an indirect impact on the transparency and equality of the EU actions.  
The European Parliament, as we saw, conducts a very useful controlling exercise by 
commissioning drafting of studies and reports on actual application of given instruments. 
The information thus obtained serves as the basis for recommendations and ultimate 
revision of the instruments at stake.  Both in case of the NGOs and the European Parliament 
we are dealing here with the external control putting in place not only the mechanisms for 
enhanced transparency, but exerting monitoring and evaluation exercises, albeit on an ad 
hoc basis.  
As far as the unilateral instruments adopted for external purposes directed at third countries 
and the members of the civil society (Chapter 5), the setting becomes much more interesting 
- Article 15 of the Horizontal Implementing Regulation provides for the involvement of 
stakeholders of beneficiary countries of financial instruments. The provision reads:  
'The Commission shall, whenever possible and appropriate, ensure that, in the 
implementation process, relevant stakeholders of beneficiary countries, including civil 
society organisations and local authorities, are or have been duly consulted and have timely 
access to relevant information allowing them to play a meaningful role in that process.'
506
 
It is a mandatory provision obliging the Commission to take such measure - hence 
consultation is formally a part of implementation of EU's financial regulations.  
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As for the evaluation processes, within the units of the Commission dealing with external 




Finally, within this group of instruments policy analysis as well as issue identification is, in 
part based on the documents produced within the process of consultation and evaluation, 
and subsequently given voice in the form of multiannual programs, annual action plans 
(these differ depending on an instrument). Each of the regulations permits the Commission 
to issue such act, thus facilitating incorporation of what has been uncovered in the process 
of evaluation and consultation into the instrument implementation.  
Finally, the Chapter 6 devoted to bilateral and multilateral agreements referred in the large 
part to action plans - policy tools developed within the realm of the European 
Neighbourhood policy and fully based on the policy cycle. Furthermore, the proceduralised 
aspects of essential elements clauses as used in Cotonou and CARIFORUM agreements point 
to a much more nuanced approach to the instrument implementation than a simple 
positive-negative application of the clause. Again, these conditions are based on the legal 
text; hence if we are to look for policy cycle elements, they are inherent for the legal 
framework and regulate the processes concerning the application of instruments.  
If we recall which elements of rule of law were tak en into consideration in 
the analysis of the Chapter 6, we can see that only  limited conclusions can 
be drawn on the basis of the rule of law. This goes  back to Waldron’s 
criticism against rule of law as a concept – the cr iticism according to 
which rule of law focuses on the static context, ra ther than a changeable 
one – as in case of external relations. However, ev en if the context itself 
is a changeable one, what remains the same is the E U's desire to affect 
third countries with its values and manner in which  it deals with specific 
problems.  
The need to maintain the force of attraction of the EU external human rights policy is 
pursued has been noted in literature. In words of Rosas ‘(t)he main emphasis is on the carrot 
(for instance, financing various projects and programmes in third countries or trade 
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preferences accorded to such countries) but the use of the stick is not excluded.’
 508
 The 
incentive approach is where the strength of the EU human rights policy lies. The leverage 
that comes with tightened collaboration with the European Union is what has been making 
the policy appealing and tools more effective than the usual international legal 
arrangements. The challenge is to preserve such force of attraction in the altering global 
environment whilst also maintaining and developing further the legitimacy connected with 
experimentation - a brand quality of the EU.
509
 And in order to meet this challenge, it is 
necessary that the policy itself is viewed in a broader manner. The following chapter offers 
one of the alternative modes of doing so. 
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Chapter 8 - Beyond Rule of Law Framework for the External Human Rights Policy 
of the European Union – governance and experimentalism 
I. Introduction 
The above chapters followed the analytical framework underlying the literature focusing on 
the external human rights policy of the European Union – that based on the rule of law 
paradigm. Whilst in case of the EU internal dealings the traditional conceptions of rule of law 
and democratic safeguards prevail, so far the external sphere ruled by international law 
required solely classical compliance. Obviously, the two – internal and external legal 
frameworks - whilst enabling achievement of the set objectives, have their own limitations. 
Some of these limitations result from particular design of the European polity and the idea of 
external policy promoted by its institutions. Other limitations, especially the incoherent 
enforcement of available measures in relation to third states, result from the intrinsic 
characteristics of international law and an essential flexibility allowing any international 
actor to pursue its objectives in the international context. In a sense, the critical voices 
uttered against the external human rights policy of the European Union could be applied to 
any European policy, which is linked to the external sphere and affects the internal dealings. 
Thus, in any such case, and in case of external human rights policy in particular, the analysis 
grounded solely on the paradigm of rule of law proves insufficient. There are two reasons 
why that is so. 
Firstly, the rule of law paradigm relates only to the authority versus individual relationship; it 
does not account for the behaviours of other actors. Thus the assumed approach to the EU 
as to the legislator in dealings with third states is blind to a much more complex reality than 
this portrayed by rule of law approaches. When the EU ‘legislates’ for third states, it also 
creates rules for actors and individuals within those third states. In external dealings the rule 
of law paradigm ignores actors other than states, whilst not providing the protection 
analogous to the one granted to individuals internally. Furthermore, the paradigm does not 
take into account processes which occur when those actors make themselves heard, that is 
even more visible if we eye the totality of the instruments employed in a given field as it is 
the case when we employ the policy cycle type of analysis.   
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Secondly, as it was observed, the ideal of rule of law has undergone continuous evolution 
over the years; it truly is a contested and unclear concept
510
. As such, though part of the 
constitutional triad, it is hardly accepted as a means to other ends. As Walker observes, rule 
of law consisted of many overlapping dimensions. The instrumental dimension developed in 




'By the instrumental dimension of the rule of law we mean the way in which it may be 
understood as a means to the realisation of the other ends
512
 rather than simply as a 
regulatory end and a good in itself. These extrinsic and instrumental benefits are in theory 
wide-ranging, but we may identify three clusters, which have tended to predominate in the 
historical analysis of the instrumental benefits of the rule of law. In the first place, there is 
the idea that a settled prospective, and a general framework of laws serves to protect the 
patterns of property rights and the predictability of exchange necessary for good commerce 
in general, and capitalist commerce in particular. In the second place, there is the idea of a 
settled, prospective and general framework of laws as the crystallisation and perfection of 
the will of 'the people' under a system of representative democracy. In the third place, and 
reflecting the post-substantive 'procedural turn' in legal thought over the past 30 years, 
there is the idea of law decision-making rules that, in their reliably settled, prospective and 
general character, are capable of responding accurately, fairly and effectively to the growing 
variety of decisional spheres within society and the increasing diversity and complexity of 
interest and preference constituencies affected within and across each of these spheres.'
513
 
Walker defines this trend in rule of law literature, but he does not seem to believe in it. The 
Ockham blade simplicity (though, according to some, not characteristic for the European 
Union
514
) of rules cannot provide all the answers, neither can it respond to complex diverse 
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interests and preferences. In addition to the above, the ideal of rule of law mainly 
determines the conditions, which need to be fulfilled for the society to be able to rely on law 
and institutions that are to ensure state's due action should the standard not be met. In 
other words, rule of law mainly applies to norm creation principles, delimited by judicial 
review. As we saw, the EU acts as a good legislator within the internally defined constraints 
(which as off the Treaty of Lisbon have the name and binding legal nature) which underlie 
judicial scrutiny of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It also complies with internal 
and external obligation to uphold and promote human rights. It could be claimed that the 
treaty makers have responded to criticisms rendering the internal and external dimensions 
of the policy more coherent. On the other hand, they have departed from the principle of 
equality of international actors, imposing the EU standards as reference point in external 
dealings. 
Yet, norm application relating to the external human rights policy of the European Union is 
different. This is so not only because here instead of enforcement (externally or 
institutionally induced one) we need to speak of compliance (more voluntary). The 
difference results, first, from the fact that human rights as a pursued external policy 
objective, most probably, to a much higher degree enter the sphere of sovereignty of other 
states. Furthermore, on the level of inter-state relations the policy obviously underlies rules 
of political process, which in the sphere of human rights policy is highly complex and 
controversial. This happens because the traditional external human rights policy instruments 
either relate to other policy objectives or oppose them. Trade, control of migration flows, 
security concerns find themselves too frequently intertwined in nexuses with what is to be 
promoted and upheld
515
 and tend to prevail over the latter. Thus, any radical measure 
resultant from essential element doctrine is likely to conflict with other policy interests (not 
to mention the . On the other hand, the suspension of an international agreement of general 
nature may amount indirectly not only to effective sanctions against the government, but 
against the population of a given state and, probably, the infringement on the part of the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                      
We appear to be no nearer a considered understanding of the contribution of law to the values and the make-
up of the institutional ethos of the EU or vice versa. In particular, no captivating philosophy for the Union or of 
its law has emerged. And, more importantly, no developed discourse or established institution-specific theory 
of substantive justice has been evident.' Williams, The ethos of Europe : values, law and justice in the EU, at 13-
14. 
515
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of promoted and upheld values. This is a frequent criticism raised against international 
sanction regime, and as such, serves as the confirmation of the broader claim. Certainly, the 
international legal order as it currently stands, with traditional international legal 
instruments at its disposal is not capable of responding to calls manifested, inter alia, by 
critiques of the EU external human rights policy. This conclusion is to be reached even before 
considering the last part of the puzzle – the availability and accessibility of judicial review 
measures which in international realm is either null or limited to the fragmented and highly 
complex regimes.
516
 Indeed, it seems that within the set limits – the external human rights 
policy of the European Union has reached the maximum level. Developing it more within 
internal sphere would amount to a de facto federalism; in external realm, it would mark a 
super-power acting according to the dictate of law (which in human rights realm is also a 
tool rather than a goal on its own
517
) regardless of externalities it might produce. 
Yet, the EU, as we have seen in the previous chapters, did not seize to look for alternative 
solutions and thus developed probably the most advanced toolbox there exists for the 
pursuit if human rights objectives in external policy and, therefore, at the intersection of the 
EU and international environment. The toolbox escapes the traditional legal analysis not 
because it is not based on legal rules, but because it corresponds to the changed 
architecture of international law and 'pierced' the veil of sovereignty of the state directly 
'promoting and upholding' the rights of individual citizens of third countries with whom the 
EU maintains relations.  
This signals, in line with the literature dominating the past fifteen years, the radical 
transformation of international legal regime. It is the departure from the logic in which 
problems had been tackled on the state level and through the institutions of international 
law and basing on State territoriality principle. In search of a better concept
518
 giving us 
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criteria for evaluation, we need to speak of governance for it grasps what the purely legal 
analysis does not take into account, whilst paying dues to the function and procedural basis 
thereof. It is clear that the EU in its external policy readily applies governance principles – 
being flexible, they serve well the purposes of going beyond what law provides for. And the 
European Union goes well beyond giving flesh to what has developed from governance; 
what became known in the EU internal dealings as, first, new governance, and, later, 
reflexive governance, and, what with reference to the external sphere, in Gráinne de Búrca’s 
term what has been adapted in the general external relations context as governance mode 
of external policy.  
In doing so, the EU has probably expanded its role and put on the hat of the administrator – 
it legislated with the view of administering. Through the use of procedures, it creates 
frameworks within which the objectives can be achieved in a manner more adapted to the 
needs of a particular situation. The hat of the administrator that the EU partially puts on in 
the external relations forces us to consider, in addition to the new governance framework, 
that of global administrative law and the relationship between the two.  
There is one more argument that speaks in favour of adopting the GAL and governance lens 
of analysis for the external human rights policy. The subject of the policy – human rights are 
particularly important for the international legal system. Universal, inalienable 
characteristics of all individuals across the world, human rights acquired the characteristics 
of public good which needs to be pursued with all means available. As such they correspond 
to the substantial focus of both governance and global administrative law, and contribute 
with yet another voice to the hitherto ongoing debates about the position of human rights 
against other areas of law (the most known being that between Petersmann and Alston 
concerning the WTO legal regime
519
). 
It needs to be noted that the GAL lens provides some additional dimensions to the two 
problems raised at the beginning of this chapter with relation to the rule of law paradigm.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Mette Kjær, Governance (Polity Press 2004) Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Theory of Governance’ Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of International Public Law, online edition and others. 
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Firstly, if we assume that in some areas of its external policy the EU acts as an administrator 
and that human rights (also as public goods) constitute a subject of its actions leading to a 
creation of the instruments that are available, potentially, to the global community, then 
from this point of view the EU fits in the rule of law paradigm. We could state that the Global 
Administrative Law endorses new governance in a functional way – treating it as an 
instrument of pursuing global administrative law objectives. In this case, whilst maintaining 
the hitherto prevailing distinction between law and governance, it seems obvious that the 
governance paradigm of the international administration is complementary to the one of 
rule of law.  
Secondly, the above conclusion leads us directly to Marc Dawson’s proposal of the theory of 
new governance being internal to law
520
, thus marking the transformation of the European 
law. Consequently, in the European Union external legal context, there is a space for 
reshaping the rule of law concept including the neglected otherwise governance elements 
thereof. In very simplistic terms we could state that the work of the past 10 years focused on 
the developing new governance theory has finally brought us to its application as the 
additional legal benchmark; constituent of the European Union rule of law framework.  
The case study of the European Union external human rights policy demonstrates – unlikely 
as it may seem given its substance – that there is a need to take the above mentioned 
change on board whenever evaluating the policies and legal frameworks devised by the 
Union for the pursuit of specific objectives. Simplifying for the illustrative purposes, there is 
no more room for objecting to the presence of the governance principles in the practice of 
the EU institutions; consequently academia needs to embrace this reality and develop tools 
enabling the comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the said frameworks. This chapter 
presents a proposal how this could be done.  
The proposal to endorse governance principles as complementary to the rule of law ones 
will start off with placing the EU external human rights policy in the context of global 
administrative law framework. Having done so, it will be necessary to determine what is the 
relationship between the GAL and the governance approaches. Finally the focus will be 
placed on the new governance and its characteristics and benchmarks. The last part of this 
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work will summarise the findings in order to propose a comprehensive tool for assessment 
of the external human rights policy of the European Union.  
II. Governance 
So far, what we have established is that there exist core components of the rule of law 
conception that could be useful in analysing and evaluating the external human rights policy 
of the European Union. The extracted benchmarks seem to be a ready solution for purposes 
of evaluation; however, as indicated above they do not give us the complete picture of the 
EU external human rights policy. The concept of governance and its derivatives should allow 
us to fill the gaps of the analysis, and complete the list of legal benchmarks according to 
which, ultimately, any policy dealing with public goods could be assessed.  
This section serves the purpose of placing governance in the midst of our discussion and 
identification of threads of legal conceptions that may prove useful to elaborating those 
benchmarks. It will start with the identification of governance as the part of the legal 
research and the constituent part of any external human rights policy. The analysis will not 
focus on the governance initiatives undertaken within international organisations at stake.
521
 
The chapter will then move to identifying the most important threads in the legal analysis of 
governance and identify those, which in factual terms can be identified in the practice of the 
EU pursuing human rights objectives in external field, thus providing the starting point of 
discussion in subsequent sections. 
Just as it is the case with the elusive concept of rule of law, there exist many definitions of 
governance.
522
 Unlike the rule of law, governance is about the practice of exercising 
authority, not about the theory or ideal to be strived for. Traditionally contrasted with 
'government', governance attempts to grasp everything that can be found underneath the 
formal structure of procedures and institutions interactions of which are provided for by 
law.
523
 Governance, at least according to its understanding in legal sciences
524
, bridges the 
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two allowing for a much better understanding of power distribution and, therefore, for 
better regulation. This can be done only with highest attention given to translation of the 
concept from the area of political science to the legal science which has been done 
especially with reference to new governance in, what is described by Dawson, as a two wave 
process, with a growing need of the third wave of literature.
525
 
The rise of the concept of governance is attributed, as explained by Ladeur, to the 
'emergence of multiplicity of phenomena of cooperation beyond traditional forms of 
decision-making'
526
. These came about as the consequence of globalisation processes, 
facilitated exchanges of goods, services resulting, ultimately, in the increased 'level of 
complexity of knowledge-generation and stabilization, for use in the processes of decision-
making' and 'a kind of "second order" proceduralization which structure the factual 
preconditions of conventions and political relations'
527
. Thus emerged the need of the 
regulation of this proceduralization which, alongside with issues regulated by them, would 
pierce 'sovereignty' and go beyond the logic of territoriality. The focus is placed on the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
all the people for the purpose of governance emphasising the participation and accountability of all the actors 
of the process.  
In the view of the Brandt’s Commission, governance is a two sided process where in order to ensure to all the 
people certain set of standards and rights, the people need to take on some responsibilities. Amongst the 
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inclusion of knowledgeable actors in the procedures of norm creation and norm application 
– because they are in possession of knowledge and frequently remain the ultimate 
addressees of norms, but also because they are 'closer' to the object of policy according to 
the rules of subsidiarity. 
Similarly, as it was mentioned in the introductory note to this chapter, the global factors, 
contributing to emergence of governance, have also affected the global legal order, 
opposing non-hierarchical model of decision making to the traditional conceptions of law. 
For, in the words of Slaughter '(i)n post-modernity the hierarchical mode of international 
coordination is severed by multiplicity of 'disaggregated' forms of cooperation at different 
levels'
528
. Thus, the global governance is yet again characterised by processes, as opposed to 
stable structures, connected with permeability of state 'borders' both in symbolic and literal 
sense
529
 and emergence of non-state actors on the international level. Their 'actorness' is 
disputed within the realm of international law, whilst, at the same time, indispensable for 
the use of governance. Ladeur thus comments on the phenomenon:  
'Beyond traditional bi- and multi-national cooperation between States or of international 
organizations in traditional vein, a new arena has emerged which is populated by different 
versions of private-public networks and forms of decision-making which act beyond the clear 
attribution of responsibility to State actors. (...) Within traditional international organizations 
the new flexible forms come to the fore as well. This is true for the use of 'soft law' as an 
alternative to binding majority decisions as a 'half-way house' (Klabbers) allowing for 
compromise (Koskenniemi, Reinicke and Witte, 2009).'
530
 
The new forms of international rule have been also complemented by the emergence of 
'new sovereignty' of a state who becomes involved in the 'wide range of international and 
trans-governmental regimes, networks and institutions'
531
. The emergence thus affected the 
core of international law and theoretical concepts underlying it, discussed also within the 
hard core of the discipline usually with reference to fragmentation of international law.
532
 
It is important to remember that the objective behind the development of the conception is 
tightly connected with rise of private actors in the globalisation process. These private 
actors, whilst getting involved with the decision making processes, have also pursued their 
                                                      
528




 Ladeur at para 14. 
531
 Chayes and Handler, op. cit. 
532
 United Nations. International Law Commission. Study Group., Koskenniemi and Erik Castrén -instituutti. 
230 
 
own interest with an ultimate view of making profit. On the other hand, public authorities, 
belonging to the sphere of government, have welcomed this rise aware that in the complex 
global setting, regulation very often requires high levels of expert knowledge, usually in 
possession of industries at stake.  
Human rights, as an objective of governance, do not fit the profit-oriented picture. The same 
problems as described in previous chapters arise. Human rights are both the base – 
underlying value – of actions and their objective. Yet, even here, private actors have 
emerged interested in the pursuit of the objectives and in possession of the knowledge to do 
so. The non-governmental organisations involved in the process of human rights objectives 
pursuit, do so also following their own interest, with the 'expert knowledge' of the field 
situation; capable of piercing 'sovereignty' veil without putting the financing actor – be it a 
state, international organisation or a private entity – at risk of infringing one of the principles 
of the international legal context – sovereignty. It needs to be noted that the pursuit of 
human rights objectives in such a mode follows the hypothesis of Renate Mayntz for the 
economic sectors
533
 according to which regulation takes the turn to governance in 
conditions of uncertainty of the status of the subject and object of regulation. In human 
rights arena, the ultimate subjects whom the principle affects do not necessarily welcome 
the standard; which in itself, though universally accepted, varies depending on the culture of 
the state we are considering.  
Therefore, the governance logic remains behind the design of procedures and instruments, 
which are to meet policy objectives. We can speak of new governance – which emerged 
within the international cooperation context between the member states in the area of 
social policy of the member states – that has found its application also in the general context 
of external policy, with human rights objectives being an example of how the traditional 
legal measures are rendered inefficient. This new governance can be perceived as 
accompanied by the transnational administrative institutions, or institutions which perform 
functions of transnational administrative institutions. These issues shall be addressed in the 
subsequent part of the chapter.  
                                                      
533
 See inter alia: Renate Mayntz and Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung., The architecture of multi-
level governance of economic sectors (MPIfG 2007). 
231 
 
Before doing so, however, we shall address the manner in which international organisations 
have embraced the governance paradigm in order to determine what in their view 
constitutes governance. They have, therefore, regulated the standards of new governance 
which have been created as benchmarks by international organisations, though in their 
history and origins reach the ancient times, and in fact distract the picture of the emerging 
governance forms by linking them to the previously existing and well developed concepts 
thus creating a chapeau over the known legal and administrative architecture of the intra- 
and inter-state dealings. The following section provides an insight into this attempts.  
What makes Good Governance? International organisations’ perspectives. 
The concept of governance in its contemporary form has been developed in contrast to the 
prevailing state-centred concepts of 'government' and international law. It needs to be 
distinguished from the normative concept of 'governance' that had been used to comment 
and evaluate the practice of exercising authority for more than 2500 years.
534
 The 
contemporary understanding of the term has been coined by the Commission on Global 
Governance, known as the Brandt Commission and was described as the collective of ways in 
which public and private institutions and individuals manage their common affairs. 
Governance includes both formal institutions and regimes which are to enforce rules as well 
as informal arrangements in which people and institutions participate because they perceive 
it to be in their interest or they agreed to do so.
535
 Later on, with development of indicators, 
the term shifted to its 'normative' understanding, used in the international context it has 
given the authority of stronger actors (usually donor countries) to evaluate 'achievements' of 
recipient countries. The term, in its normative dimension differs hugely from the above 
outlined description of the international practice and de facto transformative processes 
taking place on the international level. It is well grounded in the inter-state practices and 
focused on the fulfilment of governance conditions by the third countries. As such, it does 
not reflect the multiplicity of actors; nor does it place focus on the processes. It rather 
corresponds to the demands placed by the stronger actors and international community 
represented by the United Nations and the World Bank towards states that are weak in 
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political and economic terms and from this point of view corresponds to rule of law 
benchmarks identified in Chapter 2. It is important to note, though, that the process of 
external evaluation has also turned the lens to the organisations themselves who in recent 
years have started to develop their internal governance standards.  
For the purposes of the present analysis, both of the governance standards determined with 
reference to the external and internal dealings of organisations are useful for they shed light 
on what is regarded in international sphere as a proper management of common affairs. 
They will allow us to enrich the standard of review benchmarks used in the context of the EU 
external human rights policy.  
The Brandt’s Commission not only defined the governance – it also determined the areas 
which are of interest from the point of view global community security, economic 
interdependence, the United Nations, and the rule of law. It underlined the multitude of 
actors present on the global governance arena: states, international organisations, NGOs, 
citizens’ movements, transnational corporations, academia, and the mass media.
536
 Given 
the thus changed landscape international arena, the Commission underlined the need for ‘a 




It is interesting to note what was the Commission’s on Global Governance stance on the 
importance of the use of rule of law concept in international context: 
'The rule of law has been a critical civilising influence in every free society. It distinguishes 
democratic from a tyrannical society; it secures liberty and justice against repression; it 
elevates equality above dominion; it empowers the weak against the unjust claims of the 
strong. Its restraints, no less the moral precepts it asserts, are essential to the well-being of 
the society. Both collectively and to individuals within it. Respect for the rule of law is thus a 
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Following this assertion the Commission pointed to two major areas that it considered 
essential for the improvement of the global rule of law standard: strengthening of 
international law
539
 and facilitating the legislative process on international level. 
The UN specialised agencies took on the concept of governance and have been using it ever 
since defining what they consider as good governance on case-by-case basis and therefore 
depending on the area. The UN widely uses term coined and promoted by Kofi Annan 
‘democratic governance’; perceived as the blend of tools associated with democracy and 
governance, addressed at the people and used to empower them. It is invoked in many 
official documents
540
, yet its meaning has not been elaborated, safe for the efforts on the 
part of the United Nations Development Programme. The latter entered into the Partnership 
on Democratic Governance with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development which concluded its mandate in October 2011.
541
 Neither can one find there a 
comprehensive definition of what makes good democratic governance. 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of the UN formal documents concerning good governance, 
the literature offers the useful tool of filling in making up for this lack. John Ruggie, acting in 
his capacity as a Special Rapporteur for the Secretary General on the Framework for 
Business and Human Rights pointed to ‘governance gaps’ as the source of the predicament 
between business and human rights.  
‘These governance gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies 
of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. How to narrow and ultimately 
bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our fundamental challenge.’
542
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The gap approaches provides a useful analytical tool of understanding which aspects should 
be taken into consideration for the governance to be defined.
543
 There have been five gaps 
which were identified. The knowledge gap concerns the nature, seriousness or the size of 
the problem – both empirical knowledge and theoretical explanations. This gap is filled in by 
universities, research institutions, think tanks, NGOs and stake holders. It is about identifying 
problems and defining them. Normative gap concerns the establishment of universally 
accepted norms and the way it can be done. It also concerns the possible penetration of an 
internationally, universally accepted norm into the local system of laws. 
544
 Policy gap 
concerns existing policy, that is: ‘an interlinked set of governing principles and goals and the 
agreed programs of action to implement those principles and achieve those goals’
545
. There 
are two problems associated with filling in policy gap: the identification of relevant policy 
makers and the lack of connection between various, increasing number of actors on national 
and the concentration of decision making power in international organisations. The fourth is 
the institutional gap starting from an assumption that if the policy is not to be regarded as 
ad hoc, or arbitrary, it needs to be based on permanently existing institutions. The final gap 
is the compliance gap which involves mechanisms allowing for identification of deviations 
from universally accepted norms as well as incentives for successful cooperation and 
punitive measures should the cooperation not follow the standard.
546
 Obviously, the filling in 
of the governance gaps requires consideration of both political scientific categories as well 
as legal ones, nevertheless, this approach orders the analysis which can be undertaken in 
relation to the good governance. Following the analytical tool of governance gaps leads us to 
a conclusion that good governance that these gaps are filled in, if not sealed, yet in 
accordance to the need determined on the basis of the knowledge gathered in the process 
of knowledge gap pasting.  
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Whilst the UN remains silent about what it as an organisation understands as good 
governance, it relies heavily on the concept developed by the World Bank. The most globally 
influential indicators have been produced as the result of the research of the World Bank 
Institute for the purposes of the Worldwide Governance Indicators.
547
 The governance, 
within the project was defined as 'traditions and institutions by which authority in a country 
is exercised'
548
. The normative aspects of the indicators, as opposed to those pushed for by 
the International Monetary Fund
549
 which are focused on good economic governance, 
include in addition to economic issues, political and social ones. Six indicators are named: 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The underlying idea 
is to demonstrate that good governance is essential for achievement of economic growth. 
Fulfilment of those indicators constitute a good governance practice.  
On the European level, the Council of Europe repeats the UN commitment to the good 
democratic governance pursued chiefly on regional and local level. The Strategy for 
Innovation and Good Governance at Local Level has been launched as the result of October 
2007 Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Local and Regional Government.
550
 
The Strategy foresees establishment of the platform which would enable the exchange of 
experience and ultimately lead to granting the European Label of Governance Excellence 
based on the 12 European principles of the good democratic governance. The twelve 
principles involve: (1) fair conduct of elections, participation, representation
551
; 
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 The principle of Fair Conduct of Elections, Representation and Participation involves that local elections are 
conducted freely and fairly on the basis of the citizens’ activity and participation, which takes place on equal 





; (3) efficiency and effectiveness
553
; (4) openness and transparency
554
; 
(5) rule of law
555
; (6) ethical conduct
556
; (7) competence and capacity
557
; (8) innovation and 
openness to change
558
; (9) sustainability and long term orientation; (10) sound financial 





. The Twelve Principles constitute one of three pillars of the Strategy which 
is based on individual local authorities (municipalities, communes) and centrally agreed 
Action Plans. The Strategy is supervised by the Stake Holders’ Platform. The strategy is in the 
process of implementation, yet the CoE twelve principles of European governance provide a 
very good example of the approach to what the governance approach may mean – and the 
way in which it can be directed inwardly – towards the organisation.  
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation for the 
Economic Cooperation and Development have devoted some of their activities in 
governance oriented activities. The OSCE has been focusing especially on institution building 
in post-conflict societies, yet it does not define the term for its own purposes, seeing it as 
emanation of rule of law.
561
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 The principle of Responsiveness assumes that the authorities are to respond to any claims of citizens within 
a reasonable time; whilst the framework of actions undertaken by them is to be adjusted to the legitimate 
expectations and actual needs.  
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 The principle of Efficiency and Effectiveness requires that results meet objectives whilst the resources are 
being made use of in the best possible way. The activities are to be undertaken under the appropriate scrutiny 
(evaluation, audits).  
554
 The principle of Openness and Transparency provides for decisions to be made according to existing and 
accessible rules and regulations; public access to information; and the information is supplied in such a way as 
to enable the society to effectively participate in the decision making. 
555
 Rule of Law principle is straightforward – it requires that local authorities abide by the law and judicial 
decisions and that the decisions are made according to existing rules and regulations and enforced impartially.  
556
 The principle of Ethical Conduct requires that public good is placed before the individual interests, that 
corruption is combated in an effective manner, and that conflicts of interests are avoided by persons involved 
withdrawing in a timely manner. 
557
 Competence and Capacity requires that professional skills of those who deliver governance are continuously 
maintained at the highest of levels, there are incentives and creative methods and procedures are employed.  
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 Principle of Innovation and Openness to Change assumes that new solutions for existing problems are 
thought and that there is readiness to experiment.  
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to human rights  as well as to cultural diversity (that is to be regarded as an asset) and social cohesion.  
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are effective measures against maladministration.  
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The OECD, in contrast used to focus on corruption, perceiving its presence as the biggest 
threat to governance.
562
 In the past five years, however, has enhanced its good governance 
file and elaborated clear principles of good governance that guide its actions: 
‘Accountability: government is able and willing to show the extent to which its actions and 
decisions are consistent with clearly-defined and agreed-upon objectives. 
Transparency: government actions, decisions and decision-making processes are open to an 
appropriate level of scrutiny by others parts of government, civil society and, in some 
instances, outside institutions and governments. 
Efficiency and effectiveness: government strives to produce quality public outputs, including 
services delivered to citizens, at the best cost, and ensures that outputs meet the original 
intentions of policymakers. 
Responsiveness: government has the capacity and flexibility to respond rapidly to societal 
changes, takes into account the expectations of civil society in identifying the general public 
interest, and is willing to critically re-examine the role of government. 
Forward vision: government is able to anticipate future problems and issues based on 
current data and trends and develop policies that take into account future costs and 
anticipated changes (e.g. demographic, economic, environmental, etc.). 
Rule of law: government enforces equally transparent laws, regulations and codes’
563
 
Since 2007 the Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development has been 
working in two areas (under two committees). The Committee for Territorial Development 
deals with regional policy. The Public Governance Committee has been focusing on public 
governance drawing country reviews.
564
 In addition to the above, the data set based on 
indicators of good government are published annually.
565
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In the European Union context the term ‘good governance’ appeared for the first time in 
1991 in the Resolution on human rights, democracy and development, ever since that time 
the triad of ideals has been evoked in the development policy context. For recollection, the 
recent, October 2011 Communication of the Commission on the ‘Increasing the impact of EU 
Development Policy: an Agenda for Change’
566
 described human rights, rule of law and 
democracy as the elements which are to be promoted in the course of the work undertaken 
by the European Commission (DG Development) in the area of development aid with no 
further reference made to the general meaning of governance.  
In fact, the substantive discussion as to what ‘governance’ is to mean in the context of 
European Union activities has not taken on until later. It was initiated in 2001 with the 
delivery by the European Commission of the White Paper on Governance
567
. The White 
Paper attracted a lot of attention from wider public including NGOs and academic 
community.
568
 Its content was contested, yet what probably gives more food for thought is 
the lack of reference therein to governance as the legal concept, therefore, curbing White 
Paper’s impact assessment amongst the legal community. What is striking is the 
Commission’s will to redefine the notion of governance in order to suit its own objectives, 
but also the vision of decision making process. According to the White Paper ‘Governance 
means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at 
European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness 
and coherence’
569
 This is the broader context of the reform of the beginning of the reform of 
the governance in the European Union, the reform, that subsequently focalised itself on the 
better regulation initiatives and introduction of a ‘relational and collaborative’ mode of 
governance characterised by existence of many fora where diverse stakeholders could 
consult with the Commission in the course of the decision making process. The better 
                                                                                                                                                                      





 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions 'Increasing the impact of EU Development 
Policy: an Agenda for Change' COM(2011) 637 final’, at 5. 
567
 European Governance, A White Paper COM(2001) 428 final.  
568
 Curtin M. Deirdre and Ige Dekker, ‘Good Governance: the Concept and its Application by the European 
Union’ in Ramses A. Wessel and Curtin M. Deirdre (eds), Good Governance and the European Union (Intersentia 
2005), see at p 4 and fn 4. 
569
 European Governance, A White Paper COM(2001) 428 final, at 8, fn 1. 
239 
 
regulation has taken off with 2002 initiatives of the Commission comprising with guidelines 
as to how to legislate
570
, taken on board by other European institutions in the form of the 
2003 Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making
571
. As of this point the discussion 
of the governance has taken the turn to regulation instead of governance; ultimately 
focusing on simplified, and in recent years, better regulation. The focus of the initiatives 
undertaken as off then has been based on three concerns – simplification of the EU acquis, 
closer collaboration with the Member States in order to ensure the observance of the better 
regulation principles, and enabling stakeholders to participate in the decision making 
procedure throughout the process. The In practice of the European Commission’s activities 
those three focuses translate in the number of files that are subsequently elaborated in the 
cross-cutting initiatives which have been undertaken since the 2001 White Governance 
Paper. These comprise of: impact assessment, consultation, expertise, administrative costs 
(or reduction thereof), choice of regulatory instruments, transposition and application of EU 
law, simplification, codification and recasting, accessibility and presentation of EU law, 
evaluation, inter-institutional coordination, and Member States’ action. Interestingly, these 
focal points to a large degree reflect what is regarded in the general view, reflected by the 
benchmarks extracted for the purpose of this study, as rule of law concerns. Yet, in the 
European context those concerns refer to the two-level relationship – between the 
European institutions and citizens and citizens organisations, and between the European 
institutions and Member States. This approach refers, therefore, more to the issues 
associated with accountability of the EU before the two groups of actors. As such, they cover 
only some of the facets of what governance is about, even for the European Commission 
itself, in the light of its own findings represented by the White Paper on Governance.
572
 
Obviously, each of the focal points refers in an indirect manner to what we intuitively 
understand as governance, yet it does so from the perspective of the Commission and for 
the purposes it has defined.  
The third strategic review of the Better Regulation initiative confirms its statement. The 
focus is yet again on the more transparent presentation of results; impact assessment of 
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legislative acts with the focus on issues such as ‘SME test’, fundamental rights, consumer 
health, impact on the local and regional levels, provision of the evidence and quantitative 
analysis; analysis of subsidiarity principle (therefore, justification of adoption of specific 
regulatory measures). On the top of this ‘Commission watches its back’ approach there is a 
little statement concerning the Commission’s Minimum Standards for Consultations 
confirming the Commission’s strivings for full implementation thereof.
573
 Subsequent 
initiative undertaken by the Commission reflects the earlier, self-focused one sided 
governance approach undertaken by the European Commission. The Better Regulation has 
apparently evolved to Smart Regulation
574
 and the Communication referring to this 
development is a voice of the Commission in the inter-institutional dialogue fuelled by the 
European Parliament Report and the Report of the Court of Auditors.
575
 Smart regulation 
does not essentially change what Better Regulation was – it is rather a summary of 
achievements of the latter and experiences gathered through the experimentation phase of 
the preceding eight years. We might refer to it as codification of the rule of law processes 
underlying the European policy making (since it is to encompass all of the European policy 
making process), which is, however, an underestimation. Whilst the regulation approach 
might substantially reduce what governance is, the characteristics of the associated process 
gives a slightly different impression. We are speaking here of the institutions inter-acting 
between one another, Member States, and the civil society in the course of what we may 
call self-reflexive process. This process is based on experimentation and constant 
improvement of practices – it is a prolonged inter-active discursive process. It is 
characterised by stages (marked by the adoption of communications by the European 
Commission) of codification of practices and marking the way to their improvement. Such 
governance practice is different from what is expected of governance approaches developed 
by various others international organisations (as demonstrated above) and constitutes, as 
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observed by scholars, ‘a new governance’. The following section will present the essential 
characteristics of new governance as developed by the literature and shed light on why this 






III. New Governance, Reflexive Governance and Democratic Experimentalism 
Unsurprising as it may sound, new governance was not distinguished from other form of 
governance predominantly in opposition to the ‘old’ type of governance where usual 
governmental approaches prevail as well as reliance on standard (hard) legal instruments.
576
 
In this context ‘new’ referred to new approaches to governance as undertaken in the 
practice of the European Union and the United States. The term ‘new governance’ initially, in 
the collected publication
577
 edited by Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, was defined as ‘a 
range of processes and practices that have a normative dimension but do not operate 
primarily or at all through the formal mechanism of traditional command-and-control-type 
legal institutions’
578
. Such definition emphasizes both the focus of the explored term 
(decision making sensu largo) as well as the relationship between the command-and-control 
formal order and the informal one. 
The thus emerged debate on new governance has been ongoing for almost twenty years 
now and produced a fair amount of contributions of theoretical as well as applied, concrete 
case-study nature. Mark Dawson in his account of the rise of new governance
579
 identifies 
three waves of literature.  
The first one was about describing new governance and its relationship to the traditional 
forms of exercising authority. The above quoted, cautiously and objectively coined definition 
of the area coined by Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott comes from this first wave of 
literature – predominantly interested in the identification of the characteristics of new 




                                                      
576
 This approach had a number of shortcomings subsequently emphasised by both de Búrca and Scott as well 
as other contributors to the volume. See, for instance: G. De Búrca and Joanne Scott, ‘Introduction: New 
Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in G. De Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the 
EU and the US (Hart 2006), at 3 as well as: Neil Walker, ‘EU Constitutionalism and New Governance’ in G. De 
Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 2006), at 15. 
577
 Although not the first one dedicated to the subject. Initial publications concerning new governance go back 
to the early 1990s (see, for instance: ), yet the true beginning of the first wave of academic literature which 
built on the earlier academic contributions started only after the European Commission issued the 2001 White 
Paper on Governance.   
578
 De Búrca and Scott, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’, at 2. 
579
 Dawson, Introduction, at 1-14 and: Mark Dawson, ‘Three waves of new governance in the European Union’ 
36 European Law Review 208. 
580
 De Búrca and Scott, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’, at 1. 
244 
 
The second wave of literature named by Dawson
581
 is about consolidation and 
determination of common characteristics of new governance processes whilst developing 
normative criteria as to what may be considered experimental, and what constitutes a kind 
of governance which can be referred to as reflexive. In doing so, the second wave of 
literature departed from law v governance juxtaposition, and moved to the analysis of the 
consequences of placing governance in the place of law. (Scott, Armstrong, Zeitel, Simon 
etc). 
The final third wave of literature is a critical one. It builds on the previous two and attempts 
at overcoming the limits by incorporating new governance into the framework of law. Based 
on empirical analysis of the new governance method – especially of the Open Method for 
Coordination – it focuses on overcoming them by including the method within the 
framework of law.  
Nevertheless, against the background of three identified waves of literature, there exists 
little consensus as to the definition of new governance. This in part is connected with the 
lack of the consensus over the notion of governance itself.
582
  
As we can see, the academic discussion
583
 on new governance has been focusing mainly 
either on characteristic features of new governance and the relationship between 
governance and government paradigm. Both of the issues are important for this analysis – 
the former provides us with benchmarks; the latter is of interest for policy evaluation. I shall 
deal with them in turn. 
1. New Governance Benchmarks 
The characteristics of the new governance can be taken especially from the first wave of 
literature identified by Marc Dawson. The definition has been subsequently expanded 
through theories of experimentation and self-reflexivity.  
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De Burca and Scott initially thus describe (in a very cautious manner) the features of new 




‘(…) the idea of new or experimental governance approaches places considerable emphasis 
upon the accommodation and promotion of diversity, on the importance of provisionality 
and revisability – in terms of both problem definition and anticipated solutions – and on the 
goal of policy learning. New governance processes generally encourage or involve the 
participation of affected actors (stakeholders) rather than merely representative actors, and 
emphasize transparency (openness as a means of information-sharing and learning), as well 
as ongoing evaluation and review. Rather than operating through a hierarchical structure of 
governmental authority, the ‘centre’ (of a network, a regime or other governance 
arrangement) may be charged with facilitating the emergence of the governance 
infrastructure, and with ensuring coordination and exchange as between constituent parts. 
A further characteristic often present in new governance processes is the voluntary or non-
binding nature of the norms.’
585
 
The definition and focal points of the concept of governance have been further analyzed in 
the above-described waves of literature, yet this discussion goes beyond the scope of the 
purposes of this chapter. The objective here is to determine what would it mean for the 
policy to follow governance paradigm as defined through the ‘new’ approaches and for this 
purposes the above definition is sufficient as a starting point.  
Therefore, the experimental – new – governance is characterized by (a) the emphasis on 
provisionality and revisability connected with the accommodation of various needs, and 
promotion of diversity; (b) participation instead of representation; (c) transparency; (d) 
evaluation and review; (e) centrical/horizontal structure of exercising authority; (f) 
voluntariness and/or non-bindingness of norms. The above characteristic features have 
gained on substance as the result of intense and far-reaching governance studies as well as 
under the influence of theories of democratic experimentalism and reflexive democracy. The 
latter have complemented the first of the above listed elements with the emphasis on (g) 
learning.  
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In the subsequent part of this section each of the characteristic features of new approaches 
to governance will be presented. 
Provisionality and revisability of tools; 
Framework making and revision are the distinct features of EU governance
586
. They are to 
respond to differentiated and altering needs as well as gaps in knowledge which become 
filled as time goes by. In internal Union dealings ensuring revisability take form of framework 
directives
587
, open method of coordination as well as strategies such as the cross-cutting 
Lisbon Strategy adopted in 2000 and reviewed in 2005. 
In external policy contexts, instruments with reference to which there exists common 
agreement about their new governance characteristics include accession preparation tools 
(although sanctioned through hard law conditionality) and action plans used for the benefit 
of European Neighbourhood Policy.  
Participation 
New approaches to governance require participation of actors affected in every stage of 
rule-making and rule-enforcement. Participation substitutes representation required for 
democratic regimes and as such is heavily criticised as giving voice only to stakeholders 
instead of to the society as such.  
Instruments of participation in internal policies of the Union include: on decision making 
level: consultations, open method for coordination; on implementation level: information 
exchange platforms, reviewing and reporting activities.  
In external dealings participation on the level of decision making is limited to states involved 
in negotiations of international agreements and NGOs lobbying in the course of decision 
making processes.
588
 However, the recent reform of financial instruments have provided for 
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obligation of the Commission to give due attention to the voices of the civil society actors in 




Transparency assumes open access to information at every stage of decision making and 
implementation. It comprises therefore information about the intentions and strategies of 
European institutions (hence publication of White Papers, consultation processes etc.), 
access to documents issued in the course of the process, as well as information on 
implementation process and timeline. Reports as well as peer review outcomes are also to 
be available to the public and allow for participation of stakeholders. Transparency is a sine 
qua non condition for both participation, evaluation and review as well as revision to take 
place. In addition to the above without access to information and knowledge, learning 
process could not take place.  
Evaluation and Review 
Evaluation and review of undertaken measures fulfils two-fold function in the governance 
system. Firstly, it provides information and knowledge indispensable for conducting revising 
activities. Secondly, evaluation and review in governance paradigm fulfils the same function 
as accountability mechanisms prevailing in traditional legal contexts. 
Centric governance structure developed in horizontal manner 
The governance structure foresees such a system of interactions between different 
stakeholders in which the ‘centre’ coordinates various stakeholders involved in the 
processes. The structure of power distribution is horizontal; it does not correspond the 
command-and-control and hence top-down and bottom-up arrangements.  
Voluntariness/Non-bindingness of norms/Soft law 
Voluntariness in new governance paradigm concerns above all voluntariness to participate 
fit in the framework of ‘non-legislative or marginally legislative character’
590
.  
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The non-legislative or marginally legislative character of provisions is occasionally described 
as ‘soft’, sanction-less law. Lack of penalty does not induce compliance; instead compliance 
is induced through participation and peer review.  
In the EU human rights sphere we can speak of at least two types of voluntariness - first one 
refers to the unilateral instruments that are either put at the disposal of the public (see 
Chapter 4 for examples), or instruments from which specific eligible entities can profit if they 
wish to, subject to conditions specified in such instruments (see Chapter 5, GSP+, EIDHR or 
Instrument for Peace and Stability).  
Learning 
The final element of new governance structure lies in the inherent learning processes that 
involves all stakeholders. Learning is the result of review and evaluation; it comes from 
participation and transparency. The fact that in new governance process learning is 
facilitated and encouraged, makes it necessary for flexible and revisable rules to exist. 
Learning allows for filling information gap about the existing problems, and available means 
for finding solutions for them.  
Here, in the EU external relations realm the EU makes a big effort issuing reports for the 
totality of its external policy annually, reviewing specific measures, or producing the policy 
background documents in the form of communications with participation of civil society 
both within and outside of the EU.  
2. New Governance and EU Internal Human Rights Policy 
The new modes of governance have been analysed extensively within the context of the EU 
legal system. In particular, the impact thereof has been noted by the literature dealing with 
the internal human rights policy. The approach presented by the authors is of importance for 
the benchmarking activity as it points to the aspects that are searched for in the particular 
area of fundamental rights policy whilst at the same time offering the insight into how the 
governance and government modes can be interconnected (both practically and doctrinally).  
Probably, the best account of the new governance techniques employed in the area of EU 
fundamental rights policy was offered by Olivier de Schutter who termed them ‘the learning-
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based fundamental rights policy for the European Union’.
591
 His contribution is based on the 
premise that the non-judicial and non-legislative enforcement mechanisms need to be put 
into place in order to allow both the protection of fundamental rights by the EU Member 
States as well as to create the conditions for the effective functioning of the EU economic 
freedoms. In stating this, de Schutter does not contest the need to harmonise fundamental 
rights with legislative tools, yet claims that this may be, for various reasons, insufficient – or, 
in his words – either too ambitious or too modest.  
‘(R)eliance on the tool of legislation may be both too ambitious and too modest. 
Harmonization may be in any cases politically unrealistic to achieve. It may presume too 
much about our ability to identify how best to implement fundamental rights. The requires 
legal bases may be missing. And we have currently no mechanism allowing us to identify, on 
a more or less systematic basis, the need for the Union to take action in this field.’
592
 
De Schutter emphasises that only with the governance approach can the fundamental rights 
area grow into the full-fledged policy.
593
 In this approach he underlines the situation of 
insecurity and inadequacy of knowledge about the problem and the learning aspect of the 
policy implementation. 
‘A learning-based understanding of the development of fundamental rights is required, once 
we acknowledge that we cannot predict in advance all the situations in which obstacles to 
the internal market or to mutual cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice will 
result from the lack of a uniform understanding of fundamental rights, throughout all the EU 
Member States. It is one thing to say, as the EU Treaty itself does in Article 6 EU, that 
fundamental rights recognised  among the general principles of law may not be violated in 
the implementation of EU law; it is quite another to find agreement on the desirable degree 
to which fundamental rights should be harmonized at the level of the EU, and what form 
such harmonization should take.’
594
 
In order to determine the form in which harmonization should take place de Schutter 
reaches out for new governance known forms. He starts with purely collaborative approach 
determining their limitations. De Schutter points after Freeman that the stakeholders invited 
to the process of consultation would have ideally, in the process of institutionalised 
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participation, the possibility not only to provide potential answers, but also to reformulate 
questions. In reality, however, the process of collaborative governance, is pre-determined by 
the institution, binding the content to the pre-defined problem. Democratic 
experimentalism, similarly, whilst not relying on institutions encourages experimentation 
within sub-units which is to be terminated with the exchange of information – results of 
experiments. De Schutter emphasised the limitations of this approach underlining the lack of 
the notion of collective good (since each of the sub-units can define its own interest in the 
deliberation), the capacity on the part of stakeholders to benefit from the process and, 
finally, risk associated with presupposition of the shared values.
595
 The outlined limitations 
of different approaches explain de Schutter’s focus on procedural approach rather than that 
of substantive approach. This premise coincides with the focus of this dissertation thus 
providing us with yet another dimension of analogy making.  
De Schutter’s understanding of fundamental rights policy within the EU borders comprised in 
his search of the solutions which would ensure the finding of best solutions in the conditions 
of uncertainty as to what those solutions might be.  
He points to the establishment of the Fundamental Rights Agency as the indication that the 
governance approach has been adopted to guide the fundamental rights policy: 
‘Its establishment provides an indicia that the future of fundamental rights in the European 
Union will be based in the future on a view of rights as having to be permanently reinvented 
in the new settings in which they are invoked, and as objectives (or ‘values’), the fulfilment 
of which requires a permanent learning process, both (horizontally) between the Member 
States and (vertically) between the institutions of the Union and the Member States.’
596
 
 All of those developments have been taking place in the context of  fundamental rights 
having two basic roles within the EU – that of the shield imposed on the EU legal order
597
, 
and the positive function in as much as guiding of the EU actors is concerned.
598
 In a phrase: 
‘(t)he growth of EU law should not lead to violations of fundamental rights, and in that sense 
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these rights must be compiled within its development; but the progress of EU Law should 
not, in principle, be made dependent on the need to realise fundamental rights’
599
.  
In order to meet these objectives, the EU may either act and impose common standards on 
its Member States, or remain passive waiting for the problems to solve themselves on the 
basis of decentralised approach – both of the approaches may be more or less favourable 
depending on the area of law at stake and the existing consensus amongst the Member 
States.
600
 The downside of the passive approach lies, firstly, in the regulatory competition of 
the Member States which may seek to lower or increase standards and in such a manner to 
attract investors to their jurisdictions. Secondly, learning and exchange of information and 
best practices activities remain difficult to conduct in absence of any sort of EU intervention. 
Nevertheless, the normative claim promoting open deliberation about what the 
consequences of internal market are and the means of their reduction was made and 




De Schutter thus describes the advantages of  the reliance on the new governance 
techniques for the fundamental rights policy of the EU. The added value of the approach lies 
in facilitating the coordination between the Member States where solutions adopted by one 
of them can affect those of the others. This coordination does not necessarily need to take a 
form of the Open Method of Coordination, nor does it need to lead to the adoption of 
guidelines or strategies by the Member States. Yet even if this was to be the case, the 
particularity of the area of fundamental rights characterised by the existence of other 
forums promoting similar types of initiatives, renders adoption of such measures easier.  
The development of new governance techniques may serve the fulfilment of three functions: 
‘(1) it may facilitate coordination between the Member States where there exists no legal 
basis for the adoption of common rules;  
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(2) it may facilitate the exercise of any competence which has been attributed to the EC/EU 
in this field, thus both depoliticising subsidiarity – by limiting the risk of the requirements of 
subsidiarity and proportionality being instrumentalised, and, in particular, put in the service 
of the domestic agendas of the Member States  - and repoliticising it – by leading to a debate 
on whether there is a need for an intervention by the Union; and 
(3) whether or not the recourse to legislation constitutes an alternative, it may encourage 
the learning process between the EU Member States which has the potential to improve 
their approach to the implementation of fundamental rights.’
602
 
The analysis of de Schutter of the learning based fundamental rights policy of the EU was in 
fact the first step to providing the reasons why governance approach is the key to the EU 
human rights policy. In order to use the de Schutter’s intellectual exercise, we need to adjust 
the underlying assumptions and to recall the earlier on discussed premises of the second 
wave new governance literature.
603
 
As it was in case of fundamental rights policy, in external sphere we are speaking of a 
situation of uncertainty as to what the human rights problem is and what could be the 
solutions to solve it. One may risk the statement that in the EU external relations context, 
this uncertainty is much higher, and the knowledge gap is much bigger. In addition to this, 
the EU is to act for the benefit of the values it promotes, yet paying attention that it is not 
imposing its own approach to human rights
604
, neither is it to act on the premise of the 
knowledge it gathers. In other words, the EU is not capable of bridging the gap.  
Secondly, for the same reason as stated above, both the identification of the problem 
process as well as the attempt to devise solutions needs to be made in cooperation with 
third countries. The goal of these activities is both to learn, but also to position the European 
Union on the international stage. Within the internal, fundamental rights narrative, the legal 
system of the EU had to respond to the growing tensions between fundamental freedoms 
and fundamental rights of individuals, and thus accompanying risk of destructive regulatory 
competition between the Member States.
605
 On the other hand, in the external human 
rights policy of the European Union as we have seen in Chapter 1, the narrative is focused on 
                                                      
602
 Ibid, at 52. 
603
 Dawson, ‘Three waves of new governance in the European Union’. 
604
 This statement is obviously a theoretical intellectual construction to be found In literature and presented as 
the desirable shape of the EU external policy. It allows us, however, to see the analogy between the 
de Schutter’s explanation for the use of governance approach and its transposition to the external policy 
sphere. 
605
 De Schutter, at 3, 24-31. 
253 
 
problems of incoherence, but also the position and identity of the EU in the world. The EU 
operates in the sphere of international law where, formally, actors are equal. Equality of 
actors and universality of norms the EU is to ‘promote and uphold’ have as their 
consequence ultimately the similar setting as that within the EU with respect to fundamental 
rights where the predominance of the four freedoms principle corresponds to the equality of 
states principle. 
As we can see, here even more than in the internal sphere there is a room for new 
governance based on learning – learning from experiences of the other states (hence state-
to-state measures) or from experiences of individuals and organisations (hence the financing 
instruments). In the external sphere legislation is not about enforcing human rights (any 
quasi-legislative measures are punitive in character only). It does not focus on the manner in 
which rights can be exercised; nor does it explain what the standard of protection is with 
relation to specific rights enshrined in the international treaties. The universality of the 
approach faced with particularity of every single state and its characteristics, makes it 
inevitable for entities with elaborate human rights policy to search for measures which 
escape usual characteristics of international law measures and fall sooner amongst those 
belonging to governance paradigm.  
The new governance approach is to be used even more in the external sphere due to the 
limited availability of legal instruments. Quasi-legislative multi-, bi-, or unilateral measures 
even if binding, function within the international legal realm and as such reflect all the 
inadequacies of the system. New governance approach allows to find the solutions avoiding 
the existing traps of the EU being a ‘legislator’, and leading it to be the ‘coordinator of 
efforts’. Clearly, as de Schutter emphasised, this does not mean that for every single right, or 
in a specific country context a ‘Open Method of Coordination’ type of instrument needs to 
be put into place. What it means, instead, is that the approach demonstrated by the 
European Initiative for Human Rights and Democracy and human rights dialogue with third 
countries
606
 is about learning and self-reflection. As such, within the governance paradigm, 
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and through governance analytical lens completes the picture of the full fledged external 
policy of the EU.  
255 
 
Chapter 9 -  New Paradigm of Evaluation for the EU External Human Rights Policy? 
The above presented discussion served the purpose of outlining the alternative means of 
analysing the EU external human rights policy with the view of extracting ‘benchmarks’. The 
need for such altered benchmarks is evident, especially if we recall the inaptness of the 
usual methodological tools as demonstrated in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The described 
approaches accompanied by the benchmarks provide for a fairly coherent framework of 
analysis. Yet, the benchmarks, as it seems, do not necessarily need to alter the manner in 
which the relationship between the classical perceptions based on constitutionalism and rule 
of law and governance is conceived. They can be taken on a face value with the assumption 
of parallel existence of the two realms – the normative and empirical ones. Alternatively, the 
basic analysis presented by this thesis can be perceived (as it has been anticipated in the 
opening chapters) as the first step to the re-conceptualisation of the legal doctrine of the 
recent 15 years – that dealing with the changes in governance, constitutionalism and 
international law with the view of producing a more coherent framework which would 
acknowledge the extended boundaries of law and incorporate practices instituted as the 
cures against the insufficient or limiting legal framework.  
The two brief sections outline the two outcomes of the analysis: the first will present the 
benchmarks, whilst the second one will discuss briefly the interaction between the 
governance and government elements on the basis of its implications for the instrument 
analysis – here in the context of EU external human rights policy. 
1. New - Old - Benchmarks for Evaluation 
It seems that the characteristics of new modes of governance correspond almost in a literal 
manner to the facts and solutions that have been omitted by the rule of law analysis and 
presented above in Chapter 7. Possibly the only postulate that is not given full account of 
within the new governance framework is the inter-connectedness of all instruments.  
It is interesting to note that the broader categories of accountability and transparency are 
present in all three sets of the evaluation benchmarks. On the other hand, given that the 
above mentioned theories concern various structures of authority, not all of the benchmarks 
would be applicable to the EU external human rights policy. As it was shown in Chapter 2, 
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there exists a great deal of policy instruments which follow the usual notion of rule of law. 
Whilst good governance benchmarks provide us with the idea of what would be the 
desirable state of affairs, the new modes of governance scheme provide us with the ideas of 
how things should be done. The subsequent analysis will, therefore, take us to the 
examination whether if we apply the NMG benchmarks (whilst bearing in mind the Rule of 
Law standards that have been met by the EU), the evaluation of the EU external human 
rights policy would have been different.  
2. Applying the New Governance Benchmarks to the EU External Human 
Rights Policy 
It seems that the new governance benchmarks which were discussed above in a very 
comprehensive manner complement the rule of law paradigm presented in Chapter 2. 
Importantly, as we concluded in Chapter 7, the criteria of alternative theoretical framework - 
proposed new modes of governance - may not substitute these referring to the rule of law; 
they need to be applied in addition to them, to complement them in order to represent the 
full, and not fragmented picture. Let us see, how the elements separated from the sieve 
recalled under Chapter 7 correspond to the components of new modes of governance.  
The emphasis on provisionality and revisability of instruments appears above all in the 
context of the unilateral instruments addressed at 3rd countries and members of civil 
society. There the instruments are adopted for a given period - the adoption of financial 
instruments coincides with a given EU financial perspective, whilst for the GSP+ this period is 
set from instrument to instrument currently stretching until year 2023. Importantly, both 
the reform of the financial instruments as well as GSP+ have been broadly discussed with the 
wider public.
607
 International and multilateral measures, on the other hand do not fulfil in 
such a clear manner this criterion, although the undergo revision either in a cyclical manner 
(as was the case with Lome and then Cotonou arrangements), or as the result of the new 
policy perspective. Yet, in the latter manner, it is a usual agreement negotiations procedure 
that prevail and last many years, sometimes not attaining final ratification.
608
 Hence possibly 
we should not consider this criteria as fulfilled with reference to international agreements. 
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Soft action plans are a completely different matter - by nature they are revised together with 
the states interested. This participatory aspect is also important from this point of view. 
Finally, the provisionality and revisability of the unilateral measures directed at the EU 
institutions is obvious, though the conditions under which this is done are much less so. They 
require a political impulse and impact of consultation and evaluation for the institutions to 
start acting in the direction of revising such measures. The making of the ones discussed in 
Chapter 4 followed such impulse given by the Strategic Framework and Action Plan for 
Human Rights and Democracy.
609
 
As we already saw in Chapter 7 almost every single of the instruments involved some sort of 
participation of actors involved: In case of guidelines, guidance notes etc. presented in the 
Chapter 4 devoted to unilateral instruments directed at the EU, consultations were at the 
core of the norm creation process. In case of unilateral instruments directed at third 
countries the consultation is a binding obligation in the course of their implementation 
whilst the creation (or revision in this case) involved ongoing consultations. Similarly the 
case can be viewed in case of the adoption of delegated measures used for implementation 
of such instruments (for instance in the course of devising annual plans of action). In case of 
international agreements participation is not of such an importance, but there the 
agreement bodies fill in the void. Hence in every single of the categories of instruments 
participation appears as the basis on which actions are undertaken or at least it plays a role 
in implementation activities.  
Transparency has been extensively addressed in Part II, however, this is possibly one of the 
criteria that will always remain unsatisfactory from external point of view both because of 
the complexity of processes involved and a need for some secrecy because of the protection 
of other values. Balancing between the need to ensure transparency and other interests 
including effectiveness of undertaken measures needs to be performed. This adds further to 
the very much already blurred picture. This contestation makes one wonder whether, 
perhaps we still do not have sufficient tools at stake for analysing transparency in an 
appropriate manner taking into consideration also exceptional security and political 
circumstances.  
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Evaluation and review as well as voluntariness we saw almost in every single part of the 
analysis above constitute the standing practice of the EU, possibly mostly developed in 
relation to where the EU money is spent.
610
 This criterion is therefore met by the EU almost 
by default. 
The only problematic of the criteria named is that concerning centrical/horizontal structures 
of exercising authority. No amount of participation and voluntariness will change the  fact 
that it is the EU in general, and the European Commission in particular that decide upon 
specific aspects of the policy. In this study we referred to 'good legislator' paradigm or 
administrator. In some aspects when generally approaching the EU external human rights 
policy, it could be stated that the EU is a part of many bodies dealing with human rights
611
 
thus forming the part of the horizontal structure of authority. Clearly, however, the 
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Conclusions – The Added Value of the Governance Frameworks of 
Evaluation to the EU External Human Rights Policy 
 
Governance Approach to the EU External Human Rights Policy 
Essentially, the EU in its external policy reproduces available methodologies and 
instruments; simply, however it does it in the EU-way. There is no consideration given to 
resources already devoted to the attainment of human rights objectives in other regional 
organisations (Council of Europe) or on international level within the UN and NGOs auspices. 
Clearly, the EU could not trust the assessment of those other bodies acutely aware that 
interests at stake too frequently differ and trying desperately to build its own image. We 
cannot blame the EU especially for the latter, if we recall criticisms contained in Chapter 1 of 
this study.  
The present analysis has not provided the EU nor its critiques with a specific answer as to 
whether the instruments of the EU external human rights policy are sufficient or not. 
Instead, it offers a more comprehensive approach through which this policy area can be 
viewed. In answering the question as to how things should be done, we offer the principles 
that should be followed, leaving the assessment of legal form to the rule of law criteria. The 
results of this study, therefore, permit to leave the black and white realm of rule of law 
approaches and incorporate the governance criteria into the conventionally performed 
analysis. Whilst doing so, it takes a stance on the position between the relationship between 
law and governance - the relationship which has been already proclaimed upon by the 
institutional and legal setting. 
Governance within Law 
A very concise overview of the relationship between law and governance has been given by 
Dawson.
612
 His account finishes with the introduction of the third wave of new governance 
literature which incorporates new governance into the framework of law.  
This approach goes beyond hybridity classification developed by de Burca and Scott in the 
Introduction to Law and New Governance in the EU and the US.613 There, they assumed that 
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law and new governance were complementary to one another and that co-existence of the 
two modes of exercising authority gives birth to one of three hybrid models. Their theory of 
hybridity has been subsequently used by other contributors to the volume confirming that 




Yet the analysis built on the theories of hybridity may go further. The complementarity of 
the ‘governance’ and ‘government’ approaches does not guarantee that they work together 
for the attainment of set objectives. In addition to the above, when operating as separate, 
yet, complementing regimes, the hybrid suffers from the downsides of the two of them. It is, 
therefore, at the same time inflexible (as a part of it operates under the framework of ‘hard 
law’) and illegitimate (since it belongs to governance and not democratically created legal 
regime).  
What is the potential of new governance approaches if they are included in the general 
framework of law? De Witte is of the opinion that the biggest benefit of governance lies in 
its flexibility which allows for achieving an ultimate compromise. Legal solutions are way 
more black and white and do not correspond the complexity of the current problem (and 
governance sensu largo) setting.  
The incorporation of the governance conditions into the legal realm, by making their 
fulfilment a part of the legally binding obligations on the institutions has changed the setting 
- both for the EU, but also for third countries. Recalling the postulate according to which the 
EU should act as a good legislator, we could state that the EU has fulfilled its mandate by 
representing its constituents and values they stand for.
615
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In some aspects, however, the good legislator is not enough. Possibly, therefore, the 
proposal to base the framework of analysis solely on new governance paradigm does not 
fully encompass the other aspect of EU's activity - that of a good enforcer of rules created 
under its framework. Perhaps these aspects of the EU could be framed as that of 
administration. This assertion opens another possibility of approaching EU policies through 
the lens of administrative law which has been done already
616
. The below sections outline 
the difficulty of such approach, explaining also briefly why new governance provides a more 
adequate and less problematic approach. 
Alternative lens: Global Administrative Law and EU External Human Rights 
Policy 
There exists no one way of addressing the relationship between the Global Administrative 
law paradigm and the EU human rights policy. Usually, the EU administrative law aspects are 
considered from the perspective of the development of particular principles of the 
administrative law as it has been undertaken by the court and subsequently codified in the 
Article 41 of the Charter for Fundamental Rights. Not much attention is given to the EU as an 
administrator; save as a global administrator. Yet in the realm of the external human rights 
policy the EU does act as an administrator following the understanding of the Global 
Administrative Law proposed by Kingsbury et al.  
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B. Stewart when drafting the background paper 
entitled “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law”
617
 carefully legitimised the theory of 
Global Administrative Law through reaching to the 19
th
 Century thought thus showing that 
presenting governance in terms of administration not only has a long tradition, but also that 
the subject matter dealt with on the global level has been logically perceived as an 
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administrative matter. This is confirmed by the attempt to delineate it from other actions 
undertaken on the international level: ‘(a)s a matter of provisional delineation, global 
administrative action is rulemaking, adjudications, and other decisions that are neither 
treaty-making nor simple dispute settlements between parties’
618
. From this perspective GAL 
is narrower than governance approaches which encompass the two categories of actions 
undertaken by international actors. 
Whatever emerged after applying delineation has been divided by GAL’s creators into five 
types of global administration: (1) administration by formal international organizations; (2) 
administration based on collective action by transnational networks of cooperative 
arrangements between national regulatory officials; (3) distributed administration 
conducted by national regulators under treaty, network, or other cooperative regimes; (4) 
administration by hybrid inter-governmental-private arrangements; (5) administration by 
private institutions with regulatory functions.
619
 
Kingsbury’s, when putting forward the theory of GAL severely criticised constitutionalist 
approach to international governance. This critique, however, does not explain why it is the 
GAL approach that is more persuasive when addressing the issues of global governance. 
After all, what we are dealing with is the situation in which the substantial scope of 
regulation is very broad; sources of power are diverse. Yet this is exactly where the focus is 
placed on the principles of action, on the modes in which entities act. GAL specifically 
focuses on those principles; and it allows broad application of its paradigm regardless of the 
international administrative body we are speaking of. Interestingly, the emergence of the 
Global Administrative Law focused the attention of the academic world in the aftermath of 
the strong critique against international organisations – especially the UN and the NATO – 
and the lack of their internal accountability and external responsibility mechanisms.
620
 Luis 
Meilan Gil offers further explanation why the principles are central to the conception of GAL: 
‘There is some spontaneity in this administrative action that has occurred almost “ad hoc” to 
face realities, as a consequence of the globalization of trade, the technological advances in 
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communications, the supranational scope of sanitary or environmental problems among 
which those related to climatic changes have acquired and outstanding importance.’
621
 
The GAL approach, therefore, refers to the sphere which allows sufficient flexibility for the 
purposes of the attainment of objectives in varied contexts (mainly geopolitical ones). The 
working definition of GAL hence encompasses ‘the legal mechanisms, principles, and 
practices, along with supporting social understandings, that promote or otherwise affect the 
accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring these bodies meet 
adequate standards of transparency, consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and 
by providing effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies make’
622
. All this must 
be put within the context where respect of fundamental rights is ensured
623
 and supported 
through national systems based on the democratic principles.
624
  
The above presented outline of Global Administrative Law ideas covers only the essential 
assumptions underlying the elaborated theory. Whilst resembling to a large extent the new 
governance theories referred to above, GAL poses two sets of problems - one related to 
whether the EU could be perceived as global administrative actor; the other, whether the 
principles could be applied to the EU external action in general and human rights in 
particular.  
The first step of the analysis relates to the EU’s position as the global administrative actor. 
The issue is pertinent as it is difficult to include the EU as a participant of one of the five 
types of the global administration. If we apply the Kingsbury’s et al. division of GAL types, to 
an extent, the EU is an administrative body (or, to be more precise, a collection of 
administrative bodies) falling under  administration by formal international organisations 
overlapping, depending on the area of its activities with either hybrid inter-governmental-
private administrative arrangements (for instance in the area of pharmaceuticals) or 
distributed administration conducted by national bodies (e. g. in the area of education).  
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Yet, ultimately, the EU is a regional organisation and as such cannot have a claim of 
rulemaking for the international community. Nevertheless, the EU gets a fair amount of 
attention in the GAL and governance discourse – either as the result of its; or because of lack 
or inadequacy thereof. This is in part the consequence of the fact that other international 
actors expect the EU to take a more active position in global dealings.  
It is interesting to note that some authors point to the EU as to the author of more 
established and established principles of GAL. Frequently the Europeanization and 
globalisation of administrative law are listed one next to the other.
625
 In other cases, the EU 
internal sphere is considered as the source for the national and global administrative laws
626
. 
For example, one of scholars working in the area - Rodriguez-Arana Munoz devotes 
substantial amount of his analysis to the jurisprudence of the Luxembourg court and the 
Charter for Fundamental Rights pointing to the ‘procedural’ construction of rights ‘such as 
the citizen’s right to a hearing, the guarantee of non-retroactivity of provisions that limit 
rights, proportionality of sanctions, or the obligation to repair damages cause by defaulting 
Community norms’
627
. He also refers to the right to good administration codified in Article 
41 of the Charter for Fundamental Rights
628
. Similarly, Carol Harlow refers to the EU as the 
source of principles of good administration noting, however, that consolidation of those 
principles under GAL may happen with disregard for cultural and legal traditions of 
developing countries.
629
 Finally, we need to mention the contribution of the EU to the 
international administrative system as the result of the Kadi case and the changes thus 
induced in the UN anti-terrorist sanction regime.
 630
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None of the above, however, portrays the EU as the source of the administrative power and 
a genuine global actor who in undertaking its activities should be guided by the Global 
Administrative Law principles.  
On the other hand, as it seems the set of principles depends very much on the context and 
the object of the action.  
From this perspective the EU external human rights policy is a very particular case since both 
the context and the object of the action place the EU as an actor in the Global Administrative 
Law paradigm.  
The context is determined by the reach, on the one hand, and accessibility, on the other, of 
the tools and instruments used. Following categorisation of the toolbox used for the purpose 
of this study, we can determine which of them have global; or potentially global reach. 
Both multilateral and bilateral agreements and human rights clauses contained therein are 
binding only for the parties to the agreements. ‘Hard international law’ cannot be, therefore 
the means for the EU acting as an administrative body. On the other hand, the EU continues 
to attempt to exert influence over the international negotiations of multilateral treaties – 
with varied effects, yet obviously with the objective to position itself as an administrator.
631
 
Yet, the EU internal acts and documents issued by the EU institutions amount to the policy 
framework subject to internal accountability principles. The inclusion of human rights 
clauses in all agreements entered into by the EU, as we have seen, is a product of a long, 
political, and institutional process; the result of the exchange with the wider (global) civil 
society, and interaction with third countries. The process finalised with the formal obligation 
of inclusion of human rights clauses and the ongoing discussion of their format
632
 
corresponds to the GAL paradigm; though ultimately the impact of those discussions is 
limited.  
Unilateral instruments employed by the EU are of different nature. Their adoption underlies 
the EU internal system of checks and balances as well as that of external regimes. Yet, their 
use and enforcement is subject to procedures of administrative nature. Furthermore, they 
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are addressed to the global community according to the objective criteria. The GSP plus 
regulation and the European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy (EIHRD) offer 
examples for the above thesis.  
The GSP plus regulation provides a good example of the EU regulating granting of 
preferential treatment in accordance with the rules determined by the WTO. The regulation 
has been altered as the result of the decision of the WTO dispute resolution system forcing 
the EU to introduce objective criteria concerning states which can apply for the preferential 
treatment. In addition to the above, granting thereof is ruled by a detailed procedure 
providing for a quasi-appeal mechanism. The missing element in this puzzle is the presence 
of the participatory mechanism for third countries’ assessment as to whether the criteria of 
GSP plus are fulfilled. On the other hand, every third country may apply for the preferential 
treatment unlimited amount of times, forcing the European Commission to reconsider its 
decisions. 
The EIHRD, similarly to the GSP plus, is available for objectively determined actors who can 
claim funding from the European Union. Here, however, the regulation provides for a high 
flexibility of objectives of the funding and high independence (subject to the internal 
accountability mechanisms of the EU) of EU delegations as far as programming is concerned. 
This allows for the participation of local actors in determining the needs of particular 
countries inasmuch substantial scope of the EIHRD is concerned. Just as with any other 
financing instrument of the EU, also the EIHRD is ruled by detailed and transparent 
procedures. 
The above examples confirm that in specific contexts the EU does act as a global 
administrative body given that it fulfils specific criteria. Firstly, its activity must be directed 
outwardly – addressees of its actions must belong to an international community (though 
the circle of addressees can be limited by formal criteria). Secondly, the tools used must be 
of such character as to enable flexibility of action – also on the part of the EU; hence 
complying with the frequent ad hoc standard of actions. They obviously need to comply with 
other characteristics, yet from the perspective of the EU role this is the most important 
feature. Finally, the classification of the EU as a global administrative actor requires a specific 
substantial focus. Human rights provide an excellent example of a globally oriented policy 
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based on the claim of universality. Funding devoted to pursuit of human rights objectives 
worldwide could be even denoted as public good which the EU administers on its own 
accord but for the benefit of a global community.  
This conclusion brings us to the analysis of the importance of human rights as the substance 
of the external policy and global administrative actions. The fact that the EU in its external 
dealings invokes, albeit inconsistently, the international human rights instruments is very 
indicative of the space in which it is functioning. It is positioning itself in the middle of the 
well established institutional and legal sphere acting according to the rules that are present 
there.  
Little has been written about the relationship between GAL and international human rights 
law. It is clear that the two exist in symbiosis with the third democratic element as the 
classical triad of human rights, rule of law and democracy. Yet, though it is obvious that 
human rights law fills the gap in the system of principles of the GAL, it is unclear to what 
extent GAL is to work for the benefit of human rights movement. The first step towards 
explanation of this relationship lies in inclusion of human rights as one of the Global 
Administrative Law substantial areas; the missing one in the NYU’s GAL project list
633
. Even 
though it may seem like an obvious endeavour, it is not an easy one. Human rights in the 
period of their prevalence in the international legal sphere have benefited from a rather 
established core legal status that came along with the instruments that have been used for 
their attainment. International legal agreements, judicial enforcement, their universal and 
inalienable claim amount to a strong position of human rights in legal systems. Consequently 
not much attention has been devoted to other means of pursuing human rights enlightened 
objectives – tools that would be considered as positive administrative action. 
Final Remarks 
The above conducted analysis provides an illustration to a phenomenon that is not new, but 
for the past 15 years has been present at the core of academic discussion of the EU's 
contribution to the practice and theory of law in the era of globalisation. The object of the 
analysis - external human rights policy of the EU - seemed to be the most appropriate 
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substantive area to present how and why the framework of evaluation based on the 
traditionally conceived rule of law criteria no longer permits the full analysis of the policy 
instruments. Created and functioning at the intersection of international, international 
human rights, and the EU legal orders with the view of pursuing objectives which - in my 
view - entail obligation of best efforts rather than result, these instruments have undergone 
a long process of adaptation from the 1970s rigid international legalism to experimentalist 
governance of the present time.  
The present state of the art, as far as the instrument creation and application is concerned, 
differs from the governance v government paradigm represented in the first wave of new 
governance literature, for rather than working outside of law - in the context - it works 
within law's boundaries: the constitutive elements of governance structures have been 
unilaterally incorporated by the EU into the legal framework. If we perceive the policy 
framework as a whole and assume that either a multilateral frameworks or international 
agreements form the basis of interactions with third countries, regulations are executive 
measures taken by the institutions to enforce them subject to governance related conditions 
such as programming, evaluation, consultation etc. Importantly, the addressees of such 
measures are third countries, and members of civil societies. This puts the EU institutions in 
the position of administrators - if not of public goods, then at least administrators of 
possibility to address public goods related issues.  
The reference to the EU external human rights objectives as entailing best efforts is 
meaningful as it shifts the focus from efficiency of policy and measures it uses, to the 
adequacy of those measures from the point of view of the manner through which they are 
employed, and their procedural content. Here again new governance lens permits for a way 
more comprehensive analysis of the area - with all its virtues and vices. It opens also the way 
to the expanding of the analysis including such deeply EU law embedded principles as 
proportionality or subsidiarity which do matter in enforcement by the Commission of the 
instrumentarium of the EU external human rights policy (proportionality appears in the 
analysis of Commission's actions both by the Court and the Ombudsman). Given their 
administrative legal dimension, the need to examine GAL approach in more detail presents 
itself. This thread of research complements to an extent the recent writings on the decay of 
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consent in international legal sphere
634




With the results of the above study in mind, further avenues of research open up wherever 
the EU is to strive to fulfil its mandate in external realm and where the object of its strivings 
constitutes a globally recognised value. Starting off with the improvement of the theoretical 
framework which has been proposed here, we can test it on the basis of relations with 
specific countries, or other policy areas where, for the very nature of objectives which are 
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